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Introduction and summary 
  This collection of essays constitutes my PhD thesis, submitted to the Faculty of Social 
Sciences at the University of Copenhagen in January 2007. It consists of five chapters. 
They are self-contained and can be read independently, but they have in common their 
use of microeconometric methods to address the research questions identified. A large 
part of my PhD has been dedicated to the study of development issues in two rapidly 
developing countries, Vietnam (chapter 1) and Mozambique (chapters 2, 3 and 4). The 
first four chapters rely on analysis of household survey data. The last chapter is 
methodological using simulated micro data. As such, this chapter is not specific to any 
country, but the research was inspired when writing chapter 4. A summary of the 
content of each chapter is given below. 
  Chapter 1 on rural credit in four Vietnamese provinces is co-authored with Finn Tarp. 
As background for the written output in this chapter, a significant amount of field work 
and data collection in Vietnam was involved. Here I was active in the process of 
training enumerators, piloting the survey and cleaning the data, and the formulation of 
the questionnaire was accomplished when I joined the research team.  
  It is widely recognised that credit is important to small scale farmers in developing 
countries, and with the Nobel Peace price recently awarded jointly to the Grameen Bank 
and its founder Muhammad Yunus the issue has received renewed attention. In the 
Vietnamese context not much is known about the rural credit market. This chapter 
attempts to expand this knowledge. The first part of the chapter is a descriptive analysis 
of credit conditions faced by rural households in Vietnam. The data set allows us to 
look at the development of the rural credit market from 1997 to 2002. This was a period 
of rapid economic growth in Vietnam and this is reflected in the credit market. First, 
loan volumes grew substantially as a result of an increase in the average loan size and 
the number of households obtaining a loan. Second, the composition of the rural credit 
market in terms of credit sources also changed during the period under consideration. 
On the one hand, the loan volume share obtained from informal (unregulated) sources 
(friends, private money lenders etc.) fell by 30 percent (from 24 to 17 percent of the 
total loan volume). On the other hand, the analysis also shows that around one third of 
all loans continue to originate from informal credit sources. This is likely to be a 
consequence of formal credit sources supplying loans almost entirely for production 
purposes, whereas informal loans are often used for health expenditures and 
consumption smoothing. Throughout the period under study, regional differences are 
apparent in all aspects of the rural credit market. In the South, most rural households 
participate in the credit market. In contrast, in the mountainous central part of the 
country little activity is going on in the credit market. 
  The second part of chapter 1 investigates the household level determinants of credit 
demand and credit rationing in 2002. We find that demand from formal versus informal 
sources is distinct, and that regional differences persist even when controlling for a 
range of household level covariates. With respect to credit rationing information on 
formal and informal segments were pooled due to the moderate sample size. The 
probability of being rationed in access to credit depends negatively on education and 
connections, positively on a bad credit history and, again, on the province in which the 
household is located. Encouragingly, no evidence of gender discrimination seems to be 
present in the data. 
  Chapter 2 is co-authored with John Rand, Finn Tarp and Jacinto Chiconela and 
contains an analysis of the risk of being victimized in Mozambique. A nationally 
representative household survey (known as the IAF2003) with a unique module 
including questions on individual victimization and the economic loss from being 
victimized allows us to analyse the effects of individual, household and enumeration 
area level determinants on the risk of being victimized. In addition, we investigate the 
relationship between relative monetary loss (loss over a consumption measure) and 
income. Combining the IAF2003 survey with additional information from the 1997 
Mozambican census data further expanded the scope of the analysis. The key 
characteristic of the chapter is that we are able to control for two sets of explanatory 
variables. A first set of variables coming from the economic literature focuses on 
offender motives, while a second set from sociological studies focuses to a larger extent 
on the characteristics of the victim. This integrated approach turns out to be beneficial. 
Variables associated primarily with the sociological strand of the literature are 
significant. We find that the risk of being victimized is increasing in income but at a 
diminishing rate, and district level inequality increases the overall risk of being the 
victim of a crime. While poorer individuals are less at risk of being victimized they tend 
to suffer a bigger loss relative to their consumption level. An extensive robustness 
analysis of the results is provided in addition to a range of policy recommendations. A 
revised version of the paper is forthcoming in World Development. 
  Chapter 3 is concerned with one of the many unfortunate aspects of the AIDS 
pandemic in Africa – orphaned children. Together with co-authors Channing Arndt, 
Virgulino Nhate and Katleen Van den Broeck, I study whether children living in 
Mozambican households with a head, who is not their biological parent, are being 
discriminated. The background is a recent increase in the number of young orphans and 
projections based on HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. They show a continuous increase in 
the years to come. It is therefore of relevance to explore the existence of discriminatory 
effects of the current official policy of trying to integrate orphans in extended families. 
To analyse differences in intra household allocation of resources, both Deaton’s indirect 
‘adult good’ method and the direct Engel curve method studying purchases of children’s 
clothing and educational expenditure are employed. Both methods have been used 
extensively in the literature to study boy/girl discrimination, but our study is – to the 
best of the authors’ knowledge – the first time it has been applied to an orphan/non-
orphan setting. While we find no evidence of discrimination in the full sample, the 
‘adult good’ method shows evidence of discrimination against orphans in the sample of 
poor households. Similarly, purchases of children’s clothing indicate discrimination in 
the rural sub-sample. When interpreting the results, it should be kept in mind that both 
the direct and the indirect method often fail to show significant (boy/girl) discrimination 
where it is known from individual data records to exist. Thus, any significant 
discrimination showing up should be cause for concern. In sum, we conclude that there 
is weak evidence of discrimination of orphans in Mozambique, at least for sub-samples 
of the national representative data set (IAF2003). A revised version of this paper has 
appeared in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics (Vol. 88, 2006). 
  In chapter 4, a detailed censored food demand system is estimated using Mozambican 
household survey data (IAF2003). Estimating censored demand systems poses two 
related challenges: formulation of an econometric model that takes censoring of the 
expenditure shares into account and estimation of the chosen model. I address the 
problem of censoring by formulating the model as a system of Tobit equations with 
correlated errors. This large system of equations is then estimated with a recently 
suggested Quasi Maximum Likelihood (QML) estimator, and an appendix documents 
the Stata command specifically written for this research activity. The deterministic 
demand functions are derived from a translog indirect utility function, which is 
augmented with demographic and household location variables, so as to facilitate 
demographic and location specific parameters and elasticities. The contribution of the 
paper is twofold. First, it provides the first set of estimates on Mozambican data of 
income and cross-price elasticities for the most important food groups. Second, a 
method is developed to test for significant differences in elasticities among household 
locations. Significant differences are found among the central, southern and northern 
parts of Mozambique for both income and own price elasticities. The findings serve as 
an input into the continuing process of constructing a regional CGE model for 
Mozambique. 
  Chapter 5 contains a Monte Carlo comparison of the performance of three estimators 
to estimate systems of Tobit models, which are often used in censored demand system 
contexts. The study was motivated by the application of this type of model to 
Mozambican data in chapter 4. The Quasi Maximum Likelihood (QML) estimator 
employed in chapter 4 is based on maximizing a sequence of bivariate Tobit models. 
This approach circumvents the need to evaluate higher dimensional integrals over the 
multivariate normal distribution necessary with the full information maximum 
likelihood estimator (FIML). Thus, the FIML estimator relies on methods to simulate 
the higher dimensional integrals. While the FIML estimator is more efficient, there are 
two main drawbacks in applying it. It is programming and computational intensive and 
it is difficult to achieve convergence from arbitrary starting values. Hence, it is of value 
to search for well performing simpler estimators. In addition to comparing these two 
estimators, I introduce another – simpler – QML (sQML) estimator based on the 
maximization of a sequence of univariate Tobit models. Both the QML and sQML 
estimators show good performance relative to the more cumbersome FIML estimator 
for empirical relevant error correlation structures. This is so although their performance 
deteriorates with large (in absolute value) error correlation coefficients. The study lends 
support to the use of both QML estimators in censored demand system applications, and 
the principle should be applicable to more general systems of censored equations. 
 
Although different in scope each of the five chapters of this PhD dissertation were 
developed to contribute to the analysis of a set of policy relevant and methodological 
issues in the context of two interesting countries, Mozambique and Vietnam. It is my 
hope that the reader will agree that my Ph.D. thesis provides further insights into the 
covered areas of development economics. 
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Abstract 
 
  This paper uses a survey of 932 rural households to uncover how the rural 
credit market operates in four provinces of Vietnam. Households obtain 
credit through formal and informal lenders. Formal loans are almost entirely 
for production and asset accumulation, while informal loans are used for 
consumption smoothening. Interest rates fell from 1997 to 2002, reflecting 
increased market integration. Moreover, the determinants of formal and 
informal credit demand are distinct. While credit rationing depends on 
education and credit history, in particular, regional differences in the 
demand for credit are striking. A ‘one size fits all’ approach to credit policy 
in Vietnam would be inappropriate.  
 
JEL classification: O12, O16, O17, O18 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Vietnam has come a long way since the doi moi reform process was initiated in 1986, 
and the past 15 years have witnessed one of the best performances in the world in terms 
of both economic growth and poverty reduction. People’s living standards have 
improved significantly, and the country’s socio-economic achievements are impressive. 
Wide-ranging institutional reforms have been introduced, including greater reliance on 
market forces in the allocation of resources and the determination of prices. A shift can 
also be noted from an economy dominated by the state and co-operative sectors to a 
situation where the private sector and foreign investment account for a relatively high 
proportion of GDP. Important strides have been made over a relatively short time span 
to further the transition from a centrally planned to a socialist market economy. Finally, 
while the ratio of credit to GDP is almost twice as high in Thailand and three times as 
high in China and Malaysia (see World Bank, 2005), the financial deepening of the 
Vietnamese economy that has taken place during the past decade is remarkable.  
 
Nevertheless, Vietnam remains a poor country. Some 70 percent of the population 
continues to live in rural areas, and they depend on agriculture for their livelihood. How 
the country can transform itself and its agricultural sector to a more modern society 
remains a critical policy challenge. Access to credit for smallholders is as elsewhere a 
key ingredient in the promotion of agricultural production and transformation. It forms 
an essential element of any poverty oriented strategy for the future development of the 
financial system.1 Access to credit affects as aptly demonstrated by Diagne, Zeller and 
Sharma (2000) household welfare through at least two key channels. First, it alleviates 
capital constraints on agricultural households. This can significantly improve the ability 
of poor households to procure needed agricultural inputs, and will also reduce the 
opportunity costs of capital-intensive assets, encouraging labour-saving technology and 
raising labour productivity. The second channel identified by Diagne et al. is that credit 
access increases the risk-bearing capacity of households, altering risk-coping strategies. 
Households with access to credit may be more willing to pursue promising but risky 
technologies, and will be better able to avoid adopting risk-reducing but inefficient 
livelihood strategies.  
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 The above kinds of considerations have as elsewhere in the developing countries led the 
Vietnamese Government and its donor community to set up credit programmes aimed at 
expanding rural households’ access to credit; and significant expansion is foreseen in 
the coming years (see World Bank, 2003). The reliance on informal credit continues, 
however, to be widespread. Formal and informal credit market segments are present in 
Vietnam much along the lines of the dual credit market described by for example 
Mohieldin and Wright (2000). They cite Hoff and Stiglitz (1993), and point out – with 
reference to Egypt – that there are two competing views as to why formal and informal 
credit markets co-exist. First, government may intervene, capping interest rates, and this 
remains the case in Vietnam. The alternative view that differences in the cost of 
screening, monitoring and contract enforcement across lenders lead to fragmentation 
appears, however, also to carry explanatory power. Similarly, the interaction between 
the formal and informal credit market segments is open to conflicting interpretations. 
This is evident in the theoretical papers by for example Gupta and Chaudhuri (1997) 
and Chaudhuri (2001), on the one hand, and the careful empirical work by Zeller 
(1994), Diagne (1999) and Diagne, Zeller and Sharma (2000) on Madagascar, Malawi 
and Bangladesh, on the other. Diagne and co-authors highlight that understanding how 
informal institutions serve the financial needs of households and interact with the 
formal credit institutions is important, especially for ‘sustainable and market-oriented 
financial institutions that plan to expand and complement the services offered by the 
existing informal credit market rather than substitute for them’. Diagne, Zeller and 
Sharma also offer a concise methodological review, which together with papers by 
Kochar (1997) and Petrick (2005) provide general analytical background for the present 
work on Vietnam. Kochar points out in the context of India that the literature on rural 
credit has generally assumed that households are rationed in their access to subsidized 
‘formal’ credit; but she adds that the validity of this assumption hinges on the level of 
effective demand for formal credit, which is in turn a function of the demand for credit 
and its availability from ‘informal’ sources. This implies that the extent of credit market 
rationing may be smaller than regularly assumed. We take these cautioning findings 
serious and rely on them in our attempt to get credit demand right in our study of formal 
and informal rural credit in Vietnam. 
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 In any case, a key motivation for our paper is that very little is actually known about the 
rural credit market in Vietnam, including both its degree of efficiency and the extent to 
which credit rationing impedes agricultural development. Appropriate development of 
market institutions based on well informed policies is a key prerequisite for success in 
Vietnam’s ongoing transformation from a command-type to a more market based 
economy. Generating policy relevant insights into the characteristics and functioning of 
the rural credit market are on this background well justified. It is in this context helpful 
that the general academic literature on rural credit markets and their importance in 
developing countries (including the analysis of determinants of credit demand and the 
characteristics of credit constrained households) has seen a welcome expansion during 
the last 15 years. This has followed Japelli (1990) and Feder et al. (1990).2 They relied 
on respectively household survey data from the US and China, and this methodological 
approach has subsequently been put to good use in most of the papers cited above. Our 
study is situated within this literature, and it relies on the methodological approach, 
which Diagne, Zeller and Sharma (2000) refer to as the ‘direct method’. Accordingly, 
our household survey data allow us to establish whether households are credit 
constrained or not. They do not permit an analysis where the extent to which a 
household is credit constrained is in focus, even if we agree this would be desirable.  
 
In sum, in this paper we provide a detailed review and an in-depth econometric analysis 
of how the rural credit market operates in four provinces of Vietnam, with a focus on 
basic characteristics and differences between the formal and informal credit markets.3 
We use a new survey of 932 households designed to elicit the full credit history of 
households during 1997 to 2002. These data are combined with information from the 
2002 Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) in the econometric 
analysis, where the determinants of credit demand and credit rationing are identified 
more rigorously. We are in this process able to account carefully for possible self 
selection.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. After describing the data in Section 2, we provide in 
Section 3 a detailed descriptive overview of the characteristics of the rural credit market 
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with a focus on the division between formal and informal credit. The data set has a time 
dimension, so trends during the 1997-2002 years can be spelled out, including 
developments in overall interest rates. In Section 4, we apply the econometric 
framework to identify the determinants of credit demand, and proceed to analyse in 
Section 5 household characteristics, which potentially influence the probability of being 
credit rationed. Some key policy measures to further the allocation of rural credit in 
Vietnam and develop the credit market overall are discussed in the concluding Section 
6.  
 
2. DATA 
 
Key data used in this paper (including in particular information on the demand for 
credit) were generated in a comprehensive household survey of land, labour and credit 
markets in the provinces of Long An, Quang Nam, Ha Tay and Phu Tho. The survey, 
also known as the ILSSA Access to Resources Survey,4 was carried out in the first 
quarter of 2003 in collaboration among the Institute of Labour Science and Social 
Affairs (ILSSA), Mekong Economics, the University of Copenhagen and the Stockholm 
School of Economics (see Mekong Economics, 2004). A total of 932 rural households 
were surveyed. These households are identical to the rural households previously 
interviewed in quarter 1 and 2 in the rural areas of the four provinces under study here 
as part of the nationally representative 2002 Vietnam Household Living Standard 
Survey (VHLSS).5 In the VHLSS 2002, data were collected on income, expenditure and 
various other background variables. This largely pre-determined information is used in 
this paper in combination with our own data, collected about a year later to construct 
explanatory variables.6
 
The four provinces studied are located in four different regions of Vietnam as follows: 
(i) Long An in the fertile Mekong Delta, which is also the most densely populated of the 
four provinces; (ii) Quang Nam in the sparsely populated Central Highlands; (iii) Phu 
Tho in the North Western (Highlands), a mountainous region with a high share of ethnic 
minorities, and (iv) Ha Tay in the Red River Delta surrounding Hanoi, the Capital of 
Vietnam. The ILSSA survey is not nationally representative, but it is representative for 
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rural households in the four provinces under study. They cover a lot of the variation in 
geographical and socio-economic conditions present in Vietnam, including regional 
differences between the north, centre and south of the country. 
 
The ILSSA survey covered a large variety of topics related to land, labour and credit. In 
this paper, we rely on the credit component, including a number of illuminating 
questions on the source and use of loans, designed to elicit the full credit history of 
households during the recent past.7 The general purpose of this part of the questionnaire 
was to help clarify the functioning of rural credit markets in Vietnam and to assess the 
extent to which credit rationing constrains agricultural development.8 Questions 
covered issues such as (i) number of loans applied for and actually received, including 
information on amounts involved, interest, period and source of the credit, (ii) whether 
the household had at some point wanted to apply for a loan, but refrained from doing so, 
and (iii) various other relevant background such as the use of the loan, collateral 
requirements etc. 
 
3. THE RURAL CREDIT MARKET 
 
Due to the design of the questionnaire the credit history of each household in the sample 
can be followed. Table 1 shows the distribution of households by the number of loans 
obtained. 
 
Table 1. Households distributed by number of loans obtained, 1997-2002 
Number of loans Frequency By province (percent) 
  Ha Tay Phu Tho Quang Nam Long An 
0 289 29 18 53 23 
1 211 19 25 40 7 
2 149 22 24 4 12 
3 112 17 17 1 11 
4 52 6 8 1 6 
5 119 7 8 1 40 
Total 932 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003. 
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Over the period from the beginning of 1997 to 2002, a total of 289 households did not 
obtain any credit at all. However, 69 percent of the sample (643 households) obtained at 
least one loan, and around 46 percent (432) obtained more than one loan. Table 1 also 
reveals that there are differences among the four provinces. In Quang Nam less than 50 
percent of the households obtained a loan, whereas 71 percent secured at least one loan 
in Ha Tay. In Phu Tho and Long An around 80 percent of the households participated in 
the credit market. If we focus on households with more than one loan, Ha Tay and Phu 
Tho are quite similar with more that 50 percent having more than one loan. In Quang 
Nam only 7 percent of the households obtained more than one loan in contrast to Long 
An where the corresponding share is more than two thirds.  
 
Of the 289 households, who did not participate in the credit market during the period 
under study, only 12 got a loan application rejected, and another 65 reported having at 
some point refrained from applying even though they wanted credit. Thus, many of the 
289 households can be seen as not effectively demanding credit. In sum, the overall 
picture emerging from Table 1 is that an active rural credit market exists in Vietnam and 
that regional differences are sizeable. 
 
(a) General trends  
 
The supply side of the rural credit market in Vietnam includes a number of formal and 
informal lending institutions. The Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (VBARD) is the biggest formal lender, and the much smaller Vietnam 
Bank for the Poor (VBP) is associated with VBARD.9 VBP specialises in lending to 
poorer households. The credit market in many developing countries is characterised by 
segmentation in formal and informal sectors (see for example Zeller, 1994 and Yadav et 
al., 1992). Table 2 shows the distribution of loans by source of credit in terms of both 
percentages of all loans and percentages of all loans weighted with loan size. As 
revealed in Table 2, there is a sizeable informal credit sector in Vietnam. The informal 
sector consists of private money lenders, friends and relatives,10 responsible for 35 
percent of all loans in 2002.  
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 In terms of loan amounts, the importance of the informal sector declined from 21 
percent in 1999 to 17 percent in 2002, but measured by the actual number of loans the 
relative importance of the informal sector actually increased slightly. The figures in 
Table 2 compare well with previous work on credit markets in Vietnam. Duong and 
Izumida (2002), using data from a small household survey undertaken in 1995, found 
that the informal sector accounted for 17 percent of all loans. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of loans by source (percent)a
 1999 2002 
 Unweighted Weighted by 
loan amount 
Unweighted Weighted by  
loan amount 
VBP 11 5 5 2 
VBARD 44 64 38 56 
Private lenders 8 6 11 4 
Relatives 23 15 24 13 
Union 9 3 12 7 
Others 5 7 10 18 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003. 
Note: ‘Unweighted’ refers to the simple distribution of the number of loans. ‘Weighted by 
loan amount’ indicates the distribution of loans where each loan is weighted with loan size. 
a VBP (Vietnam Bank for the Poor, now Vietnam Bank for Social Policies, VBSP), VBARD 
(Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development), Private Lenders (Private moneylenders and 
traders, and friends charging interest), Relatives (relatives and friends charging zero interest), 
Union (Farmers’/Veterans’/Women’s Unions and People’s Credit Funds), Other (Other 
institutions not mentioned above – see Appendix A) 
 
‘Others’ include private banks, which have expanded rapidly in the south of Vietnam in 
recent years, and the sector composition of the rural credit market differs markedly 
among provinces. In Long An the formal sector provided 96 percent of the total loan 
amount in 2002 whereas only 64 percent came from the formal sector in Phu Tho, as 
further discussed in Section 3.3. 
 
In what follows, we divide the rural credit market into three different segments, one 
formal and two informal. The formal segment includes all formal institutions,11 while 
the informal sector consists of (i) private lending by unrelated individuals and friends 
charging interest, and (ii) lending from families, relatives and friends carrying zero 
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interest. These two segments will be referred to as ‘private’ and ‘family’ in what 
follows. The distinction between friends, who lend and charge interest, and friends, who 
lend charging zero interest, may seem arbitrary. However, the data reveal a marked 
discontinuity at zero interest. Friends, who lend and charge interest, charge on average 
only slightly less than private money lenders (not characterised as friends).  
 
To illustrate developments in the rural credit market in the late 1990s and early years of 
the new millennium, Table 3 shows the number of loans, the average loan size (in 
nominal terms) and the average monthly interest rate for the three different segments, 
year by year. To judge the magnitude of real interest rates the average monthly 
consumer price inflation for each year is also shown. The nominal overall volume of 
credit expanded rapidly by a factor of 2.6 in the years from 1999 to 2002. During this 
period Vietnam experienced an average annual consumer price inflation rate of around 
1.5 percent, so the credit volume in real terms grew at about 6 percent less than the 
nominal growth. 
 
Looking at the number of loans disbursed in the period, relatives and the informal sector 
increased their share from 29 to 36 percent, but in terms of loan amounts formal sector 
lending increased significantly. Formal credit accounted for 76 percent of total rural 
credit in 1997. By 2002 this share was 83 percent. The remaining 17 percent was 
divided almost equally between informal loans and loans from relatives. 
 
The trend described above is mirrored in the development of loan sizes in the three 
segments. While loan size increased steadily in the formal sector, it remained almost 
constant for friends and relatives and decreased substantially in the interest bearing part 
of the informal sector. 
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Table 3. Rural credit, 1997-2002 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Formal       
Loan size (’000 Dong)
 a
5,191 4,657 4,583 5,360 6,400 8,426 
Interest (percent per month) 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Number of loans 70 130 168 223 279 250 
Informal – interest       
Loan size (’000 Dong) 3,222 7,686 3,196 3,206 2,468 3,904 
Interest (percent per month) 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.0 3.0 1.8 
Number of loans 9 18 24 31 47 55 
Relative – zero interest       
Loan size (’000 Dong) 4,175 2,107 2,375 2,522 3,558 2,602 
Interest (percent per month) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of loans 20 29 51 69 76 84 
Total       
Loan size (’000 Dong) 4,807 4,548 3,983 4,547 5,403 6,529 
Interest (percent per month) 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 
Number of loans 99 177 243 323 402 389 
Consumer price inflation   
Monthly consumer price inflation (pct.) 0.26 0.62 0.34 -0.13 -0.03 0.33 
Distribution by source, unweighted ( percent) 
Formal  71 73 69 69 69 64 
Informal 9 10 10 10 12 14 
Relative 20 16 21 21 19 22 
Distribution by source, weighted by loan size ( percent) 
Formal  76 75 80 81 82 83 
Informal 6 17 8 7 5 8 
Relative 18 8 13 12 12 9 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003 and IMF, World Economic 
Outlook Database, September 2006. 
Note: ‘unweighted’ and ‘weighted by loans size’ as defined in Table 2. 
a
 At the time of the survey in January 2003 the exchange rate was around 14,000 VND per USD.  
 
 
Table 3 also allows us to investigate the development in loan terms. One striking feature 
is that overall interest rates have fallen – and more so for informal sector loans. The 
trend for real interest rates is less clear due to fluctuating inflation over the period. 
However, real interest rates in the formal sector for 2002 are in the low end for the 
period, and for the informal interest bearing segment there has been steady decline. The 
interest rate gap between the formal and informal sector was around 0.9 percentage 
point (per month) in 2002. The relatively large fall in the interest rate in the informal 
sector (for interest bearing loans) is clearly related to the general increase in rural 
incomes, which made borrowing less risky. This has tended to push interest rates down, 
and the same goes for the increase in formal credit possibilities during the period. 
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Another factor behind the interest rate fall is that monopoly rents obtained by private 
moneylenders are likely to have fallen in line with increased market integration. 
Increased access to collateral (in the form of red books, which are land tenure 
certificates issued by local authorities) have squeezed profit margins and the degree of 
risk associated with the portfolios of informal lenders.  
 
Table 3 confirms that the combined informal sector is important in Vietnam with 36 per 
cent of the total number of loans in 2002. The interest bearing segment made up 14 
percentage points hereof and about half in value terms. This suggests that poor rural 
households in Vietnam continue to rely on networks and relatives when they try to deal 
with shocks and face hard times. This is in line with what is generally found in the 
literature on rural households in developing countries, see Platteau (1997). 
 
Looking at the changes in the structure of the credit market it is of interest to relate 
these to potential changes in the use of approved loans. Table 4 shows that such changes 
were limited in the sample.12 It is highlighted that to increase the probability that the 
correct use of each loan was elicited, we asked both about the stated purpose in the loan 
application and about what the loan was actually used for.13 Combining answers to 
these two questions suggests that loans were generally used as stated in the applications. 
In all years differences were identified in less than 5 percent of the loans, and these 
differences are not systematic in any way. However, even if loans are generally used for 
the purpose applied for, fungibility in the form of substitution and diversion – using the 
terminology of Von Pischke and Adams (1980) – can still be present. Substitution 
occurs when a household obtains a loan for a project or part of a project the household 
would still have undertaken in the absence of the loan. Diversion of a (small) part of the 
loan to other purposes can happen even if the main share of the loan is still used for the 
purpose stated in the application. Table 4 mainly indicates that changes in the structure 
of the credit market are not driven by changes in loan composition in terms of use of 
loans.  
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Table 4. Loan use (percent of total loans each year), 1997-2002 
Year Production 
Repayment of 
existing loan Asset accumulation Health 
General 
consumption 
1997 69 3 18 9 2 
1998 70 2 11 3 15 
1999 74 2 14 4 6 
2000 73 3 11 4 9 
2001 71 3 12 6 9 
2002 68 4 12 6 11 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003. 
 
 (b) Land and credit market interaction 
 
Credit is obtained for many reasons, such as consumption smoothening and investment. 
Investment in land (including in particular land transactions) is critically important for 
the development of a market based economy and for the efficiency of the economy in 
general. It is therefore of interest to uncover any interactions between the credit and 
land markets. The credit and land sections of the ILSSA questionnaire were on this 
background designed to capture such relationships through a variety of questions; and it 
is apparent from the data that land (especially with a red book) is widely used as 
collateral in Vietnam.  
 
In Long An province no less than 99 percent of the total number of loans involved 
collateral in the form of land with a red book. In Ha Tay, Phu Tho and Quang Nam the 
corresponding shares were 31, 77 and 63 percent. Thus, land plays not only a significant 
– but a fundamental – role in determining the operation of the credit market, including 
who gets access to credit. The opposite statement cannot be made. There is almost no 
credit-based land acquisition reflected in the data as would be the case in a more 
developed market economy. Only six loans were granted for buying land during the 
period studied. This appears credible, partly since there is no evidence in the data that 
the use of loans was misstated, and partly because of the still underdeveloped nature of 
land ownership and land transactions in Vietnam.  
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(c) Rural credit in 2002 
 
In this section we look in more detail at loans obtained in 2002. It is the most recent 
year from which data are available, and they provide the best up-to-date picture of the 
rural credit market in Vietnam. Table 5 illustrates some subtle differences between 
loans obtained in the different segments of the loan market. Arguably, the definition of 
the formal segment is broad (see the list of institutions in Appendix A). Nevertheless, 
the differences are illuminating. 
 
Table 5. Characteristics of loans obtained, 2002 
  Informal segment 
 Formal segment Private lenders Friends (zero 
interest) 
Number of loans 250 55 84 
Loan amount (Dong) 8,426 3,904 2,602 
Duration (average number of 
months) 15 (N=248) 9 (N=24) 4 (N=11) 
 – Unspecified duration 
(percent) 1 56 87 
Interest (percent per month) 0.87 1.78 0 
Collateral (percent of loans) 71 0 0 
Partial default a (percent) 8 11 1 
Provinces: Pct. Pct. Pct. 
 – Ha Tay (percent) (N=126) 52 14 35 
 – Phu Tho (percent) (N=106) 50 21 29 
 – Quang Nam (percent) 
(N=24) 77 8 15 
 – Long An (percent) (N=118) 88 10 2 
Distribution of loans by source and province (weighted by loan size) 
 
VBP VBARD 
Private 
lenders Relatives Union Others 
 – Ha Tay (percent) (N=126) 3 32 6 22 14 22 
 – Phu Tho (percent) (N=106) 4 42 10 27 7 12 
 – Quang Nam (percent) 
(N=24) 4 73 2 6 3 11 
 – Long An (percent) (N=118) 1 76 2 3 1 18 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003. 
a Partial default is the default rate measured as the percentage of loans where households have defaulted. 
 
The differences in terms of volume and loan size were already evident from Table 3. 
Loans from the formal sector have an average duration of 15 months. The duration is 
shorter in the interest carrying informal sector, but with an average of nine months, it is 
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clear that this segment of the loan market is not only used for short term purposes. 
Borrowing from friends and relatives at zero interest is either for a short period or no 
specific duration is agreed for the loan. A total of 87 percent of the loans among friends 
have no formal length specified, suggesting that this kind of loan typically involves 
lending among family members or close friends. Around half (56 percent) of the interest 
carrying informal loans from private lenders also have no duration specified. This 
suggests that some households may be at risk of not generating enough income to enter 
into specified agreements, including regularly scheduled payments. Studying this group 
in greater detail would be highly policy relevant from a vulnerability point of view, but 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
The default rate is the percentage of loans in each segment where households have 
defaulted, including non-payment of interest or repayment of the principal. The 
magnitude of the figures is hard to assess. One reason is that the principal is paid in full 
at the end of the loan term for most formal loans, so only interest payments are made 
regularly. Paying both interest and principal at the end of the agreed loan period is also 
quite common. Thus, an eight percent default rate within a period of one year (as shown 
in Table 5) is substantial if this involves non-payment of interest only. On the other 
hand, it is not clear from the data whether this payment came forward sometime later or 
whether the household simply stopped paying instalments on the loan. 
 
Collateral is used for 70 percent of all formal loans whereas no collateral is needed in 
the informal sector. Land with red book is used as collateral in the majority of the loans. 
House and land without red book are also used, but to a lower degree, and there are as 
already alluded to significant regional differences in the use of collateral.  
 
Table 5 confirms that Ha Tay and Phu Tho both have about 50 percent of the loans in 
the formal segment, whereas Long An and Quang Nam have much higher shares for this 
sector. In Long An almost 90 percent of the loans originate in the formal sector. This 
corresponds well with the perception that southern Vietnam (where Long An is situated) 
is relatively more ‘market-based’ than other regions of the country. Similarly, although 
households in Quang Nam obtain close to 80 percent of their loans in the formal sector, 
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it is clear that very few households obtain any credit at all, reflecting the very 
underdeveloped nature of the economy of this province. The bottom of Table 5 provides 
information on the distribution of loans by different sources. The main difference is 
between Quang Nam and Long An, on the one hand, and Ha Tay and Phu Tho, on the 
other. 
 
The above differences suggest that different segments in the loan market serve different 
needs. In Table 6 this is further explored by tabulating the use of loans in the three 
credit segments. The formal sector focuses almost entirely on demand for production 
loans and asset accumulation.14 A higher share of loans from the informal sector is 
directed towards health expenditure and consumption. These loans are likely to be due 
to household shocks or unforeseen events. They carry a higher interest rate than those 
obtained in the formal sector, showing that households rely on loans from the informal 
sector to cope with shocks and unforeseen events due to lower transaction costs and 
more flexible terms of lending. It is also worth noting that more than 50 percent of the 
interest bearing loans from the informal sector is for production purposes, 
demonstrating the importance of this loan segment for the growth process of Vietnam.  
 
Table 6. Use of loan by credit source (percent), 2002 
  Informal segment  
Use of loan: 
Formal 
segment 
(N = 250) 
Private lenders 
(N = 55) 
Relatives 
(zero interest) 
(N = 84) 
Total 
Production 81 55 36 68 
Repayment of other loans 4 9 1 4 
Asset accumulation 9 5 23 12 
Health expenditure  3 11 12 6 
Consumption 3 20 29 11 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003. 
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4. DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT DEMAND 
 
Basic characteristics and differences between the formal and informal credit markets 
were in focus above. In this section, an econometric framework is applied to identify 
more rigorously the level and determinants of credit demand at the household level. We 
restrict ourselves to credit demand in 2002 since this is the most recent year for which 
data are available and as such provide the most up-to-date picture of credit demand in 
Vietnam. Moreover, focusing on 2002 allows us to consider the explanatory variables 
relied on in this section as pre-determined as further discussed below. 
 
In a setup where only matched (i.e. approved) loan applications are observable, the 
analyst cannot hope to identify correctly the characteristics affecting real credit demand 
at the household level. However, even with knowledge about rejected loan applications, 
identification of ‘self constrained’ households is normally complex and challenging. We 
are fortunate in the present paper that we have the information required to address these 
identification problems. Consequently, we are able to categorize households as 
demanding credit if they (i) obtained a loan, (ii) had a loan rejected or (iii) did not apply 
even if they wanted credit.  
 
The underlying structural framework for analysing credit demand is a household 
production model with utility maximizing households, who demand credit (demand = 1) 
if a loan is expected to increase utility, and they do not demand credit (demand = 0) in 
the opposite case. If a household demands credit the size of the loan applied for is 
determined by variables related to the optimal investment if the loan is for investment 
purposes or the optimal consumption loan if the loan is for consumption. This 
framework leads to a hurdle model where demand for credit is first characterized by a 
probit model. Thus,  
 
(( 1) ( , ,i c pP demand h H X D= = Φ ))     (1) 
where h is a linear function of the vectors of explanatory variables:  is a vector of 
household characteristics, 
iH
cX captures village characteristics and  represents pD
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province dummies. The expected value of the amount of credit demanded given the 
household demands credit is described by a lognormal model such that: 
 
{ } ( )2log( ) 1, ( , , ) ~ ( , , ),i c p i c ploanamount demand g H X D N g H X D σ=  (2) 
The function is a linear form of the same explanatory variables as in the 
probit model for whether or not to demand credit. The parameters in this stage can be 
estimated by OLS
( , ,i c pg H X D )
15. From the demand equation (1) and the level equation (2), the 
expected level of credit demand conditional on explanatory variables is given by: 
  
( ) ( ) ( ) 2) , , , , exp , , / 2i c p i c p i c pE loanamount H X D h H X D g H X D σ⎡ ⎤ ⎡= Φ + ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (3) 
 
At the household level human capital controls include age and education of the 
household head, a proxy for the information level (a dummy capturing whether the 
newspaper ‘People’ is read or not), and productive assets. These are total land holdings, 
number of adults as a proxy for labour power, and feed expenditure as a proxy for the 
size of livestock holdings. We also control for the value of total household assets and 
the need for obtaining credit by including the number of dependents. Furthermore, a 
proxy is included to capture shocks at the household level in the form of a dummy 
showing whether a household member was hospitalized within the last 12 months. The 
gender of the household head is also included, and we control for ‘connectedness’ 
through the use of a dummy, indicating whether anyone in the household has 
acquaintances in the existing credit institutions. Credit history is controlled for through 
the variable ‘not paid’ capturing whether a household has defaulted, i.e. not made a 
repayment on a loan in full or in part on a loan obtained prior to 2001. Finally, we take 
account of the influence of security of land tenure by including the share of household 
land area for which a red book is in hand.  
 
Village level information includes distance to the district centre where VBARD/VBP 
has an office, and four province dummies capture whether households live in Ha Tay, 
Phu Tho, Quang Nam or Long An. 
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In the present analysis data for the following explanatory variables originate from the 
VHLSS 2002: age, gender, education, adults, dependents, animal feed, total assets, 
distance, information, and hospitalization. These data were collected about one year 
before the ILSSA survey. They therefore precede our information on credit demand in 
2002 by about one year. This allows us to treat these data as pre-determined. In addition 
to the provincial dummies, data for the remaining explanatory variables, i.e. total land, 
connections, credit history and share of land covered by a red book, come from the 
ILSSA survey. Since land ownership was collected with a time dimension we can use 
the amount of land owned in 2001, which is exogenous to credit demand in 2002. 
Connectedness is measured by a dummy variable constructed based on responses to 
whether anyone in the sampled households has close personal contacts in the existing 
credit institutions that go beyond a standard customer relationship.  
 
Two sets of summary statistics are given in Table 7. The first two columns show for 
each variable the number of observations for which data is available in the total sample 
of 932 households used in Section 3. However, information is missing on distance and 
total assets for respectively 40 and 15 households (with no overlap). In addition, two 
households had no land in 2001. Accordingly, the last five columns provide summary 
statistics for the 875 households used in the empirical analysis, and they will be referred 
to as the full sample in what follows.16
 
It is clear from Table 7 that the reduction in sample size due to missing observations is 
not important. Means change very little. The age of the household head ranges from 22 
to 93 years, and some 20 percent of households are female headed. In addition, the 
education variable confirms that household heads have on average more than six years 
of schooling. Other observations include that while the average land area is small (i.e. 
around two thirds of a hectare) there are indeed a few households with large 
landholdings and substantial assets in the form of livestock. Moreover, 19 percent of all 
households in the full sample had at least one member in hospital during 2002, and 21 
percent of households read the newspaper ‘People’. Finally, some 8 percent of 
households have defaulted on a loan, and 79 percent of the total household land area 
was registered with a red book. 
 18
 
Table 7. Demand for credit: summary statistics, 2002a
 Nb Mean Nc Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
        
Demand for credit 932 0.34 875 0.367 0.48 0 1 
Age  932 47.74 875 47.61 14.31 22 93 
Total land (1,000 m2)  932 6.33 875 6.49 15.44 0.02 177 
Total land squared 932 265.5 875 280.2 1874.4 0.00 31,152 
Gender (male=1) 932 0.80 875 0.81 0.40 0 1 
Education 932 6.33 875 6.47 3.35 0 12 
Adults  932 2.44 875 2.46 1.21 0 10 
Dependents 932 1.93 875 1.96 1.18 0 6 
Feed (mill. Dong) 932 1.38 875 1.44 4.91 0 80 
Ha Tay 932 0.35 875 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Phu Tho 932 0.21 875 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Quang Nam 932 0.23 875 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Long An 932 0.21 875 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Total assets (mill. Dong) 917 12.86 875 13.02 20.91 0 370 
Total assets squared 917 589.4 875 606.3 4938.0 0 137,122
Distance (km) 892 8.82 875 8.75 8.98 0 40 
Information 932 0.22 875 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Hospitalization 932 0.20 875 0.19 0.40 0 1 
Connections 932 0.52 875 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Red book 930 0.78 875 0.79 0.35 0 1 
Not Paid 932 0.08 875 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003. 
a For complete definitions see Appendix B. 
b Total number of observations available for each variable. 
c Number of observations used in the empirical analysis. The full sample used contains 875 
households due to missing data on distance and total assets for a total of 55 households, and two 
households had no land in 2001. 
 
We hypothesize that productive capital (land holdings, number of adults and livestock 
holdings) will affect the propensity to demand credit and the level demanded positively. 
For example, the greater the landholdings the more likely a farmer is to demand credit 
to provide access to fertilizer and other inputs. The coefficient on the education of the 
household head is likewise expected to have a positive sign as greater ability and human 
capital should affect investment possibilities. Similarly, being better connected, 
informed and with secure land rights in the form of red books should have a positive 
impact on credit demand. Finally, many dependents and a person hospitalized in the last 
12 months are proxies for a higher probability of the household being in need of credit. 
They are thus more likely to have a loan demand. 
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A priori expectations about the signs of the variables capturing the age and sex of the 
household head and credit history are less clear. A number of different arguments may 
hold, so these variables are included as controls without well defined priors. The same 
can be said for the total asset base, which could theoretically affect the probability of 
obtaining a loan both negatively and positively. A larger asset base would tend to make 
self financing of loans more viable. On the other hand, it may also improve the loan 
terms, which the household are offered, making it cheaper to obtain a loan.  
 
It is expected that the distance (village) coefficient is negative. The further away the 
household lives from the district centre the more costly it is for the household to obtain 
the loan, due to for example travel costs. This argument will not necessarily hold if the 
household directs demand towards a local moneylender. Yet, in remote villages local 
moneylenders are likely to hold more monopoly lending power, demanding stricter 
repayment conditions (which we do not control for) and thus discourage demand for 
credit. 
 
Table 8 reports results from estimation of equation (1) and (2) together with marginal 
effects. As explained previously the four regions where data is sampled from are diverse 
with respect to geography and economic development. To account for this and to 
investigate if coefficients differ between regions, variables of central interest were 
augmented with regional dummy interaction terms in the demand equation.17 
Specifically, land holdings, education, distance to village centre, gender and the share of 
landholdings with a red book were interacted with regional dummy variables. We 
estimated this large model on the loan demand equation (results not reported) and 
retained in all subsequent regressions the interaction terms which were either 
individually significant or where the joint test of insignificance failed when including 
that variable. The procedure suggested that land area be augmented with a dummy for 
Long An province, distance with Quang Nam and Phu Tho dummy variables and 
possession of red book also with a Quang Nam dummy. The augmented variables are 
listed in the tables under their ‘main’ counterpart labelled with the province name for 
which the variable is augmented.  
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Table 8. Determinants of credit demand, 2002 
Full sample Reduced sampled
Dependent variable according to 
column headings. 
Probit (demand=1) 
Marginal effects
 a 
 
(1) 
OLSb  
Log(amount) if 
demand=1 
(2) 
Marginal effectsc  
(E amount
x
∂
∂
)
 
(3) 
Probit (demand=1) 
Marginal effects a 
 
(1) 
Age -0.41***   (0.12)  0.0071 (0.0059)   -12.4 (12.6)  -0.30** (0.12) 
Land   0.65** (0.33) -0.0004 (0.0030)    43.7 (46.7)   0.60** (0.28) 
- Long An  -0.66* (0.34)  0.0140*** (0.0041)    -9.5 (54.6)  -0.63** (0.30) 
Gender (male=1)  -6.46 (4.40)  0.2550 (0.2003)    70.4 (408.3)  -2.74 (5.09) 
Education  -0.07   (0.59)  0.0336 (0.0262)    43.6 (60.0)  -0.03 (0.57) 
Adults   3.25**  (1.32) -0.0610 (0.0590)    64.6 (148.1)   3.41*** (1.31) 
Dependents   0.81 (1.35) -0.0038 (0.0672)    34.5 (144.6)   0.56 (1.53) 
Feed (mill. Dong)   0.63* (0.34)  0.0374*** (0.0102)  107.5** (53.7)   0.64* (0.34) 
Total assets (mill. Dong)   0.10 (0.08)  0.0077** (0.0031)    20.8** (9.3)   0.14* (0.07) 
Distance (km)  -0.45 (0.49) -0.0212 (0.0154)   -65.7 (51.7)  -0.51 (0.54) 
- Phu Tho   1.49** (0.62)  0.0089 (0.0154)    97.8 (68.3)   1.65*** (0.63) 
- Quang Nam  -1.48** (0.72)  0.0184 (0.0474)   -61.9 (240.2)  -1.62 (1.09) 
Information  -3.73 (4.43)  0.2715 (0.1903)  344.6 (425.1)  -3.76 (4.72) 
Hospitalization   1.83 (4.66)  0.0941 (0.1873)  324.7 (426.3)   0.21 (4.55) 
Connections 12.55*** (3.52) -0.0188 (0.1386)  678.2* (390.9) 11.75*** (3.56) 
Red book  -0.90 (4.84)  0.2155 (0.2704)  397.9 (615.4)   1.04 (5.32) 
- Quang Nam 27.47 (19.74)  0.5103 (0.6656) 6097.3 (10,776) 20.10 (19.60) 
Not Paid   6.43 (6.01) -0.1263 (0.2782)   112.0 (706.9)   4.22 (6.08) 
Phu Tho -14.38*** (4.86) -0.4179** (0.1974) -1282.7** (581.6) -14.93*** (4.65) 
Quang Nam -31.98*** (12.34) -0.2901 (0.7274) -36215.4 (8.8E7) -21.47 (15.09) 
Long An  20.91*** (6.48)  0.6716** (0.2679)  3187.2* (1643.2) 27.67*** (7.27) 
Constant ..  7.112*** (0.4409) .. 
Test: all coefficients are zero 
Wald chi2(21) 
p-value = 0.0000 
F(35,44) 
p-value = 0.0000 
.. Wald chi2(21) 
p-value = 0.0000 
Goodness of fit Mcfadden R2 = 0.13 R2 = 0.35 .. Mcfadden R2 = 0.15 
Number of observations (clusters) 875 (46) 293 (45) 875 817 (46) 
Source: Samples from ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003 as described in the main text. 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Level of significance robust for clustering at the enumeration area throughout. *, **, 
***significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
a Coefficients on continuous variables measure the marginal effect in percentage points on the probability of demanding  
credit, whereas they measure the effect of discrete changes for the dummy variables. All marginal effects are evaluated  
at sample means. 
b Coefficients (semi-elasticities) from OLS regression on log(loan amount). Only received loans included. 
c Marginal effects of coefficients on the unconditional expectation of loan amount evaluated at sample means. Robust standard 
errors obtained by non-parametric bootstrap with a 1000 replications (see Appendix C). 
d The reduced sample excludes 58 households from the full sample, who obtained a zero interest loan from friends. 
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Apart from results on our full sample of 875 households, Table 8 shows the demand 
equation estimated on a sample which is reduced by removing 58 households, who 
obtained a zero interest loan from friends (column 4). The motives for demanding credit 
in this situation may differ from the framework set up above, and we wish to uncover 
whether our results are robust to removing these households.  
 
It emerges from Table 8 that the probit regressions based on the full and the reduced 
sample are actually quite similar. Magnitude, significance levels and signs are (with one 
insignificant exception) the same for all variables. Therefore, we focus on the results 
from the full sample. 
 
The results confirm as expected that land is a statistically significant determinant of 
credit demand. However, the nature of this impact differs between Long An and the 
three other provinces. Outside Long An the probability of demanding credit increases 
with land size but this is not the case for the size of the loan. For Long An province the 
opposite is true. While the size of land holdings have virtually no impact on the 
probability of demanding credit, the amount obtained depends significantly on 
landholdings. However, in economic terms the effects are not large. In Long An, an 
extra 1,000 m2 of land gives a 1.4 percentage point larger loan, whereas the probability 
of demanding credit goes up with 0.66 percentage points for an additional 1,000 m2 in 
the three other provinces. There are as already referred to above many reasons for 
expecting that land should be significant, and it is reassuring that this is reflected in the 
data. The connectedness variable is positive, large and strongly significant, which 
confirms that being connected has clear and positive impact on credit demand. As 
indicated above no province differences were found for the connectedness variable, and 
no impact is found on the loan size. This suggests that connectedness works through 
increased knowledge of opportunities rather than through preferential treatment. The 
number of adults affects credit demand strongly both in terms of statistical and 
economic significance. An extra adult in the household increases the probability of 
demanding credit with more than 3 percentage points, ceteris paribus. Apart from 
increased investment possibilities more adults also increase the scope for demand for 
consumption loans. Assets and the proxy for livestock holdings (feed) have small or no 
 22
effect on the probability of demanding credit, but they affect the credit amount given a 
loan was obtained positively and significantly. The effects on loan size are small in 
economic terms. For instance, a doubling of livestock holdings (feed) from its mean 
level results in a 5 percent increase in loan size given the household obtains a loan. 
However, this result does confirm that when a household has productive assets (in this 
case livestock) the demand for credit goes up. The age of the household head is also 
significant, but the older the household head the less credit is demanded. This in all 
likelihood reflects that older people in the provinces studied are more settled and less 
likely to take new and capital demanding initiatives. Cultural values may play a role 
here as well.  
 
Table 8 reveals very interesting differences in credit demand among the provinces under 
study. Recalling that Ha Tay is the base, there are large significant differences between 
Ha Tay and the three regional dummy variables for Phu Tho, Quang Nam and Long An. 
Controlling for other factors the demand for credit is lower in Phu Tho and Quang Nam 
than in Ha Tay and Long An (with a significant positive coefficient). Demand is lowest 
in Quang Nam, although not significantly lower than in Phu Tho, and highest in Long 
An. The differences have large economic significance as well. For otherwise similar 
households being located in Long An entails a 50 percent increase in the probability of 
demanding credit. This is further compounded when taking into account the differences 
in the amount of credit given a loan is obtained, and the marginal effects on the 
unconditional (on having a loan) expectation of household credit amount. These 
observations correspond well with the respective level of development of the provinces 
studied, and it confirms that credit issues are going to remain key challenges as the 
transformation of the Vietnamese economy proceeds. Apart from the effect of land 
holdings as discussed above, regional differences are also present with respect to 
distance from the village centre. Relative to Ha Tay province greater distance has a 
positive impact on the probability of demanding credit in Phu Tho. The opposite is the 
case in Quang Nam. While it is not obvious to see what is driving the result for Phu 
Tho, the finding for Quang Nam is in line with the prior expectation of this 
mountainous region. Finally, among the statistically significant variables, it is worth 
noting the coefficient on the variable ‘Red book’ – the share of land holding under the 
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red book. For Quang Nam the coefficient is large and positive while for the base (i.e. 
the other three provinces) it is small and negative.  
 
It is important to keep in mind that pooling demand for formal and informal credit risks 
blurring the picture of rural credit demand. It is likely that there are differences in the 
way in which the various households and other characteristics affect formal credit 
relative to informal credit demand. Distance to the district centre (office of a formal 
lender) may for example be negatively related to demand for formal credit and 
positively related to demand for informal credit. It is also sensible to expect that 
households with a problematic credit history are more likely to demand credit through 
the informal market. Finally, it is probably also correct that negative shocks like having 
a household member hospitalized is more directly correlated with informal credit 
demand. Households may well perceive it as difficult to obtain consumption loans from 
formal credit sources.   
 
To explore this, Table 9 presents results of probit regressions where formal and 
informal credit demand is studied separately in a bivariate probit model where non-
independence in the error term is allowed for. Thus, using i to indicate households, 
 
*
1 1 1 1 1
*
2 2 2 2 2
1 0,0 (
1 0,0 (
i i i i
i i i i
z if z q otherwise demand for formal credit
z if z q otherwise demand for informal credit
β ε
β ε
= = + >
= = + >
)
)
 (4) 
 
where 1iε  and 2iε  have mean zero and unit variance (for normalisation), such that 
formally 1 2( , )i iε ε ~ (0,0,1,1, )zbinorm ρ , and zρ  is the coefficient of correlation.  is a 
vector of explanatory variables with the first element being one, and 
jq
jβ  a conformable 
vector of coefficients to be estimated, 1,2j = . Our interest is whether factors 
determining credit demand differ between the formal and informal sectors, thus we ask 
whether 1 2β β= . The explanatory variables used here are the same as those relied on in 
Table 8. 
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Table 9. Determinants of formal and informal credit demand 
Demand Formal 
(Full sample) 
Demand informal 
(Full sample) 
Dependent variable 
according to column 
headings. 
Probit 
(demand=1) 
Marginal effects a
 
(1) 
OLSb  
Log(amount) if 
demand=1 
(2) 
Marginal effectsc  
(E amount
x
∂
∂
)
 
(3) 
Probit (demand=1)
Marginal effects a 
(4) 
OLSb  
Log(amount) if 
demand=1 
(5) 
Marginal effects c 
( )E amount
x
∂
∂  
(6) 
Age  -0.24** (0.10)  0.014* (0.008)    0.64 (9.3)  -0.23*** (0.08)   0.004 (0.009)  12.6*** (4.0) 
Land   0.32** (0.14)  0.010 (0.007)   35.7*** (10.2)   0.01 (0.09)  -0.016** (0.008)  -4.6 (3.8) 
- Long An  -0.25 (0.16) -0.000 (0.007)  -18.7** (9.3)  -0.03 (0.13)   0.109 (0.083)  14.0 (44.4) 
Gender (male=1)  -3.38 (4.01)  0.196 (0.239)  -59.8 (315.0)  -3.11 (2.51)   0.581** (0.269) 136.9 (143.1) 
Education   0.48 (0.49)  0.052** (0.025)  102.7*** (31.2)  -0.75** (0.34)  -0.015 (0.040)  -31.5 (20.4) 
Adults   2.82** (1.09) -0.058 (0.086)  106.0 (98.5)   0.67 (0.74)  -0.178* (0.104)  -47.5 (54.7) 
Dependents   0.09 (1.33)  0.022 (0.080)    31.4 (91.5)   1.54* (0.79)  -0.042 (0.123)   7.7 (55.3) 
Feed (mill. Dong)   0.53** (0.27) 0.016*** (0.003)    51.5*** (8.7)   0.33** (0.15)   0.058*** (0.005)  40.0*** (9.7) 
Total assets (mill. 
Dong)   0.17*** (0.06)  0.005** (0.002)   16.2*** (3.2)  -0.17*** (0.06)   0.026** (0.012)   5.7 (6.2) 
Distance (km)  -0.53 (0.39) -0.017 (0.012)  -53.7*** (16.0)   0.03 (0.26)   0.006 (0.024)  16.4 (10.4) 
- Phu Tho   1.06** (0.49) -0.008 (0.016)   52.8*** (20.0)   0.35 (0.33)  -0.016 (0.040)   -2.7 (18.2) 
- Quang Nam  -1.03 (1.00) -0.022 (0.064)   -77.5 (64.4)  -0.39 (0.43)   0.034 (0.033)  -13.6 (14.4) 
Information  -1.63 (3.94) -0.140 (0.250)  -237.8 (340.4)  -2.27 (2.15)   0.628** (0.258)  139.8 (217.2) 
Hospitalization  -0.90 (3.01)  0.250 (0.220)   267.1 (433.0)    4.44 (3.25)   0.192 (0.246)  396.3 (307.5) 
Connections   6.96** (2.70)  0.153 (0.132)   648.3** (279.7)   6.74*** (2.33)  -0.278 (0.238)  261.7** (130.7) 
Red book   7.63 (4.84) -0.302 (0.232)   207.8 (283.6)  -5.27* (3.17)   0.417 (0.455)    39.0 (220.9) 
- Quang Nam 11.17 (18.11)  1.102 (0.667)  1817.3** (710.1)   7.83 (9.34)  -1.897 (3.970) -573.6 (1878.6) 
Not Paid  -0.79 (4.37) -0.048 (0.392)  -144.9 (541.1)   7.38* (4.35)  -0.280 (0.543)   -14.2 (250.1) 
Phu Tho  -4.50 (4.50) -0.432 (0.281)  -679.4** (312.1)  -1.04 (4.21)  -0.529 (0.681) -184.0 (292.6) 
Quang Nam  -8.89 (16.75) -0.384 (0.492)  -843.8 (981.1)  -15.4*** (4.62)   1.228 (3.355) -330.4 (885.7) 
Long An  29.91*** (8.51) 0.793*** (.275) 4458.4*** (1288.2)  -8.18*** (2.92)  -0.487 (0.730) -420.5 (316.4) 
Constant .. 7.33*** (.430) .. ..   7.12*** (0.659) 
Test: all coefficients are 
zero 
Wald chi2(42) 
p-value = 0.0000
F(21,20) 
p-value = 0.0000 .. 
Wald chi2(38) 
p-value = 0.0000 
F(21,13) 
p-value = 0.0000 .. 
Goodness of fit 
Wald test ρ=0, p-
value 0.96 R2 = 0.37  
Wald test ρ=0, p-
value 0.84 R2 = 0.34  
Number of observations 
(clusters) 
875 (46) 192 (41) 875 875 (46) 113 (34) 875 
Source: Samples from ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003 as described in the main text. 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Robust standard errors and adjustment for clustering at the enumeration area throughout. *, **, 
***significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively 
a Coefficients on continuous variables measure the marginal effect in percentage points on the probability of demanding  
credit, whereas they measure the effect of discrete changes for the dummy variables. All marginal effects are evaluated  
at sample means. Estimated jointly with bivariate normal error term. Estimate of correlation coefficient: ρ=0.03. 
b Coefficients (semi-elasticities) from OLS regression on log(loan amount). 
c Marginal effect of coefficients on the unconditional expectation of loan amount evaluated at sample means. Standard errors obtained 
by the delta method (see Appendix C). 
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The reported test for independence between the equations shows that the null hypothesis 
of independence cannot be rejected. Specifying an individual probit regression for each 
equation yields almost the exact same result (not reported) as the bivariate model. 
 
Analogous to the results from the pooled formal and informal credit markets presented 
in Table 8, Table 9 shows determinants of logarithmic loan size and marginal effects 
conditioning on the households obtaining a loan in respectively the formal and informal 
sector (column 2, 3, 5 and 6).18
 
As regards the distinction between formal credit, on the one hand, and informal credit, 
on the other, it is clear why some of the insignificant statistical results were obtained in 
Table 8. Columns 1 and 4 of Table 9 show that counter veiling impacts between the 
formal and informal credit market segments are involved when it comes to education, 
dependents, assets, credit history and the red books. They tend to make the overall 
effect on credit demand in Table 8 insignificant. An additional year of education of the 
household head significantly reduces the probability of the household demanding credit 
from informal sources. Also, regarding the formal segment, although education is 
insignificantly positive as a determinant of credit demand, it increases the size of the 
loan obtained with around 5 percent given a loan is obtained. In both the formal and 
informal market a household’s asset base plays a significant role. For the formal market 
more assets increase the probability of demand credit; the opposite holds in the informal 
market. This is consistent with productive assets giving more opportunities for 
investments and therefore increased demand for credit from formal sources. On the 
other hand, a larger asset base makes borrowing less necessary in the case of negative 
shocks – hence, a lower probability of borrowing from the informal sector. If a loan is 
obtained, they tend to be larger in both segments. Arguably, this is due to easier access 
to collateral when the asset base is larger. 
 
In addition to the observations outlined above two policy relevant differences are 
apparent between Table 8 and 9. The first relates to credit history (not paid). Recall that 
this dummy variable takes on the value one if the household has previously defaulted 
and zero otherwise. Pooling formal and informal credit demand yields a large positive 
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marginal effect of a ‘bad’ credit history, although, it should be kept in mind that the 
effect is insignificant. Table 9 suggests an explanation for this result. A bad credit 
history significantly increases the probability of demanding credit from an informal 
source – and the effect is large in economic terms. For the formal sector the effect is 
negative, though insignificant. While caution is needed in interpreting this finding, it is 
consistent with ‘bad’ credit history households being unable to secure loans in the 
formal sector and therefore address their demand towards the informal sector. The 
second issue is that of red book coverage of land holdings. A larger share of land with a 
red book means more secure land rights. This in turn should induce investments in 
productivity enhancements due to better ability to put up collateral and more secure 
access to returns from investments (Besley, 1995). In the pooled sample no such effect 
is evident, except from – insignificantly – the province of Quang Nam. Splitting the 
formal and informal credit market gives a large positive effect on formal credit demand 
bordering significance. Demand for informal credit is significantly and negatively 
affected by red book status suggesting that the red book enables households to obtain 
loans on better terms in the formal sector than those available in the informal sector. 
 
It is of interest to look further at households, who obtained a loan from both a formal 
and an informal credit source. In total 29 households received a loan from both 
segments of the credit market in 2002. Given the limited number of households it is not 
feasible to make a combined formal analysis (i.e. via a trivariate probit estimation) of 
demand characteristics. Instead some important statistics is presented in what follows. 
For the 29 households over half (16) of the loans from the informal segment was from 
relatives carrying zero interest. The loans from relatives do not differ in the average 
loan amount compared to loans obtained from relatives by households not having loans 
from both sources. However, loans taken out from moneylenders charging interest are 
on average of half the size of the loans taken by other households. This is similar with 
the formal loans, which are also around half the size compared with the rest of the 
sample. Regarding the duration, informal loans tend to have lower and formal loans 
longer duration for households involved in both segments. It is difficult to arrive at one 
simple explanation consistent with these observed patterns. There is nothing to suggest 
that 29 households were rationed from formal lending, and therefore had to turn to the 
 27
informal segment of the credit market. Rather, it would seem that these households rely 
on formal lenders for longer term (i.e. longer than average) financing and on relatives 
and other private lenders for short term financing. However, a larger sample would be 
needed to unravel these explanations. 
 
To sum up, the only variables in Tables 8 and 9 for which little systematic influence on 
credit demand can be uncovered one way or the other appear to be the information 
variable and hospitalization, which are admittedly rather crude proxies. Moreover, the 
data suggest as just alluded to that a key underlying distinction between formal and 
informal credit demand is that formal demand is particularly driven by factors such as 
total land and to a lesser extent by red book status. This reflects the need for credit for 
production and the management of assets whereas the effect of age does not differ.  In 
contrast, informal credit is, in addition to being negatively associated with age and 
education positively dependent on the credit history (not paid) and on the number of 
dependents, reflecting household need to smooth consumption and address external 
shocks. When households have assets they are better able to manage these needs 
without relying on informal credit as reflected in the coefficient of total assets. Yet, 
being connected, for example, is statistically important throughout.  
 
Finally, when it comes to provincial differences striking results stand out. In terms of 
the informal credit market Quang Nam and Long An have significantly less activity. For 
Long An this is more than compensated for by very high formal market participation 
relative to the base province of Ha Tay, whereas Quang Nam also has lower activity in 
the formal market (not significant). The province of Quang Nam is clearly a relatively 
underdeveloped province (as compared to Ha Tay) in terms of both formal and informal 
credit demand, whereas Long An stands out as the most developed province. All in all, 
the statistical results confirm that location specific circumstances (including the general 
level of development) are critical in understanding credit demand.  
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5. DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT RATIONING 
(a) Rationing by formal lenders, VBARD 
 
The Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) is as shown in 
Table 2 by far the largest single lender to rural households in Vietnam, accounting for 
around one third of the total market in volume and more than half when loan size is 
accounted for.19 It is therefore central to rural development that credit is disbursed 
efficiently by the VBARD. While a complete evaluation of the lending practices of 
VBARD is outside the scope of the present paper, our data make it possible to identify 
both the characteristics of households, who obtained credit from VBARD, and the 
characteristics of households, who had their application turned down. The sample size 
for those, who got their application rejected, becomes fairly small, so results should be 
interpreted as indicative only.  
 
Table 10 displays the mean values of the variables examined in Section 4. Total land 
holdings and total assets are larger for households, who were approved for a loan than 
for rejected households. However, the difference between the two groups is only 
statistically significant for total land holdings, likewise for sex and the dummies for Phu 
Tho and Long An. Households residing in Phu Tho are ‘overrepresented’ among the 
rejected households whereas the opposite holds for Long An. If any gender 
discrimination is present it is a bias against men. Worth noting is also that education and 
family size are both larger (although not significant) in the rejected group; and loan 
default rates are clearly important in explaining rejection, at least for other formal 
lenders and informal lenders. In the province of Quang Nam few households apply for a 
loan and few households are rejected, in line with the results for credit demand analysed 
in Section 4.  
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Table 10. Household characteristics for approved and rejected loan applications by lendersa
 VBARD Other Formal Lenders Informal Lenders 
Variables Approved Rejected Approved Rejected Approved Rejected 
Full 
Sample 
        
Age 46.44 47.05 46.94 44.33 45.02 47.80 47.61 
Total land (1,000 m2)b 13.52 3.66 4.43 2.54 4.52 10.72 6.49 
Gender (male=1)b 0.85 1.00 0.76 0.67 0.79 0.80 0.81 
Education 6.74 7.05 7.07 6.89 6.65 5.77 6.47 
Adults  2.79 3.16 2.62 2.44 2.51 2.66 2.46 
Dependents 1.96 1.79 1.87 1.67 2.02 2.46 1.96 
Feed (mill. Dong) 2.17 1.49 2.16 0.51 1.54 1.44 1.44 
Ha Tay 0.25 0.16 0.42 0.67 0.51 0.60 0.35 
Phu Thob 0.19 0.58 0.38 0.11 0.35 0.09 0.22 
Quang Nam  0.10 0.05 0.10 0.22 0.03 0.03 0.21 
Long Anb 0.45 0.21 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.29 0.22 
Total assets (mill. 
Dong) 19.49 12.15 11.36 6.47 10.98 11.25 13.02 
Distance (km) 9.75 12.05 7.52 11.94 9.41 7.09 8.75 
Information 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.21 
Hospitalization 0.22 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.19 
Connections 0.60 0.68 0.59 0.44 0.61 0.57 0.52 
Red book 0.85 0.83 0.80 0.85 0.74 0.69 0.79 
Not Paid 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.33 0.06 0.17 0.08 
        
Number of 
observations 209 19 124 9 186 35 875 
Source: Samples from ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003 as described in the main text. 
a Information for 2001 and 2002 is used, and variable mean values are indicated (see Appendix B for full variable 
definitions). 
b Means are statistically (5 percent) different between the two first columns. 
 
 
Given that VBARD specialises in production lending with relatively large loans 
compared to the other lending institutions (see Table 6) the findings in Table 10 are 
sensible. They once again spell out that the regional differences in the credit market are 
substantial and they illustrate that VBARD is focusing its lending on relatively large 
land and livestock holders.20
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(b) Characteristics of credit rationed households 
 
Earlier theoretical literature on rural credit markets in developing countries is based on 
the assumption that all households have a positive demand for credit (see Eswaran and 
Kotwal, 1989 and Braverman and Stiglitz, 1989). Thus, all households, who have not 
obtained credit within a given period, are considered credit rationed.21 Several more 
recent papers have, however, documented that this assumption may be too restrictive in 
empirical analysis, see Kochar (1997). 
 
In this section we pursue this theme and identify factors at the household level, which 
influence the probability that a household with given characteristics is credit 
constrained. It would have been interesting to study the formal and informal sectors 
separately, but the number of households, who had loan applications rejected, is as 
already mentioned quite low.22 Nevertheless, the characteristics which influence credit 
rationing are likely to be at least similar in the formal and informal segments making it 
worthwhile to pursue the issue in the aggregated sample. Similarly, because of the 
sample composition, it is not feasible to augment variables with province level 
dummies. While this is a drawback, interesting results still emerge from the analysis. 
 
Importantly, a household is defined as being credit rationed if it has both applied for a 
loan (in either the formal or the informal credit market) and had the application 
rejected.23 In this setting the methodology differs from the one used in the section on 
credit demand. From household responses it can be established whether a household 
demands credit. However, for those households, who did not apply for credit, it is 
impossible to observe what the lender’s decision would have been had those households 
actually applied. This sample selectivity issue is addressed by specifying a bivariate 
variant of Heckman’s selection model (Wooldridge 2002) as follows: 
 
*
1 1 1 1 1
*
2 2 2 2 2
1 0,0 (
1 0,0
i i i i
i i i i
y if y x u otherwise rationed
y if y x u otherwise applied
δ
δ
= = + >
= = + >
)
( )
  (5) 
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Error terms are assumed to be bivariate normally distributed with zero mean, unit 
variance and correlation .uρ  Thus ~ 1 2( , )i iu u (0,0,1,1, )ubinorm ρ and 1iy  (i.e. a loan is 
approved or rejected) is observed only when . The vectors of explanatory 
variables,
2 0iy >
1 2,i ix x , have one as their first element.  The second equation is our selection 
equation determining characteristics, which influence the household decision to apply 
for a loan ( ). Results from Section 4 are used in specifying this selection 
equation.
2 1iy =
24
 
Given that a household applies for credit ( 2 1iy = ), the outcome of the application 
process can be observed from the equation 1– 1 1iy =  if the household were awarded the 
loan and zero in the case of rejection. Characteristics at the household, commune and 
province level are aggregated together in respectively 1ix  and 2ix  to ease notation. This 
simultaneous approach allows us to try to identify determinants of credit rationing 
taking into account the possible selection bias in households applying for credit. Testing 
for independence between the two equations is equivalent to testing the hypothesis that 
uρ  equals zero.  
 
Table 11 displays the results from four different specifications of the equation 
determining the probability of a household being rationed. The first column (base 
applied) shows the coefficients (not marginal effects) from the selection equation, 
including all of the variables used in Section 4. The same selection equation is used for 
all four specifications. Only results from the selection equation for the first specification 
are reported. Due to the simultaneous nature it differs slightly across specification. 
Although not completely comparable – because of the difference in specification 
described above and since demanding and having applied for a loan differs in some 
circumstances, it is instructive to compare the results from the selection equation with 
those in Table 8. For the significant variables the results from the selection equation 
conform well with the demand equation in Table 8 – adding further robustness to the 
results. Thus, numbers of adults, livestock and being connected increase the probability 
of having applied for a loan. Also, residing in Quang Nam lowers the propensity to 
apply for a loan substantially whereas the opposite is true for Long An. 
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Table 11. Credit rationing, 2002  
Variables Base 
Applieda 
1.  
Rationed Base b
2. 
Age, gender b
 
3. 
Distance, 
information b
4. 
Connections b
Age -.0117*** 
 (0.0030)  
0.024  
(0.044)   
Total land (1,000 m2)  
0.0030 
 (0.0039) 
0.022 
 (0.024) 
0.021 
 (0.025) 
0.022 
 (0.025) 
0.029 
 (0.023) 
Gender (male=1) 
-0.2081*  
(0.1076)  
1.379* 
 (.0754)   
Education 
-0.0004  
(0.0162) 
-0.363***  
(0.112) 
-0.390** 
 (0.171) 
-0.375*** 
 (0.112) 
-0.331*** 
 (0.095) 
Adults  
0.0951**  
(0.0387)     
Dependents  
0.0012  
(0.0367)     
Feed (mill. Dong) 
0.0188**  
(0.0078) 
0.054  
(0.056) 
0.050 
 (0.055) 
0.057  
(0.054) 
0.052  
(0.057) 
Total assets (mill. Dong) 
0.0023  
(0.0026) 
-0.019  
(0.034) 
-0.021  
(0.032) 
-0.020  
(0.034) 
-0.016  
(0.032) 
Distance (km) 
0.0002  
(0.0097)    
-0.015 
 (0.082)   
Information 
-0.1726  
(0.1188)   
0.513 
 (1.225)  
Hospitalization 
0.1187  
(0.1312)     
Connections 
0.3686***  
(0.0947)    
-1.554* 
 (0.892) 
Red book 
0.1341  
(0.1360) 
-1.607  
(1.295) 
-1.731 
 (1.223) 
-1.598  
(1.278) 
-1.697 
 (1.263) 
Not paid 
0.1674  
(0.1476) 
6.206*  
(3.586) 
6.571*  
(3.739) 
6.401*  
(3.740) 
6.767* 
 (3.870) 
Phu Tho 
-0.0137  
(0.1599) 
-1.641*  
(0.945) 
-1.648* 
 (0.889) 
-1.488  
(1.015) 
-1.585* 
 (0.945) 
Quang Nam 
-0.7387***  
(0.1807) 
-2.967***  
(0.806) 
-2.987***  
(0.775) 
-2.959*** 
 (0.828) 
-2.940***  
(0.782) 
Long An 
0.3043*  
(0.1650) 
-1.472*  
(0.826) 
-1.510** 
 (0.771) 
-1.366 
 (0.882) 
-1.583** 
 (0.791) 
Constant 
-0.2189  
(0.2540)     
Test: all coefficients are 
zero  
F(9,37),  
p-value = 0.006 
F(11,35),  
p-value = 0.000
F(11,35),  
p-value = 0.017 
F(10,36),  
p-value = 0.004
Test: Independence of 
equations  
Wald test ρ=0,  
p-value 0.14 
Wald test ρ=0, 
p-value 0.07 
Wald test ρ=0,  
p-value 0.06 
Wald test ρ=0, 
p-value 0.38 
      
Number of observations / 
uncensored / clusters  875 / 311/ 46 875 / 311/ 46       875 /  311/ 46  875 / 311/ 46 875 / 311/ 46 
Source: Samples from ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003 as described in the main text. 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Robust standard errors and adjustment for clustering at the enumeration area 
throughout. *, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
a Coefficients from the selection equation estimated jointly with ‘Rationed Base’. The selection results from the 
other specification differ only marginally due to the simultaneous structure and are not reported. 
b Marginal effects in percent. 
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Our base specification of rationing is shown in column two (specification 1). We 
include only variables, which are believed to affect the borrower’s ability to pay back 
the loan, and which are (at least in principle) observable to the lender, together with 
provincial dummies. Thus, we include land and assets, education,25 feed expenditures as 
a proxy for livestock holdings, credit history and the share of land for which the 
borrower has a red book. This last variable is a proxy of the borrower’s prospective for 
entering the land market to secure repayment of the loan. Arguably, the number of 
adults might also be a useful indicator of repayment ability. We do not include it in the 
rationed base since the lender is in effect unable to monitor the effort to repay. It might 
be possible for the lender to force sale of land in case of default, but not to force people 
to get an income-generating job. Including adults bring no qualitative changes to the 
result (not reported). 
 
A bad credit history and education are significant with the expected signs. Also the 
coefficients for assets and the share of land with a red book have expected signs, 
although they fail conventional significance tests. The larger the share of land for which 
the household has a red book the lower the probability of being rejected credit. The sign 
of the coefficient on the land variable is contrary to prior expectations, but insignificant. 
The provincial dummies reveal significant differences in rationing given our controls 
among the four provinces studied here. Thus, the probability of having a loan 
application approved is, once we control for the propensity to apply for credit, 
statistically different among the various provinces considered here. Relative to Ha Tay, 
the households in the provinces of Phu Tho, Quang Nam and Long An all have lower 
probabilities of having a loan rejected. The differences within these three provinces are 
not significant. The statistically significant results also carry economic significance. For 
instance, since in the sample around 9 percent of loan applications are rejected, a 6 
percent increase in the probability of being rationed as a result of ‘bad’ credit history 
constitutes a large relative increase in the risk of being rejected. To a lesser extent the 
same can be said about the differences between Ha Tay and the other provinces. 
 
Apart from land holdings, the only variable, which does not conform to our prior, is the 
proxy for livestock. A lender should be more willing to lend if the borrower has 
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livestock which can be sold in case of default. In contrast, the coefficient on feed is 
positive, suggesting a greater possibility of being rejected, but the coefficient is 
insignificant. 
 
Finally, the hypothesis of all coefficients (excluding the constant) being equal to zero in 
the rationing equation is rejected at less than 1 percent, and it appears that the selection 
framework is in the present case not strictly necessary as the independence of equations 
cannot be rejected. 
 
In specifications 2, 3 and 4, we augment the rationed base regression with other 
variables from Table 8, but which should not in theory affect lender decisions given the 
information contained in the variables from the base regression. In column three 
(specification 2), we include age and gender of the head of household. It is evidently of 
interest to uncover whether systematic biases against women are present in the process 
of reviewing credit applications. We find no such bias here. Keeping in mind that the 
gender variable has woman household head as its base, the data suggest that women 
who apply for credit are in fact more likely than men to be approved for a loan. Again, 
note that the size of the marginal effect is not trivial. This result is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level, whereas the corresponding age parameter is clearly 
insignificant. The gender result must be interpreted with caution. The nature of this 
issue is complex, and we recall that we do not have individual level information on loan 
allocations, only at household level. So robustness and channels of influence is an issue 
for further study. However, our result does correspond with observations made in 
studies of the allocation of firm credit in Vietnam (see World Bank, 2005). With respect 
to the other base line variables, signs, magnitudes and significance levels are virtually 
unchanged for all variables. The test of independence of equations is rejected at the 10 
percent level. 
 
The third specification (in column 4) looks at the effect of distance to a district centre 
(distance) and a proxy for the household information level (information). We offer no 
prior expectations about the sign of the distance coefficient; but outreach is of particular 
concern, so insights on the importance of this variable is potentially important 
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information in assessing how credit should be expanded in rural Vietnam. The rationed 
baseline variables remain virtually unchanged in terms of signs and magnitudes, except 
for the coefficients of provincial dummy variables Phu Tho and Long An which become 
marginally insignificant. In fact, specification 3 changes very little, and while distance 
has a negative and information a positive parameter, they are clearly statistically 
insignificant. Information has very little explanatory power with a t-value of 0.43, and 
the t-value of distance is not much higher at 0.18. 
 
Finally, in the fourth specification we try to isolate the effect of being well connected 
(with respect to contacts in credit institutions). This is done by introducing a dummy 
variable (connections) equal to one if the household has contacts in any credit 
organisation. The estimated coefficient is negative and significant at 10 percent, which 
corresponds to stating that being well connected within credit institutions promotes the 
application process. Relative to the base specification, the coefficients are very robust to 
the inclusion of the connectedness variable. In this last specification the test of 
independence of equations cannot be rejected.26   
 
Looking at the four sets of simultaneous regressions overall it is evident that the signs of 
the coefficients in the base regression are very robust. Households with older heads are 
less likely to apply for credit. All else equal, elder households are less likely to 
undertake risks (i.e. apply for loan where repayment is uncertain), but when they apply 
they neither gain particular preferential treatment nor are they rationed. There is some 
evidence that males and females are treated differently in the application process, but 
we interpret this result with caution as indicated above. It seems likely that better 
educated households are more likely to know when an application will be rejected and 
the data strongly suggest that once they have applied they are not being discriminated, 
quite the contrary. The better educated the household head, the better the probability of 
approval.  
 
Feed, i.e. the measure of assets in the form of livestock, has the expected positive sign 
in the selection, but plays no role in rationing. This is slightly surprising since if a 
household decides to apply for a loan then – everything else equal – the ability to repay 
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measured in terms of assets, which can be transferred to the lender should be negatively 
related to the probability of being rationed. Yet, we also note that the relevant 
parameters in the rationing equations are statistically insignificant. 
 
Furthermore, as one would expect, the indicator for a bad credit history (not paid), 
which indicates that a household have defaulted on a loan instalment previously, is 
positively related to being credit rationed. Yet, it does not appear to deter household 
from applying in any statistically significant manner, although as noted in the previous 
section, demand for credit shifts from formal to informal lenders. While clearly 
important to rural credit, overall, the possession of a red book is not significant when it 
comes to the decision to apply, but there is some indication that those households who 
have a red book are less likely to be rationed. The variable controlling for connections 
has the expected sign in both the selection and rationing equations, but it is only 
significant at 10 percent level in the rationing equation. The household information 
level might be said to have the ‘wrong’ signs in both selection and rationing. We offer 
no convincing story for this result but note that this is statistically insignificant. The 
same goes for the distance parameter, though it should be kept in mind that the 
regressions in this section are pooled over formal and informal lending institutions. 
Turning to the province dummies, it is clear that provincial differences play a role as all 
three dummy variables are statistically significant in the majority of specifications. 
However, in case of rationing it seems that only Ha Tay differs significantly from the 
three other provinces.  
 
In general the sign of most coefficients as analysed in this section are in line with what 
we expected a priori. We acknowledge that there are a few exceptions and that several 
variables lack statistical significance. However, we believe this is more likely to be a 
feature of the data not having enough variability in central variables. Given the regional 
differences pointed out above it is also likely that the dummy variables capture a bit too 
much of the differences in the data. Ideally and with unlimited data, interacting the 
dummies (as done in Section 4) with core variables to detect province specific effects 
would be desirable. This is left for future research when better data become available. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Little is known about the characteristics and the operation of the rural credit market in 
Vietnam. This paper was written with the aim of helping to fill this gap based on a new 
data set covering 932 households in four provinces (Ha Tay, Phu Tho, Quang Nam and 
Long An) surveyed in early 2003. In the formal analysis this data was complemented 
with information available in the 2002 Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey 
(VHLSS). A number of general observations emerge, which deserve close attention in 
efforts to further develop the existing credit system.  
 
An active and growing rural credit market exists in Vietnam, and formal credit is clearly 
expanding its share of total credit. This is in line with the general rapid development of 
the economy, and overall interest rates have also fallen suggesting that market 
integration is in fact progressing. In parallel, a sizeable informal sector remains in 
existence, accounting for about one-third of all loans, and reflecting that poor rural 
households continue to rely on informal networks and relatives. Different segments in 
the loan market serve different needs, and we note that the formal sector focuses almost 
entirely on production loans and asset accumulation. In contrast, both the descriptive 
statistics and the formal analysis in this paper demonstrate that households actually 
demand loans for other purposes, such as consumption smoothening and health 
expenditures. Such loans are often obtained in response to temporary shocks (i.e. having 
a person hospitalized) and thus work as a consumption smoothing device.  
 
Because of the limited formal lending for consumption smoothening, households direct 
this demand for credit at private money lenders. This may well be welfare enhancing if 
the money lenders offer alternatives preferred by the borrower. Yet, to the extent that 
the borrower can provide collateral (i.e. in the form of land) it should in theory make no 
difference to formal lenders whether a loan is used for production purposes or for 
temporary consumption smoothing. If the formal sector entered the market for non-
production loans (on financially sustainable terms) this would provide borrowers with 
an alternative to private money lenders. This could well be welfare increasing, 
especially for marginalized low-income households. They have limited connections, and 
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this characteristic is as shown in Sections 4 and 5 a strongly constraining factor for 
credit demand in both the formal and the informal sector. In the informal sector it is 
moreover typical that older and better educated households have less credit demand. In 
contrast, a larger number of dependents and a bad credit history tend to increase a 
household’s informal credit demand. This does not necessarily reflect market failure, 
but it does suggest there is need and space for careful, well designed public action in 
expanding credit facilities. The social returns of such action may well be high. 
 
Another key characteristic of the rural credit market in Vietnam is the one-way 
interaction with the land market. Land (with a red book) is widely used as collateral and 
plays a fundamental role in the operation of the credit market. Land is a statistically 
significant determinant of overall credit demand. This result is as shown in Section 4 
driven by formal credit demand geared towards production purposes and asset 
management. This further reinforces the above conclusion about the need for carefully 
metered public action; but it is in parallel striking that there is almost no credit-based 
land acquisition in rural areas. This highlights the very considerable challenges, which 
remain to be addressed in establishing the necessary market based institutional 
framework for a more efficient functioning of the economy.  
 
It comes as no surprise that land is widely used as collateral. Land is immobile and its 
quality cannot be changed at short notice. Yet, an active land market depends critically 
on a well functioning credit system for land transactions. The lack of such a market is 
due to both supply (i.e. lending institutions do not generally finance land transactions) 
and to the demand side. Accordingly, the land section of the present household survey 
reveals that the land market among non-relatives is very thin indeed. However, 
productivity increases in rural agriculture will depend crucially on land consolidation 
and development in the years to come. The demand for loans to finance land 
transactions may appear small at present, but formal lending institutions should actively 
prepare for a more active role in this market. This will as well require that 
complementary institutions are put in place with the capacity to value land, and also an 
effective legal system to solve potential land disputes will be required. 
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The most striking and cross-cutting general insight emerging from this paper is the 
extent of regional differences in almost all aspects of the credit market. Some broad 
national generalizations are as already discussed possible. At the same time, it is in 
designing public policy indispensable to be very careful about the region, the household 
group and the market segment in question. The formal sector accounts for around 50 
percent of loans in Ha Tay and Phu Tho. Long An and Quang Nam have much higher 
shares, but this characteristic is a reflection of very different levels of development in 
these two provinces. Few households in Quang Nam obtain credit, and credit demand in 
this province is clearly limited compared to the other provinces in our sample. This is so 
both overall and in the various market segments. Pooling demand for formal and 
informal credit risks blurring the picture of rural credit demand. Counter veiling effects 
are at work between the formal and informal credit segments when it comes to 
education, distance, credit history and also the provincial dummy effects differ. 
 
In sum, the econometric analysis confirms that specificity and the general level of 
development are fundamental in understanding credit demand in Vietnam. A ‘one size 
fits all’ approach to expanding credit is not going to be the most effective. This 
dimension therefore needs to be kept in mind in the planned expansion of rural credit 
through the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies. The VBSP aims at operating a large 
number of new branches throughout Vietnam (World Bank, 2003). An additional 
observation in this regard is that expansion needs to be carefully metered to take 
account of the need for credit in areas where access is presently low – such as in Quang 
Nam. In Ha Tay and Phu Tho the informal sector is sizeable and as such compensate for 
an insufficiently developed formal sector, whereas the formal market is already much 
better developed in Long An. It is in this context also to be noted as shown in Section 5 
that VBARD is focusing its lending on relatively large land and livestock holders. We 
stress that regional differences in credit rationing seems to be limited, although there are 
small differences showing up once selection is accounted for. In Quang Nam few 
households apply for credit and few are rejected. On the other hand, the analysis in 
Section 5 reveals that households with a bad credit history are more likely to get 
rationed. This merits attention as these households in all likelihood include those 
households, who are subject to shocks and who find it difficult to manage their lives. It 
 40
would, given the regional differences pointed out above, be desirable to interact the 
provincial dummy variables with a larger number of core variables to detect province 
specific effects. Yet, this is left for future research when better data become available, 
and the same goes for the challenge of establishing the degree of credit rationing which 
households experience. 
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NOTES 
 
1 See for example Kovsted et al. (2004). 
2 Diagne, Zeller and Sharma (2000) provide a series of other references. 
3 See Duong and Izumida (2002) and McCarty (2001) for earlier work on rural credit and microfinance 
issues in Vietnam. 
4 For documentation and the questionnaire used see Barslund et al. (2004).  
5 Some 28 households interviewed during the VHLSS could not be interviewed and had to be excluded in 
the ILSSA survey.  
6 The following website http://www.worldbank.org.vn/data/household_survey.htm provides access to a 
complete description of the 2002 VHLSS and the questionnaire. 
7 Retrospective questions always entail a risk of imprecise or erroneous answers. However, obtaining a 
loan is not an ‘every year’ event and as such is more likely to be remembered correctly than more 
recurring events. Furthermore, taking out a loan often coincides with ‘big’ events such as major shocks or 
purchases, which are likely to be recalled correctly.  
8 The credit market section of the ILSSA survey is Module B (questions 168-224), with three sections: B1 
for loans actually received, B2 for loans not received, and B3 on general questions. 
9 The VBP has recently been renamed the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP). BARD and VBP are 
associated in the sense that they often share office facilities. See World Bank (2003) and Kovsted et al. 
(2004) for a more detailed description of the institutional set up. 
10 Private Trader was also a category in the questionnaire. It turned out that this group does not play an 
important role in the credit market in the four provinces studied. 
11 See appendix A for the full list of institutions included in the questionnaire. 
12 If loans for primary consumption are only obtainable from informal sources and there is a general 
increase in incomes, which makes consumption loans less needed, a change in the composition of loans 
may be expected. Similarly if it is easier to obtain loans for specific purposes such as production, rather 
than for consumption smoothening or health purposes. 
13 The questions were, respectively: “What was the stated purpose of the loan (select one for each loan)?” 
and “What did your household mainly use the loan for (select one for each loan)?” 
14 This includes buying/building a house, the few instances of buying land and re-lending and buying 
other assets. 
15 Only households obtaining a loan were used in this stage, since loan amounts are not available for 
rejected and self-constrained households. 
16 All regressions were also carried out on a sample excluding outliers, defined as observations, situated 
outside an interval of three standard deviations from the mean. All qualitative results remained 
unchanged. Full tables are available on request. 
17 We are not able to specify a fully unconstrained model (i.e. with regional interaction terms on all 
variables). Our data are sampled in clusters (46 different clusters/enumeration areas) and, thus, have less 
degrees of freedom in our estimation procedures than with an ‘unclustered’ approach. The advantage is 
that the significance of our statistical results are robust to observations being independent between but not 
within clusters. Assuming independence of all observations strengthens our results considerably. 
18 Self-rationed households did not indicate in which sector they would have applied if they had applied 
for a loan. Thus, self-rationed households were treated as not demanding credit in the sector specific 
analysis.  
19 The second most important state bank, Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) has recently been reorganised 
and is now operating under the umbrella of the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), which is 
scheduled for a large expansion in the years to come (World Bank, 2003).  
20 While a general characteristic, this effect does to some extent reflect higher BARD lending activity in 
Long An, which also tends to have larger farms. 
21 In what follows, the terms credit constrained and credit rationed are used interchangeably. 
22 In 2002, 25 households in the sample of the 875 had their loan application rejected by a lending 
institution (formal and informal). For the sample of 932 households the number was 29 households. 
23 In fact a household may be approved for a loan smaller than it applied for. These households are also to 
some extent credit rationed. We asked questions about amount obtained, amount wanted and amount 
applied for to identify households rationed in the loan amount. In our sample 21 households reported 
(credibly) that they were rationed in the amount they obtained in 2002. For simplicity these households 
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are considered not rationed in the present study. The qualitative results hold if we include the 21 
household (except three households which were rationed in large loan amounts) as rationed. 
24 It is recalled that the definitions for households demanding credit and applying for credit differ as 
described above. 
25 See Nga Nguyet Nguyen (2004) who reports significantly increasing returns to schooling in recent 
years. 
26 A fifth specification with the remaining three variables from Table 8, i.e. including Adults, Dependents, 
and Hospitalization was also carried out. This changed none of the key results discussed, and provided no 
further insights except that the number of dependents is potentially important. This specification is 
therefore left out here, but results are available on request. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Lending institutions in the questionnaire: 
 
Bank for the Poor (includes National Poverty Alleviation Program)   
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development    
Other State-Owned Bank      
National Employment Generation Program    
Other National Government Program     
Other (non National) Poverty Alleviation Program    
Private Bank       
Farmers’ Union      
Veterans’ Union      
Women’s Union      
People’s Credit Funds      
Other Credit Associations      
Private Trader      
State Owned Enterprise (SOE)     
  
International Organisation      
Private Money Lender      
Friends/Relatives      
Other (please specify)      
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APPENDIX B 
 
List of variables 
Name in tables Definition Source 
Demand for credit Dummy variable equal to 1 if household demanded credit in 
2002 
ILSSA 2002 
Age Age of household head in years VHLSS 2002 
Total land Total landholdings in 1,000 m2 ILSSA 2002 
Gender Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is male and equal 
to 0 if household head is female 
VHLSS 2002 
Education Education of household head, number of years of schooling VHLSS 2002 
Adults Number of adults defined as household members between 15 
and 65 years of age and not studying 
VHLSS 2002 
Dependents  Number of dependents are full time students and household 
members aged less than 15 or above 65 years 
VHLSS 2002 
Feed Expenditures on livestock feed during last 12 months in mill. 
Dong 
VHLSS 2002 
Province dummies Ha Tay, Phu Tho, Quang Nam, Long An.  ILSSA 2002 
Total assets Total value of assets in mill. Dong VHLSS 2002 
Distance Distance to district centre in km VHLSS 2002 
Hospitalization Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one household member 
hospitalized within the last 12 months and equal to 0 is no 
member hospitalized 
VHLSS 2002 
Connections Dummy variable equal to 1 if anyone in the household has 
contacts in the existing credit institutions 
ILSSA 2002 
Red book The share of household land area for which a red book is in 
hand 
ILSSA 2002 
Information Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household reads the 
newspaper People 
VHLSS 2002 
Alternative information Index where having a radio counts 0.5 and a television 1 VHLSS 2002 
Got help Dummy equal one if the household at some point prior to 2001 
got help from the authorities to apply for a loan 
ILSSA 2002 
Not paid Dummy equal one if the household did at some point prior to 
2001 not pay a loan instalment in full 
ILSSA 2002 
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APPENDIX C
The hurdle model
Consider the hurdle model presented in the main text:
P (demand = 1 | x) = Φ (xγ)
log(loan size) | (x, demand = 1) ∼ N (xβ, σ2)
where demand is a binary variable indicating if the household demanded credit (or ap-
plied for credit depending on the context) and zero otherwise. The variable Loan_size
is assumed to follow a log-normal distribution with the expectation conditional on de-
mand=1 given by:
E (loan size | x, demand = 1) = exp (xβ + σ2/2)
The unconditional (on demand) expectation of loan size given the set of explanatory
variables, x, is given by:
E (loan size | x) = P (demand = 1 | x) · E (loan size | x, demand = 1) + (demand = 0 | x) · 0
= Φ (xγ) · exp (xβ + σ2/2)
Marginal effects of continous and discrete multi value variables are obtained by differ-
entiation
∂E (loan size | x)
∂xi
= φ (xγ) γi · exp
(
xβ + σ2/2
)
+ Φ (xγ) · exp (xβ + σ2/2)βi
= exp
(
xβ + σ2/2
) · (φ (xγ) γi + Φ (xγ)βi)
where explanatory variables are evaluated at sample means. For discrete (0/1) dummy
variables the marginal effects are evaluated using the expression
∂E (loan size | x)
∂xj
= E
(
loan size | x−j , xj = 1
)− E (loan size | x−j , xj = 0)
where x−j denotes the set of mean values of explanatory variables excluding xj .
Standard errors
The delta method
To save on notation, let the full parameter vector
{
γ, β, σ2
}
be represented by the 1 × r
vector θ and denote by mi (θ, x) the marginal effect of xi evaluated at the mean values of
x. Thus, mi (θ, x) =
∂E(loan size|x)
∂xi
. Let Vθ be the estimated r×r asymptotic variance matrix
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of θ from respectively the probit and OLS regressions. The asymptotic variance matrix
of mi (θ, x) , Vmi(θ,x), is then given by (Wooldrigde, 2002)
Vmi(θ,x) = giVθg
′
i where gi =
(
∂mi (θ, x)
∂θ1
,
∂mi (θ, x)
∂θ2
...,
∂mi (θ, x)
∂θr
)
The 1× r vector gi is composed of derivatives of the elements of θ.
In terms of the hurdle model the derivatives of the marginal effects of the continuous
variables are derived as
∂mci (θ, x)
∂βj
= xj exp
(
xβ + σ2/2
)
[φ (xγ) γi + βiΦ (xγ)] + exp
(
xβ + σ2/2
)
Φ (xγ) I [i = j]
∂mci (θ, x)
∂γj
= exp
(
xβ + σ2/2
)
[xjβiφ (xγ)− xjγiφ (xγ) + φ (xγ) I [i = j]]
∂mci (θ, x)
∂σ2
= 1/2 · exp (xβ + σ2/2) [φ (xγ) γi + βiΦ (xγ)]
I [.] is an indicator function evaluating to one if the expression inside square brackets
is true and zero otherwise. The superscript c indicates that the derivatives are valid for
continous variables. Similar for discrete variables
∂mdi (θ, x)
∂βj
=
∂E
(
loan size | x−j , xj = 1
)
∂βj
− ∂E
(
loan size | x−j , xj = 0
)
∂βj
∂mdi (θ, x)
∂γj
=
∂E
(
loan size | x−j , xj = 1
)
∂γj
− ∂E
(
loan size | x−j , xj = 0
)
∂γj
∂mdi (θ, x)
∂σ2
=
∂E
(
loan size | x−j , xj = 1
)
∂σ2
− ∂E
(
loan size | x−j , xj = 0
)
∂σ2
Bootstrap method
An alternative to the delta method for obtaining standard errors for the marginal effects
is the bootstrap method (see Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). With this approach the sample
of N households surveyed is considered the population (referred to as the population
in the following). Using a non-parametric boot strap, syntetic samples of size N are
obtained by drawing with replacement N times from the population. For each sample
drawn, the hurdle model is estimated and marginal effects are calculated and stored.
Repeating the procedure a large number of times, say 1,000, produces a distribution of
marginal effects. The empirical variance estimator of the sample of marginal effects is
then obtained by the usual variance formula. This bootstrap estimate of the variance is
used for statistical inference. This approach is used in Table 8. The code is available
from the author.
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Abstract 
This paper analyzes how economic and non-economic characteristics at the 
individual, household and community level affect the risk of victimization in 
Mozambique. We use a nation wide representative household survey from 
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when such shocks occur. Lower inequality and increased community level 
employment emerge as effective avenues to less crime. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is a contribution to the literature on violence and the socio-economic 
determinants of individual and household level victimization. Crime is rightly perceived 
as a critical constraint on economic development, and the many ways in which crime 
and insecurity may affect human welfare in developing countries are aptly summarized 
by Fafchamps and Moser (2003). Consequently, efforts geared towards a better 
understanding of victimization and the formulation of comprehensive and effective 
policies to combat criminal behavior and minimize victimization are areas with 
potentially very high social and economic returns. This is certainly so in Mozambique. 
This war- and drought-stricken southern African country provides the case context for 
the present paper, and in spite of recent economic growth, Mozambique remains one of 
the poorest countries in the world. Mozambique also continues to suffer from a 
particularly violent economic and political history with roots going back to an extreme 
case of colonial domination and exploitation. Misguided economic policies in the 
immediate post-independence years added further complications, and the apartheid 
regime in South Africa fiercely undermined the development efforts of the 1980s.  
By way of background and to put crime in Mozambique in perspective, Table 1 
provides comparable statistics for homicide rates around the world. According to UN 
(2005) intentional homicide is reasonably accurately measured in the official police 
statistics, especially due to relatively high rates of reporting. Among  33 countries in the 
African region, only South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland report higher homicide rates 
than Mozambique, and based on world wide information from WHO (2002) it appears 
that only Columbia and Brazil in other regions experience a higher rate of homicides per 
100,000 people. Moreover, data in Dgedge et al. (2001) and Nizamo et al. (2006) 
suggest that the homicide rate in Mozambique increased significantly between 1994 and 
2000. In 1994, 188 homicides were recorded in the capital city of Maputo as compared 
to 225 in 2000. This is equivalent to homicide rates of 17.0 and 22.1, respectively. 
Finally, official crime data from the Mozambican Ministry of the Interior (2004) 
suggest that 39,061 and 40,630 criminal offences of different types took place in 
respectively 2002 and 2003 in the whole of Mozambique. With a population of around 
18 million this indicates that no less than 220 per 100,000 people are victimized every 
year.1  
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Table 1: Homicide rates in perspective  
  
  Homicides per 100,000 people 
Mozambique 22.1 
Angola 9.4 
Botswana 12.9 
Lesotho 50.6 
Namibia 16.3 
Sao Tome and Principe 6.2 
South Africa 59.7 
Swaziland 50.9 
Tanzania 7.8 
Uganda 20.9 
Zambia 8.1 
Zimbabwe 7.2 
The Americas 19.3 
South East Asia 5.8 
Europe 8.4 
Eastern Mediterranean 7.1 
Western Pacific 3.4 
All countries 8.8 
Note: Mozambique is based on data for Maputo only. This may give an upward bias, 
since homicide rates are generally higher in urban areas. The figures reported for 
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Uganda are based on simple 
averages of estimates from two or three different sources. The table does not present 
statistics for African countries with a homicide rate below five. These countries 
include: Algeria (1.0), Benin (4.5), Burkina Faso (0.4), Cameroon (0.4), Cote d'Ivoire 
(3.3 – based on an average of two estimates), Djibouti (3.5), Egypt (0.4), Eritrea (2.0), 
Ghana (2.1), Libya (2.3), Madagascar (4.7 – based on an average of two estimates), 
Mali (0.7), Mauritania (0.8), Mauritius (2.5 – based on an average of three different 
estimates), Morocco (0.5), Niger (0.9), Nigeria (1.5), Rwanda (4.5), Senegal (1.2), 
Seychelles (4.4 –based on an average of two different estimates), Sudan (0.3) and 
Tunesia (1.2).  
Source: Mozambique: Nizamo et al. (2006), Demombynes and Özler (2005), 
Fafchamps and Minten (2006), Fajnzylber et al. (2002), UN (2005) and WHO (2002). 
 
While officially reported criminal statistics are available in Mozambique, they 
are as is the case elsewhere in the developing world not representative of the ‘true’ 
criminal situation. This is so first of all due to underreporting of crimes to the police. 
Alternative sources of information such as national surveys where information is 
available at the level of individuals and households are therefore a potentially rewarding 
avenue to improve our understanding of victimization in developing countries. Here we 
are fortunate that a nationally representative household survey was conducted in 
Mozambique during 2002 and 2003. It included a novel and informative section on 
individual level victimization on which the empirical section of this paper is built.  
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The first and main objective of our paper is to provide a ‘map’ for identifying 
individuals with the highest risk of being subjected to crime of different kinds in 
Mozambique and to identify appropriate policy measures, or at least broad areas, where 
policy action appears to be effective in curtailing crime. In this part of our analysis, we 
look at the risk of being victimized due to property crimes and physical assaults of 
various kinds and identify the correlates of victimization. We subsequently look more 
narrowly at how income and the economic loss from property crime are related at the 
household level. Some 90% of those victimized in our data suffered a property loss, and 
we ask whether relatively well off households are victims of minor property crimes and 
poor households are victims of economically more disruptive crimes.  
When it comes to the question of which determinants of crime and victimization 
the analyst should include in empirical work, there is no clear cut, commonly agreed 
methodology. Economic theory calls attention to offender motivation and behavior 
(Gaviria and Pàges, 2002); and Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) suggest that criminal 
acts can be viewed as being directly linked to rational economic decision making by the 
offender. He/she carries out an a priori cost-benefit type analysis, where perceived 
economic costs and benefits are weighed against each other. Subsequent action is 
decided on this basis. This suggests that the probability of being a victim can be 
expected to be a positive function of indicators related to income, education, and 
employment status as well as to the severity and effectiveness of the preventive and 
punitive actions taken by society. Thus, in economic attempts to explain crime, focus 
has generally been on how the offender perceives the optimal balance between gains 
from criminal activity, on the one hand, and associated constraints and risks (i.e. the risk 
of getting caught and the punishment involved), on the other. In addition, economic 
studies have generally focused on the application of household and community level 
data and information. In contrast, sociological studies have in their theories of criminal 
victimization put emphasis on victim behavior and individual (personal) level 
characteristics, which are at least to some extent non-economic in nature. Limited 
attention is paid to factors associated with offender motivation and perception. The most 
prominent perspectives in this group are the ‘lifestyle exposure’ and ‘routine activity’ 
theories associated with Hindelang et al. (1978) and Cohen and Felson (1979).  
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Existing literature reveals with some notable exceptions a lack of attempts at 
trying to integrate economic and sociological perspectives.2 We believe this is 
unfortunate. Economic and sociological variables (and data at household, community as 
well as individual level) should be considered on par with each other to identify which 
individuals are most likely to be victims of criminal acts. A second main objective of 
the present paper is therefore to develop an integrated analysis where both economic 
and sociological factors are ‘allowed to play their part’. More specifically, we aim at 
helping to clarify the role of economic and sociological factors and to come better to 
grips with the value added of an integrated framework as a basis for future research. 
This is so both with the regard to the general analytical approach and in the search for 
appropriate policy measures. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 digs into existing economic and 
sociological literature to identify in an organized manner a pertinent set of specific 
determinants of victimization to be included in the empirical analysis. This is followed 
in Section 3 by an overview of our empirical methodology as well as the data used, 
together with some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents results, while Section 5 
looks into robustness. Section 6 concludes and outlines policy implications. 
 
2. DETERMINANTS OF VICTIMIZATION 
In this section, we aim at identifying the set of economic and sociological 
variables, which should enter our unified empirical framework. To structure the process 
we follow the sociological categorization of Cohen et al. (1981), and focus on the role 
played by: Exposure, guardianship, proximity to potential offenders, and attractiveness 
of potential targets. Definitions of these four factors are listed in the Appendix, and 
Table 2 provides a summary of the empirical variables at individual, household and 
community level associated with each category. The expected sign of each variable is 
also indicated.  
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Table 2: List of empirical variables by sociological category  
Group Variables Exposure Guardianship Proximity Attractiveness 
Individual  Individual income       x (?) 
 Gender (Female = 1) x (-)    
 Age x (-)    
 Employment status (Employed) x (+)    
 Marital status (Single) x (+)    
 Education   x (?)  
Household Household consumption       x (?) 
 Possessions: Durable goods    x (+) 
 HH gender (Female = 1) x (-)    
 HH age x (-)    
 HH employment status x (+)    
 HH education   x (?)  
 Distance to police station  x (-)   
 Members in household  x (-)   
 Family composition  x (-)   
Community Population density     x (+)   
 Unemployment rates   x (+)  
 Distribution of Income: Inequality   x (+)  
 Average level of educational attainment   x (-)  
  Integration     x (+)   
Note: All regressions in the econometric analysis also include regional and urban/rural dummies as 
community variables. In parenthesis are the expected sign of the variable on victimization. Income is 
listed with a ‘?’ since income involves different predictions depending on the type of crime. We 
expect (i) larceny to be positively linear in income, (ii) burglary to be increasing in income, but at a 
diminishing rate, and (iii) assault to be indeterminate.    
 
 Within sociological theories of victimization the most cited contributions are as 
already noted the ‘lifestyle-exposure perspective’ and the ‘routine activity theory’. 
Meier and Miethe (1993) argue that the key difference between these frameworks is that 
the routine activity perspective was created to account for changes in crime rates over 
time, while the lifestyle-exposure approach was developed with a view to capturing 
differences in victimization risks across social groups. Common to the lifestyle and 
routine activity theories is their emphasis on ‘exposure’. When this factor is included in 
the analysis it amounts to saying that social and economic interactions increase the risk 
of victimization, and it is indeed a dimension that has been mostly ignored in economic 
approaches to crime and victimization. Accordingly, differences in the likelihood of 
being a victim can be explained by differences in the lifestyles of the potential victims. 
People, who are more active in the public domain and engage more in non-household 
activity, use less time within the family and are more frequently in contact with 
individuals with criminal tendencies. We believe this is captured by individual level 
variables such as gender and age as well and employment and marital status, in 
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combination with selected characteristics of the household head. The sociological 
‘exposure’ argument is supported by empirical observation. Fajnzylber et al. (2000) 
offer one of the few studies of victimization in the economic literature using individual 
level characteristics. It shows in line with the overview of sociological studies by Meier 
and Miethe (1993) that young, single, employed males have higher probability of being 
victimized than their demographic counterparts. 
Considering the guardianship factor next, the economic literature often refers to 
the nature of security measures (including distance to police station). They are expected 
to deter crime by increasing the offenders’ expected costs through a higher risk of being 
caught. As such this is a typical example of the economic incentives approach. Yet, in 
developing countries where public services of police and justice are often of 
questionable quality and in limited supply (or distributed unequally), private deterrence 
may well become more important. This may call into play a set of more sociological 
individual level factors related to members of the household and family composition, 
not captured in the typical economic analysis. The prediction in this kind of individual 
level analysis is that the risk of victimization should decrease with the number of 
members in a household and the share of males because the household is considered a 
social network of protection.3 Turning to existing studies, Fajnzylber et al. (2000) find 
no significant evidence of members of the household influencing the risk of 
victimization, and the review in Smith and Jarjoura (1989) concludes that the empirical 
evidence regarding the effect of the household size and family composition is mixed. To 
pursue this topic through the household and family composition variables listed in Table 
2 is interesting. 
In line with economic thinking, we also include distance to local police stations 
as a measure of guardianship. This measure (and other measures of the density of police 
personnel available in the nearby neighborhood) has to our knowledge mostly been 
included in more aggregate analysis of crime (see for example Fajnzylber et al., 2002a 
and 2002b). As in Zenou (2003) our prediction is to find a negative relationship 
between the police guardianship variable and the probability of being victimized. The 
underlying assumption is that the longer the distance to a local police station is the 
higher probability of being victimized. However, conclusions based on this variable 
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should be handled with caution. Causality could potentially run from 
crime/victimization rates to distance to police as further elaborated on in Section 4. 
Turning to the ‘proximity’ category, most explanatory variables considered here 
are at the community level; household head and individual education being the 
exceptions. The effect of education has been studied at different levels of aggregation 
and great care should be taken when trying to compare these results. In the following we 
limit our comments to the literature considering victimization studies. First, at the cross-
country level Soares (2004) finds that education reduces crime/the probability of being 
victimized. This is consistent with the result obtained in Fajnzylber et al. (2000) 
showing that the average educational attainment level in a society is positively 
associated with lower levels of victimization (even more so for assaults). At a more 
disaggregated (household) level, Gaviria and Pàges (2002) show that education of the 
household head increases the risk of being victimized; and at individual level Fajnzylber 
et al. (2000) find no significant effects of individual years of schooling on the risk of 
victimization. These results suggest that societies with higher levels of education tend to 
have lower rates of victimization, but whether an individual is more or less educated 
within a given society does not necessarily affect the probability of victimization. We 
therefore have no clear priors on the sign of the education variables. 
Considering the community level proximity characteristics captured here 
through five indicators it is to be expected that the closer people reside to relatively 
large groups of motivated offenders, the greater is the risk of victimization. This is 
supported by the empirical evidence of Meier and Miethe (1993). People living in larger 
urban areas are in this perspective more exposed to crime, a finding which has however 
been challenged by Fafchamps and Moser (2003) in the case of Madagascar. Here crime 
and insecurity are associated with isolation, not urbanization. Moreover, it is often 
argued that individuals living in areas with high unemployment rates are at a greater 
risk of becoming a victim. This corresponds with the results obtained by Cohen et al. 
(1981), who note that the risk of being victimized increases in poorer neighborhoods. 
This observation is also in line with Bourguignon et al. (2003), Demombynes and Özler 
(2005), Lederman et al. (2002) and Soares (2004). They consider the effects of 
inequality on crime, and find that income inequality affects crime rates positively. The 
share of foreigners in total district population is included here as well as a proxy for the 
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social tension that potentially exists in a former colonized country. We predict that 
larger social tension at the community level increases the probability of being 
victimized. This issue has to our knowledge not been directly addressed in the 
victimization literature before. 
Finally, if crime is motivated by instrumental (economic) ends it is generally 
expected that the greater the attractiveness of a target (income level and ownership of 
expensive and portable consumer goods as indicated in Table 2), the greater the risk of 
victimization. Yet, the effect of income on victimization risk is probably highly 
dependent on the nature of the crime as noted by Cohen et al. (1981). This has in our 
view not been adequately acknowledged in the economic literature and is an area where 
the current sociological and economic literatures differ substantially. For example 
Cohen et al. (1981) argue that in terms of assault the proximity, exposure and 
guardianship effects seem to dominate increased attractiveness caused by higher 
incomes. This may, ceteris paribus, lead to a negative relationship between income and 
the risk of assault, in contrast to the positive relationship emerging from economic 
thinking. Income also has two opposing effects on burglary victimization risk, and 
according to Cohen et al. (1981) it is not clear whether proximity, exposure and 
guardianship will dominate the influence from increased attractiveness in this case. 
According to the routine activity approach and consistent with the economic approach 
to victimization the risk of being a victim of larceny will always be increasing in 
income. Overall, it is not entirely clear a priori whether more economic resources allow 
individuals to avoid risky and vulnerable situations or whether this attracts more 
criminals (and thus increases the probability of becoming a victim). The attractiveness 
of individuals and their associated properties play an important role in increasing the 
risk of victimization, but higher levels of self-protection or guardianship will decrease 
individual risk. This can only be settled through empirical analysis. 
In sum, the sociological and economic literatures offer somewhat different 
underlying perspectives on the causal links behind victimization. It is equally clear that 
conclusions about the effects of specific economic and sociological variables (such as 
income) on the probability of becoming a victim vary. We therefore feel motivated to 
go on to analyze how different economic and sociological characteristics at the 
individual, household and community level affect the risk and loss of victimization in 
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Mozambique within a unified analytical framework. We highlight that while we have 
tried in Table 2 to link explanatory variables to one of the four sociological categories 
(exposure, guardianship, proximity, and attractiveness), there are potential ambiguities 
involved. A particular variable may in theory be associated with more than one 
category. This was referred to above when we discussed income. Another example is 
that gender may be associated with exposure (at the individual and household level) as 
well as guardianship. Females may not be quite as effective in protecting their 
household as males. The same kind of consideration may go for age. It might also be 
speculated that employment status and education are linked to attractiveness in addition 
to exposure and proximity, respectively. While this effect is at least in part controlled 
for by having income in the attractiveness category, these kinds of ambiguities form 
part of the motivation of the empirical part of this paper and are further discussed in 
Section 4.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY, DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Based on the literature survey in the previous section we take a reduced form 
approach to modeling the probability of an individual being victimized. Formally,  
 
),,,(),,|1Pr( ijccjcijccjcijcijc eqzxfqzxy ==    (1) 
 
where  is an indicator variable showing whether an individual i, who is a member of 
family j that lives in community c, was a victim of crime. The dependent variable takes 
on a value of one if the individual was victim of a crime and zero otherwis x , z , 
cq  are vectors of respectively individual, household and community characteristics, 
whereas 
ijcy
e. ijc jc
ijcε is an individual error term. We also estimate (1) at the household level, the 
dependent variable hjcy  indicating whether any member of the household was 
victimized. 
We use a probit model as our preferred specification, and interpret (1) as derived 
from an underlying latent variable model. In this model, we assume that 
]0[1 3210 >++++= ijccjcijcijc eqzxy αααα  with eijc being normally distributed. In 
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Section 5 we test the robustness of our results with respect to the variables included. 
Choosing a logit or linear probability model instead of the probit specification would 
not affect the results reported. 
In the analysis of the relative loss from property crimes at the household level 
we rely on Heckman’s selection framework. For household j the relative loss, , can be 
expressed as:  
jcl
 * *0 1 2
h h
1jc jc jl z qβ β β= + + + ju    (2) 
 
where superscript *h indicates that the vectors *hjcz  and 
*h
jq  are not necessarily identical 
to their counterparts in the household level version of (1). A loss is only observed if: 
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Equation (3) is our selection equation, and it is the household level equivalent of 
the underlying latent variable model above. Note that the samples used in estimating (1) 
and (3) differ. Households, who suffer a loss, are a subset of all households victimized.4  
In all estimations, appropriate household weights are used, taking into account 
the survey design (i.e. stratification of the survey sample and the clustering of 
enumeration areas). 
The data come from a nationally representative household survey (IAF) 
conducted in Mozambique during 2002 and 2003 by the National Institute of Statistics 
(INE). The survey took place over the space of a year, beginning in July 2002 and 
ending in June 2003. Data collection was carried out in clusters of nine and 12 
households in respectively rural and urban regions using a stratified sampling process 
with 21 strata (consisting of 10 provinces, each divided into a rural and an urban zone, 
plus Maputo city).5 A total of 858 clusters make up the sample of 8,700 households. 
After data collection, INE constructed household weights so as to ensure that the sample 
is representative at the national, regional and rural/urban levels in accordance with the 
1997 census.  
The survey contains detailed information on individual characteristics including 
victimization entries on robbery, assault and larceny for around 43,000 individuals 
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distributed among the 8,700 households. The survey instrument also includes questions 
on general characteristics of the individual and the household (including whether or not 
individuals have been victimized), daily expenses and home consumption, possession of 
durable goods, gifts and transfers received. Other expenses, which tend to occur with 
lower frequency than daily expenditures, such as school fees or purchases of clothing 
are covered as well. Additional details on the survey can be found in MPF et al. (2004). 
Full documentation of all aspects of the 2002-03 IAF survey is available in Portuguese 
from the National Institute of Statistics (INE, 2004). 
In our analysis we consider individuals aged 12 and above, but variables 
measured at the household level include information on the complete household, i.e. 
including members aged less than 12 years. A number of households had to be excluded 
due to missing information, so our final sample consists of 25,594 individuals 
distributed among 8,515 households. 
The questionnaire includes a novel and detailed section on victimization of each 
member of the family as well as related questions at the household level. These are the 
data on which we focus in this paper, and by way of background, we note that 6.4% of 
the respondents are of the view that criminal offenses are the main social problem in 
Mozambique at the moment. Moreover, 19% of the households answered that crime in 
their residential area had increased during the past 12 months. About half of the 
households in our sample felt unsafe when walking alone at night, even though only 
around 27.5% of the households have experienced a household member being 
victimized. Table 3 gives an overview of the types of crimes faced by the households. 
About two-thirds of the crimes can be characterized as some kind of theft or robbery, 
whereas rape, other sexual abuse, assault and domestic violence account for 4.8%. 
Interestingly, bribery does not come across as particularly serious in Mozambique. 
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Table 3: Victimization statistics 
Type of crime Percent 
A. Purse snatching 6.2 
B. Tried or took an object of value 3.4 
C. Robbed of a bicycle 4.1 
D. Robbed of any type of vehicle 0.3 
E. Cattle stolen 5.5 
F. Victim of other theft 47.7 
G. Victim of rape 0.4 
H. Insult or offensive 7.3 
I. Threats 1.8 
J. Assault 2.7 
K. Sexual abuse 0.3 
L. Domestic Violence 1.4 
M. Bribery 0.5 
N. Other 18.5 
Total 100 
  
Locality of crime Percent 
At home 66.9 
On roads 8.9 
In public transport 1.6 
In the market 3.2 
At work 3.2 
In places of leisure 1.2 
Other 14.9 
Total 100 
 
From Table 3 it is also clear that most offences happen within the household 
premises. One third of crimes take place in the public domain, including in particular on 
roads (8.9%), in the market (3.2%) and at work (3.2%). 
In Section 2, we identified a number of potential determinants for being 
victimized, and information on these determinants can be obtained from the IAF survey 
questionnaire. The variables used in the analysis are listed together with descriptive 
statistics in Table 4 at the individual and at the household level. Most variables come 
straight out of the survey, but a few had to be constructed as explained below. To ease 
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our brief overview of the determinants, they are grouped according to the classification 
in Table 2.  
The first set of determinants considered here is those in the attractiveness group. 
The average monthly individual (nominal) income is 0.92 million Meticais (around 37 
US$) and the household income is on average 2.77 million Meticais (approximately 111 
USD).6 This figure might suggest underreporting of income. At the household level the 
real annual consumption is on average 14.1 million Meticais (562 US$), which as 
expected is somewhat above the GDP per capita of 212 US$ in 2000 reported in WDI 
(2003). Last, possession of durable goods, which is expected to make individuals more 
prone to being a victim, is measured by household dummy variables for having at least 
one TV, radio and bicycle in the household. Around half of households own a radio, 
whereas bicycle and TV ownership is more limited at 26.8% and 11.9%, respectively. 
The second group of determinants includes those in the exposure group, 
including gender (individual and household head), age (individual and household head), 
employment status (individual and household head), and marital status. At the 
individual level, 53.3% of the sample consists of women, but only around 22.8% 
(27.2% measured at the household (HH) level) of individuals has a woman as household 
head. The average age of individuals is 31.1 years, and for household heads this figure 
is 45.5 (43.4 years measured at the HH level). As already pointed out in Section 2, 
employment status is potentially an important determinant of victimization. At the 
individual level, 11.7% of the sample is registered as being without work, and for 
household heads this figure is 7.0%. This corresponds with the average for sub-Saharan 
Africa and the information on Mozambique in WDI (2005). The final determinant at 
individual level in the exposure group considers the marital status of the individuals. 
Married or cohabiting partners make up 51.4% of the sample, 37.1% are single and the 
rest are either divorced or widowed. 
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Table 4: Summary statistics 
      Individual HH 
Group Classification Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Type of crime Victim 0.089 0.284 0.266 0.442 Individual and 
HH level  Burglary 0.055 0.228 0.169 0.375 
  Larceny 0.028 0.164 0.086 0.281 
  Assault 0.013 0.113 0.039 0.194 
Individual  Attractiveness Individual income (monthly) 0.924 7.295     
Individual  Exposure Gender 0.533 0.499     
  Age 31.106 16.489   
  Employment status: Employed 0.667 0.471   
  Employment status: Studying 0.216 0.411   
  Employment status: Unemployed 0.117 0.322   
  Marital status: Single 0.371 0.483   
  Marital status: Married 0.101 0.301   
  Marital status: Married Polygam 0.074 0.262   
  Marital status: Cohabit 0.339 0.473   
  Marital status: Divorced 0.059 0.236   
  Marital status: Widow 0.056 0.230   
Individual  Proximity Education: Educ0 0.247 0.431     
  Education: Educ1 0.382 0.486   
  Education: Educ2 0.207 0.405   
  Education: Educ3 0.107 0.309   
  Education: Educ4 0.057 0.233   
Household Attractiveness HH income (monthly)     2.777 12.896 
  HH consumption (yearly)   14.056 32.427 
  Possession of durable goods: TV 0.172 0.378 0.119 0.324 
  Possession of durable goods: Radio 0.553 0.497 0.494 0.500 
  Possession of durable goods: Bicycle 0.296 0.457 0.268 0.443 
Household Exposure HH gender 0.228 0.420 0.272 0.445 
  HH age 45.467 14.513 43.432 15.317 
  HH employment status 0.930 0.254 0.942 0.234 
Household Proximity HH education 0 0.239 0.427 0.278 0.448 
  HH education 1 0.351 0.477 0.359 0.480 
  HH education 2 0.209 0.407 0.187 0.390 
  HH education 3 0.103 0.303 0.093 0.291 
  HH education 4 0.098 0.298 0.082 0.275 
Household Guardianship Household size 6.441 3.407 5.067 2.794 
  Adult male share 0.243 0.170 0.245 0.207 
  Distance to police station 1 0.441 0.496 0.373 0.484 
  Distance to police station 2 0.123 0.329 0.124 0.330 
  Distance to police station 3 0.069 0.254 0.076 0.265 
  Distance to police station 4 0.073 0.260 0.087 0.281 
  Distance to police station 5 0.294 0.456 0.340 0.474 
Community Proximity Unemployment rate 0.157 0.140 0.136 0.129 
  Distribution of Income: Inequality 0.394 0.095 0.385 0.099 
  Average level of educational attainment 1.420 0.590 1.340 0.573 
  Population density 1.181 3.515 0.860 2.938 
    Integration 0.018 0.006 0.018 0.006 
N   Total observations 25,594 8,515 
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Proximity determinants such as education and the community variables are 
listed in the third group. Measures of the individual level of human capital, i.e. 
education, is represented by five dummy variables.7 At the level of the household head, 
education level is measured by a categorical variable with values from zero to four, 
constructed from the five dummy variables at the individual level.8 Some 24.7% of the 
sample has no education at all, and in general the educational level is as expected quite 
low. The next variable in the proximity group is the community unemployment rate, 
which is constructed from the survey data. It is measured at the district level (a 
geographical and administrative unit below the province level) by looking at the share 
of adults aged 18 years and above, who stated in the IAF that they did not have work 
and were not studying. With a mean unemployment rate of 15.7%, this community 
indicator is above the individual unemployment level referred to above.  
Turning to inequality at the district level we use the Gini-coefficient of real 
expenditure (i.e. spatially and temporally deflated) extracted from the survey data.9 The 
Gini-coefficient in our sample is 0.39. This is around the average for sub-Saharan 
Africa (WDI, 2005), and the reported 0.40 for Mozambique in 1997. The average 
population density is also recorded at the district level and is based on the 1997 census. 
In the sampled areas the average population density is around 1,181 persons per square 
kilometer. As a crude proxy for how integrated each community is we use the 
information in the 1997 census on the number of foreigners living in each district to 
form the share of foreigners in total district population. The average share of foreigners 
in our sample is quite low at 1.8%.  
Finally, we have descriptive statistics concerning the characteristics related to 
the guardianship characteristics, such as household size, family composition (share of 
adult males over the age of 18 in the household) and household distance to a police 
station. The average household size in the sample is 6.4 individuals (5.1 at the 
household level), and the adult male share is around 24.3%. Distance to the police 
station is reported by the household as a categorical variable corresponding to different 
lengths of time it takes to reach the nearest police station. A third of the population has 
less then half an hour to the nearest police station by foot, but variation is large and 
29.4% of the sample has more than a 120 minutes walk to the police.10
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4. RESULTS 
Some 26.6% of the households in our sample and 8.9% of people at the 
individual level experienced as shown in Table 4 one or another kind of criminal act(s) 
during the past 12 months according to the Mozambican IAF.11 At the individual level, 
the 8.9% were victimized at least once during 2002/03, but only 1.3% of the 25,594 
observations were physically assaulted. Most of the crimes registered in the survey were 
burglaries (5.5%), whereas cases of larceny were reported for 2.8% of the sample. 
 
(a) Determinants of Victimization 
Tables 5 and 6 present the main findings of our econometric analysis of the 
probability of being victimized (marginal effects at the mean of the data); and the 
discussion in what follows is organized in accordance with the four groups of 
determinants identified in Section 2. We start with the attractiveness and end with the 
guardianship variables, and possible ambiguities in classifying the various explanatory 
variables are alluded to. Table 5 documents the baseline formulation at the individual 
level including the 25,776 observations analyzing aggregate victimization as well as a 
disaggregation into three types, burglary, assault, and larceny.  Table 6 shows results of 
the analysis at the household level using household consumption as a proxy for income. 
This has been done recognizing that income may be measured with error.12
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Table 5: Individual level probit results 
      Victim Burglary Larceny Assault 
Group Classification Variable 
Marginal 
effects t-stats 
Marginal 
effects t-stats 
Marginal 
effects t-stats 
Marginal 
effects t-stats
Ind  Attractiveness Income  (x100) (coefficients) a)  1.160*** (2.57)  1.432*** (3.51)  0.548 (1.60)  0.767** (2.03) 
  Income squared  (coefficients) a) -0.003* (1.68) -0.005*** (2.95) -0.001 (1.09) -0.002 (1.21) 
  Income (x100)  (marginal effect)b)  0.130** (2.54)  0.095*** (3.40)  0.019 (1.59)  0.194 (1.33)
Ind  Exposure Gender (x10) -0.551*** (8.93) -0.297*** (8.19) -0.152*** (5.04) -0.028** (2.12)
  Age (x100)  0.015*** (8.39)  0.107*** (9.13)  0.040*** (4.58) -0.001 (0.23)
  Empl. status: Studying -0.028*** (2.61) -0.014** (2.24) -0.003 (0.54) -0.005 (1.63)
  Empl. status: Unemployed -0.022*** (3.33) -0.011** (2.39) -0.006** (1.98) -0.002 (1.20)
  Marital status: Married  0.085*** (7.11)  0.056*** (5.95)  0.019*** (2.99)  0.003 (0.95)
  Marital status: Polygam  0.138*** (9.16)  0.075*** (6.49)  0.043*** (4.71)  0.015*** (3.36)
  Marital status: Cohabit  0.090*** (9.48)  0.048*** (7.09)  0.027*** (4.74)  0.010*** (3.33)
  Marital status: Divorced  0.161*** (8.06)  0.067*** (5.65)  0.050*** (4.29)  0.038*** (3.94)
  Marital status: Widow  0.144*** (7.06)  0.075*** (5.58)  0.053*** (3.90)  0.013** (2.06)
Ind Proximity Education: Educ1 (x10)  0.295*** (4.72)  0.198*** (5.10)  0.108*** (3.63) -0.003 (0.24)
  Education: Educ2 (x10)  0.448*** (4.64)  0.361*** (4.96)  0.114** (2.53) -0.003 (0.19)
  Education: Educ3 (x10)  0.446*** (3.19)  0.258** (2.23)  0.161** (2.47) -0.011 (0.49)
  Education: Educ4 (x10)  0.571*** (3.10)  0.423*** (2.82)  0.206** (2.16) -0.014 (0.37)
HH Attractiveness Durable goods: TV (x10)  0.049 (0.61)  0.008 (0.19)  0.069 (1.54) -0.029** (2.16)
  Durable goods: Radio (x10) -0.056 (1.30) -0.031 (1.09) -0.003 (0.14) -0.019* (1.75)
  Durable goods: Bicycle (x10)  0.055 (1.12)  0.037 (1.05) -0.012 (0.59)  0.026** (2.17)
HH Exposure HH Gender (x10)  0.405*** (5.33)  0.217*** (4.16)  0.118*** (3.48)  0.037** (2.19)
  HH Age (x100) -0.142*** (7.69) -0.082*** (6.49) -0.040*** (5.04) -0.012** (2.36)
  HH Employment status (x10) -0.085 (1.02) -0.068 (1.31) -0.030 (0.74)  0.006 (0.30)
HH Proximity HH Education 1 (x10) -0.050 (0.86) -0.074** (1.96) -0.004 (0.19)  0.014 (0.88)
  HH Education 2 (x10)  0.021 (0.29) -0.056 (1.09)  0.026 (0.82)  0.071*** (2.98)
  HH Education 3 (x10) -0.072 (0.70) -0.105 (1.46)  0.010 (0.22)  0.036 (1.24)
  HH Education 4 (x10)  0.010 (0.07) -0.108 (1.42) -0.008 (0.20)  0.163** (2.02)
HH Guardianship Household size -0.004*** (5.35) -0.002*** (4.50) -0.001*** (2.68) -0.001*** (2.96)
  Adult male share -0.042*** (2.88) -0.028*** (2.90) -0.002 (0.34) -0.001 (0.17)
  Distance to police 2  0.002 (0.30) -0.002 (0.37)  0.008* (1.88) -0.003** (2.31)
  Distance to police 3 -0.006 (0.43) -0.001 (0.13)  0.002 (0.40) -0.001 (0.50)
  Distance to police 4 -0.017* (1.68) -0.009 (1.44) -0.002 (0.43) -0.004** (2.12)
  Distance to police 5 -0.024*** (2.98) -0.018*** (3.28)  0.001 (0.30) -0.002 (1.19)
Com Proximity Unemployment rate  0.104 (1.49)  0.070 (1.54)  0.014 (0.46)  0.037*** (2.91)
  Inequality  0.087** (2.12)  0.035 (1.20)  0.040*** (2.79)  0.003 (0.46)
  Average educational level -0.006 (0.53) -0.007 (0.89)  0.000 (0.08)  0.001 (0.49)
  Population density  0.001 (0.82)  0.001* (1.94) -0.001* (1.66)  0.000 (0.11)
  Integration -0.528 (1.04) -0.415 (1.13) -0.099 (0.32)  0.051 (0.48)
Including regional and rural/urban dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    Observations 25594 25594 25594 25594 
   Pseudo R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 
Note: Probit, marginal effects at the mean of all variables. *, **, *** indicates significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Including only 
individuals, who are living in a household reporting non-zero (positive) income. Base: Individual male, individual no education, individual employed, 
individual single, household head male, household head unemployed, household head no education, distance to police station 1, Maputo. 
a) The two first rows show coefficients for the non-linear effect of income. Implied turning points are much larger than the 99 percentile of the 
distribution. All other rows show marginal effects at the mean of all variables. 
b)  Marginal effect of income evaluated at the mean of all variables. 
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Table 6: Household level probit results 
      Victim Burglary Larceny Assault 
Group Classification Variable 
Marginal 
effects t-stats 
Marginal 
effects t-stats 
Marginal 
effects t-stats 
Marginal 
effects t-stats 
HH Attractiveness Real cons. (x100) (coefficients) a)   0.755*** (4.36)  0.667*** (3.74)  0.538*** (3.25)   0.335* (1.95) 
  Real cons. squared (x100) (coefficients) a)  -0.001*** (2.99) -0.001*** (3.21) -0.001** (2.23)  -0.000 (0.99) 
  Real cons. (x100) (marginal effects) b)   0.151*** (2.85)  0.084** (2.12)  0.041** (2.04)   0.054 (1.54) 
  Durable goods: TV   0.011 (0.35) -0.004 (0.22)  0.027 (1.22)  -0.016*** (3.02) 
  Durable goods: Radio  -0.015 (0.96) -0.010 (0.76) -0.001 (0.15)  -0.008* (1.91) 
  Durable goods: Bicycle   0.020 (1.19)  0.022 (1.53) -0.005 (0.58)   0.009 (1.62) 
HH Exposure HH Gender   0.050** (2.47)  0.011 (0.69)  0.022** (2.04)   0.015** (2.15) 
  HH Age (x100)  -0.063 (1.42)  0.012 (0.34) -0.026 (0.94)  -0.047*** (3.04) 
  HH Employment status   0.022 (0.82)  0.004 (0.22)  0.007 (0.46)   0.006 (0.86) 
HH Proximity HH Education 1   0.060*** (3.11)  0.029** (2.00)  0.035*** (3.34)   0.006 (0.96) 
  HH Education 2   0.102*** (4.14)  0.074*** (3.72)  0.045*** (2.83)   0.023** (2.52) 
  HH Education 3   0.048* (1.72)  0.005 (0.21)  0.045** (2.51)   0.009 (0.89) 
  HH Education 4   0.058* (1.65)  0.026 (0.90)  0.029 (1.58)   0.037** (2.06) 
HH Guardianship Household size   0.010*** (3.35)  0.006*** (2.69)  0.002 (1.36)   0.001 (0.90) 
  Adult male share  -0.003 (0.06) -0.030 (0.87)  0.030 (1.38)   0.013 (1.01) 
  Distance to police 2   0.047 (1.46)  0.007 (0.27)  0.049** (2.53)  -0.012** (2.06) 
  Distance to police 3  -0.026 (0.54) -0.005 (0.13)  0.006 (0.29)  -0.003 (0.36) 
  Distance to police 4  -0.037 (0.98) -0.029 (1.06)  0.003 (0.15)  -0.013* (1.65) 
  Distance to police 5  -0.065** (2.23) -0.067*** (2.82)  0.017 (1.06)  -0.008 (1.06) 
Com Proximity Unemployment rate   0.312 (1.30)  0.226 (1.23)  0.071 (0.49)   0.160*** (3.06) 
  Inequality   0.150 (1.09)  0.069 (0.57)  0.127* (1.91)  -0.001 (0.04) 
  Average educational level  -0.005 (0.14) -0.031 (0.96)  0.015 (0.57)   0.003 (0.28) 
  Population density   0.005 (1.30)  0.006** (2.08) -0.002 (1.18)   0.000 (0.11) 
  Integration  -0.928 (0.53) -1.495 (0.96)  0.134 (0.09)   0.531 (1.22) 
Including regional and urban/rural dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    Observations 8515 8515 8515 8515 
   Pseudo R-squared 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.10 
Note: Probit, marginal effects at the mean of all variables. *, **, *** indicates significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Base: Household head male, 
household head unemployed, household head no education, distance to police station 1, Maputo. 
a) The two first rows show coefficients for the non-linear effect of income. Implied turning points are much larger than the 99 percentile of the distribution. All other 
rows show marginal effects at the mean of all variables. 
b)  Marginal effect of income evaluated at the mean of all variables. 
 
 (i) Attractiveness 
There is a statistically significant indication in the data of income being 
positively related to the probability of being victimized. This holds in all regressions in 
Tables 5 and 6 except for the larceny regression at the individual level (Table 5), 
although the marginal effects at the mean of the data in both assault regressions are not 
significant. Moreover, results suggest that there exists a non-linear relationship between 
income and victimization. The probability of being victimized is in Mozambique 
increasing in income, but at a diminishing rate. However, looking at the specific crime 
types this result is driven by the non-linearity between burglary and 
income/consumption and – for the household level – in the larceny regression. These 
results confirm Cohen et al. (1981), who concluded that the effect of income on 
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victimization risk is highly dependent on the nature of the crime. However, we do (even 
for assault) find a positive relationship between income/consumption both at the 
individual and the household level independent of the types of crime faced.  
Possession of durable goods is another attractiveness variable which is often 
expected to affect the risk of victimization positively. We are not able to confirm this 
relationship in our aggregate data. However, when disaggregating victimization by 
types of crime, we find a negative and significant relation between owning a TV or a 
radio and a positive relation with owning a bike in the assault regression. While assets 
may be expected to make potential victims more attractive, the ownership of a bicycle, a 
TV or a radio is also related to exposure, so there is ambiguity here. Accordingly, we 
believe our empirical result is due to the fact that (i) the TV and radio variables proxy 
for the amount of time individuals spend at home, and (ii) bicycle ownership is related 
to how much time individuals spend away from their immediate neighborhood. This 
implies that this particular result is probably more due to exposure associated with 
bicycle, TV and radio ownership, overriding the effect from the attractiveness 
dimension. 
It follows that the results for the attractiveness variables are consistent with 
Fafchamps and Minten (2006). They conclude that certain forms of crime respond to 
economic incentives while others do not. This also reinforces the argument that both 
economic and sociological dimensions should be considered when analyzing 
victimization.  
 
(ii) Exposure 
The above observations are reinforced by looking at determinants in the 
exposure group. We generally find a significant influence of exposure variables on the 
probability of being victimized both at the individual and the household level. At the 
individual level we confirm that males have a higher probability of being victimized 
than females. However, members of female headed families have a higher probability of 
becoming a crime victim both in the individual and household level regressions. Males 
clearly tend to be more exposed than females, and the latter observation is in all 
likelihood driven by ambiguity vis-à-vis the guardianship dimensions of gender. 
Another result is that older people have a higher probability of victimization driven by 
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property crime. This holds even though we include several attractiveness controls 
(people accumulate assets over time and thereby increase their attractiveness for 
potential offenders). All in all, this might suggest that the ambiguity vis-à-vis 
guardianship may be effective. Older people are in Mozambique less able to protect 
themselves at the individual level, ceteris paribus, possibly linked to their physical 
ability to protect themselves. In contrast, when persons live in households with an older 
household head this reduces as expected the risk of victimization (individual level 
regressions), probably linked in part to the experience embodied in age.  This result is, 
however, only significant in the assault regression when aggregating the analysis to the 
household level.  
In the individual level regressions we see (in accordance with the literature) that 
employed people have a higher probability of being victimized than their unemployed 
and studying counterparts. It suggests that exposure is indeed important, but we also 
note that this result is largely driven by the property crime (burglary) regression. We 
have tried to control for individual attractiveness in order to account for ambiguity in 
categorizing employment; but we cannot exclude that there are elements of 
attractiveness involved reinforcing the exposure link. Finally, single people are less 
victimized than their marital and divorced counterparts in Mozambique. This is opposite 
to what is normally found in the literature (Fajnzylber et al., 2000), but our result holds 
for all types of victimization. This indicates that it is a common characteristic of the 
Mozambican case, probably related to greater exposure of these groups (noting that we 
have controlled for the fact that guardianship may be different for single people). 
 
(iii) Proximity 
Looking at proximity characteristics it appears that individuals, who are 
educated (measured vis-à-vis those without any education), are more likely to be 
victimized (except for assaults in the individual level regressions). This is in accordance 
with Gaviria and Pàges (2002). They argue that educated people are more proximate to 
crime than less educated people. In the Mozambican context, we do not find this 
convincing. It is more appropriate to suggest that being educated may transmit some 
kind of signal of being a more attractive target of crime, even if we highlight that we 
have tried to control for other factors of influence, including attractiveness. In any case, 
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proximity and exposure (and probably also guardianship to some extent) are probably 
all playing a role here, the net effect being positive. Unemployment at the community 
level tends to increase the individual probability of being victimized. We believe this is 
a result that is largely and directly driven by the fact that living in areas with high 
community unemployment increases the probability of being assaulted.  
Consistent with Bourguignon et al. (2003) and Soares (2004), we find 
indications of a positive relationship between inequality and the risk of victimization. 
When disaggregating by type of crime the relationship between inequality and assaults 
as well as burglary turn out insignificant. That is, victimization in terms of larceny is 
sizeable, significant and positively related to income inequality whereas the relationship 
turns both insignificant (for assaults and burglary) and of much smaller size (for 
assaults). This suggests that for these types of crime, proximity is less important, but it 
may also reflect to some extent that there are counter veiling effects from ambiguity in 
relation how to classify inequality. Finally, there is as expected an indication of high 
population density being associated with greater risk of being burglarized in 
Mozambique both in the individual and the household level analysis. In sum, proximity 
does indeed seem to matter, but the general picture is complex.  
 
(iv) Guardianship 
Finally, when we turn to determinants classified in the guardianship category, it 
is clear that household size yields different results depending on whether the analysis is 
done at the individual or at the household level. At the individual level, household size 
is significant and negatively related to victimization in accordance with typical lifestyle 
theories. Family members tend to look after each other and the household does seem to 
serve as a network of protection (Fajnzylber et al., 2000). We find a positive and weakly 
significant relationship between household size and victimization at the household level 
driven by property crimes. This suggests that the greater exposure caused by more 
members outweighs the guardianship effect, illustrating the unavoidable ambiguity in 
classifying a variable such as household size. Yet, this observation does illustrate the 
need for bringing economics and sociological approaches together.  
A larger share of adult males in a household seems to reduce the risk of 
becoming a victim, and according to Table 5 this is especially so for burglaries, which is 
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in all likelihood a clear guardianship effect. Turning to distance to the police station, 
this variable may be expected to have an effect on the probability of criminals being 
caught and therefore on the risk of victimization, in line with the economics approach. 
However, coefficients do not depict a clear picture, except that when distances are large, 
the risk of victimization decreases (noting that we have controlled for a series of other 
variables related to exposure, proximity and attractiveness). This may well suggest that 
police services are not altogether effective in terms of guardianship, but we wish to note 
that reverse causality may also be at play, i.e. police stations may be placed where 
criminal rates and the risk of victimization is higher. Our results correspond with the 
findings in Fajnzylber et al. (2000) for Latin America, and they do seem to suggest that 
the Fafchamps and Moser (2003) result for Madagascar, where crime increases with 
distance to urban centers, does not hold in the case of Mozambique.13  
 
(b) Economic Loss from Victimization 
As a measure of the severity of economic loss due to victimization (caused by 
property crimes, but excluding assaults), we use the logarithm of the ratio of monetary 
loss to yearly household income. For the 1,937 households with economic loss due to 
crime the mean ratio is 25.3% of yearly household income (9.2% excluding households 
reporting loss greater than yearly income). The similar mean for the entire population is 
6.1%. The few observations with very high loss ratios (i.e. greater than 100% of yearly 
income) can however be included in the analysis since leaving them out has no effect on 
the estimates of the effect of household income on relative loss.14 We are particularly 
interested in the relationship between relative loss and household assets and therefore 
include household consumption and household consumption squared as explanatory 
proxy variables together with household level variables included in Table 4 – except 
distance to police station. In the robustness analysis we show that the coefficients on 
consumption and consumption squared are not sensitive to which other explanatory 
variables are included. The selection equation is the same as the household level probit 
regression reported in Table 6. Provincial and rural/urban dummies together with 
community variables and distance to police station are excluded from the loss 
regression. Thus, we implicitly assume that these variables have no effect on the size of 
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the economic loss from victimization when controlling for the household level variables 
described above.   
Table 7 presents the results when controlling for selection and – for comparison 
– without controlling for selection. 
 
Table 7: Loss from victimization 
      Heckman OLS 
Group Classification Variable Mean t-stats Mean t-stats 
HH Attractiveness Real cons. (x100) -1.915*** (3.98) -1.249*** (3.10) 
  Real cons. squared (x100)  0.003*** (3.71)  0.002*** (3.04) 
  Durable goods: TV -0.276 (1.10) -0.265 (1.23) 
  Durable goods: Radio -0.294*** (2.57) -0.286*** (2.60) 
  Durable goods: Bicycle -0.181 (1.49) -0.141 (1.22) 
HH Exposure HH Gender -0.066 (0.42)  0.042 (0.28) 
  HH Age  0.007* (1.66)  0.006 (1.52) 
  HH Employment status -0.162 (0.64) -0.136 (0.58) 
HH Proximity HH Education 1 -0.467*** (2.78) -0.342** (2.22) 
  HH Education 2 -0.562** (2.37) -0.305 (1.42) 
  HH Education 3 -0.788*** (3.19) -0.626** (2.52) 
  HH Education 4 -0.756** (2.20) -0.567* (1.90) 
HH Guardianship Household size -0.100*** (4.42) -0.078*** (3.64) 
    Adult male share -0.283 (0.74) -0.268 (0.79) 
Observations   1937 Uncensored (8409) 1937 
Wald test of independent equations Chi2(1) = 5.69 P-value: 0.02     
Note: Dependent variable is the logarithm of the loss ratio (see main text). *, **, *** indicates significance at a 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. Base: Household head male, household head unemployed, household head no 
education. The coefficient estimates for the selection equation are not shown. Due to identical specification they are 
very close to the estimates reported for the household level probit in Table 5. 
 
The test for dependent equations reported in Table 7 illustrates the need for 
using a selection equation framework. Our interest centers on the estimates of the 
consumption terms. The convex relationship has an estimated turning point of around 
300 million Meticais (around 12,000 USD). This means that for all but a few 
households, the expected marginal loss ratio is decreasing in income. Poorer 
households, though less at risk of being victimized, lose a relatively large share of their 
income when they are victimized. This highlights that the vulnerability of the poor is 
also in this area of social and economic life a dimension that deserves careful attention 
by policy makers. Helping combat crime is of particular importance to the poorest 
which are hardest hit, in relative terms. 
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5. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
In this section, we analyze the robustness of the results presented in Section 4. 
We investigate how the results are affected when one or more of the variables 
previously identified as potential determinants of victimization are omitted. In an 
analogous way we then turn to investigating whether our results on the relation between 
economic loss from victimization and income are robust to changes in the specification. 
Following the literature on extreme bounds analysis, we run a systematic series 
of probit regressions to assess the sensitivity of the estimated coefficients to omission of 
specific groups of variables. Specifically, we divide the variables of Table 6 into two 
groups. One group contains what we denote as core variables. These are included in all 
subsequent regressions. The remaining variables belong to the second group – denoted 
secondary variables. The victimization dummy is then regressed on all possible linear 
combinations of the secondary variables including, in all the regressions, the full set of 
core variables. In other words, if the group of secondary variables is said to consist of k 
variables we perform 2k-1 regressions. 
The selection of core variables can of course take different directions. Yet, our 
main focus is on how individual and household characteristics affect the probability of 
being victimized. We therefore include as core variables all individual and household 
characteristics, excluding the three dummy variables indicating household possession of 
durable goods (due to their insignificance) and the distance to police station dummies 
because of the possible endogeneity mentioned above. This implies that the group of 
secondary variables is made up of 12 variables: Possession of durable goods (three 
variables), distance to police station (four variables), unemployment rate, inequality, 
average level of educational attainment, population density, and integration. 
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Table 8: Sensitivity analysis –summary statistics 
          
Group Classification Variable Max Min Mean AvgSTD PercSig Perc+ Perc- AvgT 
Ind  Attractiveness Income (x100) 1.301 1.100 1.196 0.446 1 1 0 2.682 
  Income squared (x100) -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.00 0 1 1.747 
Ind  Exposure Gender (x10) -4.656 -4.745 -4.706 0.527 1 0 1 8.932 
  Age (x100) 0.139 0.135 0.137 0.017 1 1 0 8.234 
  Empl. status: Studying -0.268 -0.287 -0.277 0.109 1 0 1 2.541 
  Empl. status: Unemployed -0.202 -0.230 -0.218 0.069 1 0 1 3.158 
  Marital status: Married 0.562 0.542 0.552 0.079 1 1 0 7.017 
  Marital status: Polygam 0.776 0.751 0.762 0.083 1 1 0 9.200 
  Marital status: Cohabit 0.671 0.657 0.664 0.071 1 1 0 9.389 
  Marital status: Divorced 0.848 0.821 0.836 0.108 1 1 0 7.740 
  Marital status: Widow 0.781 0.758 0.770 0.111 1 1 0 6.940 
Ind Proximity Education: Educ1 (x10) 2.593 2.459 2.531 0.537 1 1 0 4.713 
  Education: Educ2 (x10) 3.426 3.237 3.342 0.723 1 1 0 4.623 
  Education: Educ3 (x10) 3.484 3.102 3.246 1.001 1 1 0 3.241 
  Education: Educ4 (x10) 4.195 3.727 3.931 1.253 1 1 0 3.137 
HH Attractiveness Durable goods: TV (x10) 0.716 0.384 0.516 0.686 0 1 0 0.752 
  Durable goods: Radio (x10) -0.333 -0.506 -0.419 0.386 0 0 1 1.084 
  Durable goods: Bicycle (x10) 0.484 0.286 0.379 0.426 0 1 0 0.888 
HH Exposure HH Gender (x10) 3.342 3.075 3.195 0.585 1 1 0 5.465 
  HH Age (x100) -1.236 -1.287 -1.260 0.167 1 0 1 7.538 
  HH Employment status (x10) -0.690 -0.870 -0.773 0.703 0 0 1 1.100 
HH Proximity HH Education 1 (x10) -0.353 -0.577 -0.466 0.528 0 0 1 0.883 
  HH Education 2 (x10) 0.509 0.064 0.271 0.647 0 1 0 0.417 
  HH Education 3 (x10) -0.009 -0.811 -0.454 0.968 0 0 1 0.470 
  HH Education 4 (x10) 0.888 -0.082 0.343 1.250 0 0.98 0.02 0.276 
HH Guardianship Household size -0.034 -0.040 -0.037 0.007 1 0 1 5.104 
  Adult male share -0.345 -0.382 -0.365 0.131 1 0 1 2.784 
  Distance to police 2 0.108 0.004 0.067 0.076 0 1 0 0.890 
  Distance to police 3 0.072 -0.081 0.012 0.114 0 0.60 0.40 0.381 
  Distance to police 4 -0.005 -0.192 -0.092 0.089 0.01 0 1 0.991 
  Distance to police 5 -0.129 -0.230 -0.175 0.061 1 0 1 2.872 
Com Proximity Unemployment rate 1.292 0.657 0.981 0.601 0.12 1 0 1.635 
  Inequality 0.823 0.640 0.738 0.357 0.66 1 0 2.072 
  Average educational level 0.152 -0.086 0.039 0.086 0 0.71 0.29 0.727 
  Population density 0.015 0.005 0.010 0.007 0.21 1 0 1.442 
  Integration -1.137 -5.661 -3.717 4.698 0 0 1 0.791 
Note: See table 5 for description of base household. Max, Min and Mean are respectively the maximum, minimum and mean value of the point 
estimate over all regression. AvgSTD and AvgT are averages over the standard deviations and t-values, respectively. PercSig gives the percentage 
times the coefficient was significant. Perc+ indicates the number of times the coefficient had a positive sign and analogously for Perc-. 
 
Table 8 shows the summary statistics from this analysis. The first three columns 
show the maximum, minimum and average of the point estimate over all possible 
regressions discussed above. Column (4) shows the average standard deviation of the 
point estimates. Columns (5) to (7) contain the main results from the analysis. They 
reflect respectively the share of regressions where the point estimate is significant at the 
 76
5% level, the share with a positive point estimate (not necessarily significant), and 
finally the share of regressions with a negative point estimate. Column (8) gives the 
average t-value over all regressions. 
The core variables are remarkably robust. Only the dummy variable for higher 
education change sign in any combination with the secondary variables, and except for 
individual income squared, education and employment status of the household head 
they are always significant at the 5% level. The square of individual income is ‘on 
average’ significant at the 10% level. Regarding the secondary variables the results are 
more mixed. Only the dummy variable indicating the longest distance to a police station 
is significant in all the regressions, while the smallest and second longest distance 
dummies retain the same sign in all regressions. The attractiveness variables (TV, radio 
and bike) also have the same sign in all regressions, though never significant. The 
unemployment rate, inequality and population density have sizeable shares of 
significant variables and together with integration the sign never varies. The average 
level of educational attainment is the only other variables where the point estimate 
switches sign depending on which secondary variables are included in the regression. 
Turning to the robustness of the economic loss from victimization we use a 
similar methodology. More specifically – in light of our findings above – we retain the 
same selection equation (3) in all the regressions. For the regression equation (2) we use 
the variables of primary interest, income and income squared, and household size as 
core variables. The group of secondary variables consists of gender, age, education 
(four variables), employment and the share of adult males at the household level, and 
possession of a TV, radio and a bicycle. Proceeding as described above leaves us with 
2,047 regressions.  
Table 9 summarizes our findings for the three core variables.15 As is evident 
from Table 9 the coefficient estimates of the income terms are very robust with respect 
to the specification of the regression equation. In all but a few regressions, they are 
clearly significant at the 5 percent level and the variability between regressions is small. 
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Table 9: Selection sensitivity analysis – summary statistics 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Variable Max Min Mean AvgSTD PercSigni Perc+ Perc- AvgT 
Household income (x10) -1.539 -2.969 -2.122 0.751 0.98 0 1 2.9 
Household income squared (x100) 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.001 1 1 0 3.0 
Household size -0.077 -0.140 -0.104 0.027 1 0 1 3.9 
Note: Max, Min and Mean are respectively the maximum, minimum and mean value of the point estimate over all regression. 
AvgSTD and AvgT are averages over the standard deviations and t-values, respectively. PercSig gives the percentage times the 
coefficient was significant. Perc+ indicates the number of times the coefficient had a positive sign and analogously for Perc-. 
Selection equation as specified in Table 5. Secondary variables are (see main text): gender, age education (4 variables) and 
employment of household head together with share of adult males in the household. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper departed from the observation that economics and sociology point in 
somewhat different directions when trying to understand victimization in developing 
countries. Economics suggests that focus should be on the potential offenders and their 
evaluation of costs and benefits of antisocial behavior. This implies, for example, that 
higher incomes among potential victims are, ceteris paribus, expected to lead to a 
greater risk of victimization. Moreover, economists have with few exceptions paid no 
attention to variation by type of crime and individual characteristics of the victims. 
Sociology, on the other hand, has been more concerned with the individual 
characteristics of potential victims, including in general a more complicated set of 
explanatory categories. This approach has, however, been hampered by poor links 
between theory and data, inadequate measures of key concepts and failure to specify 
clear functional forms of the relationship between various sets of variables (Meier and 
Miethe, 1993). 
While the sociological approach may to some reflect an idea that smacked of 
‘blaming the victim’ as formulated by Meier and Miethe (1993), it is equally correct 
that the economic approach may potentially suffer from its trying to move forward on 
‘one leg’ only, ignoring that there may be need to control for influential sociological 
variables before conclusions are drawn up. On this background, we proceeded to 
studying victimization in the case of Mozambique, relying on a unified analytical 
framework where both economic and sociological dimensions were allowed to speak. 
The choice of country case is justified both with a view to the fact that Mozambique 
belongs to the category containing the poorest countries in the world and because a 
novel and revealing, nationally representative household survey with relevant 
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information on victimization at the individual, household and community levels has 
recently become available. 
In discussing the identification of our explanatory variables, we highlighted that 
there are potential ambiguities involved in their categorization according to the four 
main factors emphasized in the sociological literature (attractiveness, proximity, 
exposure and guardianship). Individual level variables such as gender and age may, just 
to mention some examples, belong to several categories. Nevertheless, individual level 
variables do turn out to matter in a statistically significant and robust manner in our 
integrated analysis. Thus, the sociological approach helps ensure that potentially 
important differences between analyzing victimization from an individual and a 
household perspective are accounted for, and this does appear to matter. For example: 
• Males have a higher probability of being victimized, but members of female 
headed households are more at risk of becoming a victim, probably due to lower 
levels of guardianship. Preventive policies geared towards supporting female 
headed households emerge as important, in contrast with what follows from the 
former observation. 
• The guardianship variable ‘household size’ reduces the risk of becoming a 
victim when controlling for individual level characteristics. At the household 
level the conclusion is the reverse (driven by the burglary relationship). The 
bigger the household, the bigger the risk of victimization. There is in other 
words merit in viewing guardianship as related not only to public (police) 
initiatives but also to private aspects of deterrence, a dimension an offender view 
on victimization would not capture.  
Our analysis also showed that analyzing victimization from an aggregate economic 
point of view misses that the explanatory factors behind different types of crime may 
differ. We brought out a variety of such examples, including:  
• Inequality affects victimization, but only through larceny. Burglary and assault 
victimization are not affected. Similarly, it appears that lower unemployment 
will only decrease the assault rate, leaving burglary and larceny unaffected. It 
follows that a package of preventive policies geared towards employment 
creation and limiting inequality would affect larceny and assaults, but leave 
burglary unaffected. The general implication is that one-dimensional policy 
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action is unlikely to be effective. To achieve several different victimization 
goals, a series of complementary policy measure are required. On the other 
hand, if policy makers assign priority to for example the assault issue (as has 
been the case in Mozambique more recently), attention should certainly be paid 
to the reduction of unemployment. In contrast, lower inequality will not per se 
make assaults go away. 
In sum, by drawing upon the sociological literature we believe to have uncovered a 
more informed set of causal relationships than would have emerged in a ‘pure’ 
economic analysis. For sure, our ‘map’ for identifying individuals with the highest risk 
of victimization is more accurate than would otherwise have been the case. This is 
important both in general and with a view to the fact that policy makers may have 
specific groups of people or specific types of crime in mind as deserving priority 
attention. 
At the same time, our integrated analysis confirmed the critical importance of 
approaching victimization from an economic angle. While exposure was mainly viewed 
from a sociological perspective, attractiveness, proximity and guardianship are all 
dimensions, which are narrowly related to economic considerations. Their empirical 
significance is also clear, including in particular:  
• The probability of being victimized is increasing in income, but at a diminishing 
rate. The latter aggregate effect is mainly driven by the non-linearity between 
property crimes and income, but it is nevertheless clear that economic 
attractiveness matters across the board. The implication of our analysis is for 
example that both private and public guardianship measures should be 
promoted, taking due account of the importance of individual exposure. 
Moreover, it would appear that institutions offering effective insurance against 
victimization should be considered and promoted as an integral part of an 
overall strategy against crime and victimization. 
• Poorer households are less at risk of victimization. They exhibit lower 
attractiveness. They are also more vulnerable. They suffer proportionally larger 
losses when crime occurs. It is not straightforward to derive policy implications 
from this result, as a complex interpersonal metric of utility based on fractions 
of income are looming in the background. Yet, we do find the result of interest. 
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It merits careful attention by policy makers as well as further study, and we 
suggest that this characteristic is likely to be linked to poorer people possessing 
more limited guardianship than better off people. This implies inter alia that the 
design of criminal policy should take careful account of the distribution of 
preventive resources across social groups. 
In our review of the importance of employment status (classified under exposure) and 
education (classified under proximity) we also noted that there are in all likelihood 
elements of attractiveness involved in explaining the impact of the specific empirical 
variables included, especially in the education case. Thus, our analysis suggests that 
being employed and educated increase the risk of victimization, over and above the 
impact captured through individual income, which we controlled for. This might induce 
a negative incentive towards seeking employment outside the home, so policy makers 
may wish to focus attention on safety while workers are commuting alongside measures 
addressed to combat attractiveness crime. Furthermore, education does appear to 
increase victimization risk. It is not obvious what should be done about this, but policy 
makers should be aware that this carries with it the risk that better educated workers 
may eventually migrate or change behavior. Different kinds of insurance may be one 
way of dealing with this problem. 
In sum, we believe to have justified that it is indeed possible to increase our 
understanding of victimization following the advice of Meier and Miethe (1993) of 
incorporating sociological victimization theories into a unified theory of crime where 
functional relationships are clearly specified. We acknowledge the ambiguities 
involved, but wish to reiterate by way of general conclusion that the robust causal 
patterns identified in this paper can serve both as an input into policy formulation and as 
a more comprehensive starting point for future victimization research.  
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NOTES 
 
1 For further country specific context on Mozambique see for example UN (2005). Reference can also be 
made to the following website maintained by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=Mozambique. 
 
2 See Fafchamps and Moser (2003) and Demombynes and Özler (2005) for two important recent studies 
where a broad range of explanatory variables are relied on in explaining crime in respectively Madagascar 
and South Africa. While these two articles study crime we focus in this paper on the other side of the 
criminal event, victimization. 
 
3 Looking at the available evidence on guardianship factors it is important when interpreting the results to 
distinguish between ‘aggregate’ household level and ‘micro’ individual level studies. Moreover, Meier 
and Miethe (1993) note that few studies of guardianship have included sufficient controls for other factors 
influencing victimization risk. We focus here on the few existing individual level studies, which are 
closer in nature to the objective of the present paper. See for example Gaviria and Pàges (2002) for a 
recent analysis at the household level. 
 
4 Of households being victimized 90.2% suffered a property loss. We highlight that it is only these 90.2% 
of the victimized, who enter the selection equation (3) with a loss. The welfare loss suffered due to non-
property crime can of course be substantial, but an analysis hereof is well beyond the scope of the present 
paper. 
 
5 Mozambique has 10 administrative provinces (Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Nampula, Sofala, Zambézia, 
Manica, Tete, Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo) in addition to Maputo city. 
 
6 Exchange rate 1US$ = 25,000 Meticais or 1Metical = 0.00004 US$.  
 
7 Educ0 = Never went to school; Educ1 = Went to school but no grade obtained; Educ2 = literate and 
primary 1st completed; Educ3= primary 2nd completed; Educ4 = higher and technical educations. 
 
8 Thus, average education is calculated as (# of persons with edu0=1x0 + # of persons with 
edu1=1x1…)/# of persons. 
 
9 See MPF et al. (2004) for a detailed description of the construction of real consumption. 
 
10 The categorical values correspond to the time it takes to reach the police station on foot: 1 = 0-29 min.; 
2 = 30-44 min.; 3 = 45-60 min.; 4 = 60-119 min.; 5 =120+ min. When answering the question on distance 
to the police station households could choose mode of transportation. For some households distance on 
foot had to be constructed. This was done by giving all households that did not answer ‘on foot’, the 
corresponding average value for households in the same enumeration area that answered ‘on foot’. 
Moreover, we assumed that households which reported that they had more than 30 minutes transport by 
car to the nearest police station has been categorized under category 5. Similarly, households responding 
that they had more than 60 minutes by bicycle are put into category 5.  
 
11 In the sample, there are a few cases of people, who suffered more than one offense. They are however 
so few that they do not affect our overall results. In this paper we focus on whether people were 
victimized or not. 
 
12 Consumption figures are only available at the household level. In the analysis we also used household 
consumption to instrument household income. In order to capture the non-linearity in household income 
we created instruments interacting household real consumption with continuous exogenous regressors in 
our specification (household real consumption squared was a weak instrument for squared income 
according to our first stage regressions). We were left with eight instruments, exogenous by construction. 
The qualitative results reported in Table 6 do not change using this approach. 
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13 We included the control variable ‘distance to urban centres and markets’ and this did not change our 
distance to police station result. Moreover, we found an indication of distance to urban centres and 
markets being negatively related to the risk of being victimized in all specifications. 
 
14 We tried several different ‘cut-off’ values for the relative loss (i.e. only using observations with relative 
loss less than 10, 30 or 50% of yearly income). All estimations produced results very similar to using the 
full sample. 
 
15 A full set of regressions is available upon request. 
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APPENDIX 
The sociological categories in the routine activity framework are defined as follows 
(Cohen et al., 1981): 
a) Exposure 
The physical visibility and accessibility of persons or objects to potential 
offenders at any given time or place.  
b) Proximity 
The physical distance between areas where potential targets of crime reside and 
areas where relatively large populations of potential offenders are found. 
c) Guardianship 
The effectiveness of persons or objects in preventing violations from occurring, 
either by their presence alone or by some sort of direct or indirect action. 
d) Target Attractiveness 
The material or symbolic desirability of persons or property targets to potential 
offenders, as well as the perceived inertia of target against illegal treatment.  
e) Properties of Crimes 
The features of specific crimes that act to constrain strictly instrumental actions 
by potential offenders. For example, many larcenies are less difficult to commit 
and require less knowledge of victim routine activities than do burglaries. 
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Abstract 
 
An increasing number of orphans is one of the most unfortunate consequences of the AIDS 
pandemic in Africa. High HIV prevalence in Mozambique motivates this study. The 
projected 800,000 AIDS related adult deaths over the period 2004-2010 will leave 
significant numbers of orphans in their wake. Of these, many will reside in families where 
the household head is not their biological parent. We analyze the extent of discrimination in 
resource allocation within households against children who are not the biological 
descendant of the household head in Mozambique. Both Deaton’s outlay equivalence 
method and the related Engel curve approach are applied using a nationally representative 
survey from 2002/03. Results point to discrimination in the intra-household allocation of 
resources against children that are not direct biological descendants of the household head 
in poor households. Discrimination is identified in both the rural and urban sub-samples. In 
non-poor households, resource allocations between biological and non-biological children 
do not differ significantly. 
 
Keywords:  Mozambique, AIDS, Orphans, Outlay equivalence, Engel curves, Discrimination 
 
JEL classification: J13, D13 
                                                 
1 Address for correspondence: Mikkel.Barslund@econ.ku.dk. This is a much expanded version of an article 
with the same title appearing in American Journal of Agricultural Economics 88, No. 5.  
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1. Introduction and background 
 
High HIV prevalence in many parts of Africa motivates this study. For example, in 
Mozambique, the prevalence of HIV among adults aged 15-45 years in 2005 is estimated to 
be about 16.2 percent and is projected to climb (INE et al, 2004). Figure 1 illustrates 
estimated annual and cumulative adult AIDS deaths from 1991 to 2010. As shown in the 
figure, nearly 400,000 Mozambican adults were estimated to have died of AIDS related 
causes by 2003, the year of the survey. Worse, AIDS deaths are projected to grow rapidly 
through the rest of the decade. In fact, more than twice as many adults are projected to die 
in the period 2004-2010.  
 
Figure 1: Adult AIDS deaths in Mozambique. 
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Due to the tendency of the pandemic to strike young adults, AIDS related deaths leave 
significant numbers of orphans in their wake. A demographic and health survey (DHS) 
carried out in 2003 found that, for children under 15 years of age, approximately one child 
in ten had been orphaned (paternal, maternal, or dual) (INE, 2004). Demographic 
projections based on a time series of HIV prevalence data estimate an orphaning rate of 
more than 16% in 2003 for children below 18 years of age (INE et al., 2004). The 
difference in age categories (0-14 versus 0-17) explains part, but not all, of the difference in 
the rates. Reluctance on the part of surveyed households to admit the death of the biological 
mother of the child could account for the remaining difference and would explain the 
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relatively low ratio of maternal to paternal orphans in the DHS data relative to the 
demographic projections. Overall, despite some differences in quantity and nature, both 
sources of data point to significant orphaning. Furthermore, the number of orphans appears 
set to climb dramatically.2
 
Mozambican national policy specifically favors the integration of orphans into substitute or 
extended families (GM, 2004). This mirrors policy in other highly afflicted African 
countries such as Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Uganda (UNUSIDA, 1999). The 
approach has the advantage that orphans remain integrated within a family. This also 
implies that the resources available to families that accept orphans and the allocation of 
those resources within the household become of policy interest.  
 
Generally, resources are exceedingly tight within Mozambican households. In 1996-97, 
72% of children (aged 0-17) lived in households characterized as absolutely poor using a 
consumption based metric. By 2002-03, this share had improved considerably but remained 
very high with 58% of all children living in households characterized as absolutely poor. 
Although non-biological children tend to concentrate in households that are on average 
slightly better off (Nhate 2004), resource availability remains distinctly limited. Because of 
the severe limitation of available resources, difficult decisions regarding resource 
distribution have to be made. As noted by Hamilton (1964) biological bonds are important 
in the distribution of resources within the household implying the potential for 
discrimination against non-biological children. Some evidence of discrimination in 
Mozambique has already been found. Nhate (2004) found that children that are not 
biological descendants of the household head were significantly less likely to attend school 
in both rural and urban areas holding constant other factors. A qualitative survey 
commissioned by the World Bank building on interviews with parents as well as school 
managers found evidence of orphans more often being kept at home for domestic tasks 
(World Bank, 2004). 
 
                                                 
2 In 2003 there were around 470,000 maternal orphans in Mozambique. In 2010 the number is expected to 
reach 900,000 (National Statistics, Mozambique).  
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It is important to point out that, similar to Nhate (2004), this analysis compares children 
who are biological versus non-biological descendants of the household head rather than 
orphans specifically. The available database on consumption does not permit the 
identification of ‘true’ orphans. For the age group 15 and under, about one child in four is 
not the biological descendant of the household head and the AIDS pandemic can be 
expected to add considerably to this group of children over the next decade.3
 
Nevertheless, an important subset of children who are not the biological descendant of the 
household head is not likely to be at risk for discrimination. In particular, weak geographic 
coverage of higher primary and secondary school causes some families living in areas 
without access to schools to send children to live with relatives or friends in areas where 
primary schools are available. It may be plausibly assumed that children who are sent by 
their parents to live with another family in order to attend school are less likely to be 
discriminated against than the target group of interest children, such as orphans, who are 
forced into fostering due to some negative shock. As we are not capable of distinguishing 
between these two groups of children in our sample, the results obtained here could be 
viewed as a lower bound on the degree of discrimination within families against the target 
group of interest. 
 
A number of other African countries are facing large increases in orphans due to the AIDS 
pandemic. Therefore, the issue of how orphanhood affects important outcomes, like e.g. 
schooling, has recently been studied in a number of countries. Case et al. (2004) use DHS 
surveys for 10 sub-Saharan African countries to investigate if orphans are less likely to be 
enrolled in school compared to non-orphans once wealth is controlled for. They find that 
although orphans are on average poorer than non-orphans, this wealth gap does not explain 
the lower enrollment rate observed for orphans. Further, they find that closeness of the 
caretakers biological ties with the orphan affect the degree to which orphans are ‘under 
enrolled’. The closer the biological ties, the smaller is the enrollment gap. Sharma (2006) 
uses a panel for Malawi to assess the impact of orphanhood on schooling and finds that 
                                                 
3 For an unknown but likely substantial fraction of these children, the circumstance of being fostered reflects 
stress, such as the death of a parent, resulting in placement of the child with another family. We hypothesize 
that these children are at risk of being discriminated against. 
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they are less likely to complete as many years as non-orphans. Beegle et al. (2006) find that 
orphans in Northwestern Tanzania lose out on schooling relative to non-orphans. Also, 
there are indications that orphanhood is associated with height deficiencies although longer 
spanning longitudinal data is needed to see if the effect is permanent. Case and Ardington 
(2006) look at data from South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province and find a negative effect 
on schooling outcomes from being a maternal orphan, but no effects for paternal orphans. 
Evans and Miguel (2005) find similar results in their analysis from a district in rural Kenya. 
 
In the present study we focus on possible discrimination in intra-household allocation of 
resources in general and related to expenditure on education and children’s clothing. The 
issue of how resources are allocated within households has become an important focus of 
poverty analysis. Unfortunately, where individual consumption data is not available, intra 
household resource allocations are difficult to measure directly; and standard household 
consumption surveys rarely attempt to do so. To counter this difficulty, indirect measures 
have been developed. In particular, Deaton (1989a) proposed a method, labeled ‘outlay 
equivalence’, whereby spending on children is measured indirectly via spending on adult 
goods. The intuition is that the addition of a child should imply increased spending on 
goods for children. If total consumption levels are inflexible (i.e. the budget constrain is 
binding), the budget constraint must then imply reduced spending on adult goods. Since, 
particularly in developing countries, pure adult goods are often easier to identify than pure 
children’s goods, the method has become popular. Where aggregate household expenditure 
has been available for pure children goods (i.e. education and clothing expenditure) a 
method known as the Engel curve approach has been applied. The intuition behind this 
approach is that once total expenditure and household size have been controlled for the 
composition of the households’ children in biological and/or non-biological children should 
not influence the expenditure share on children’s goods. Below we utilize both designs in 
order to detect possible discrimination. 
 
A large number of applications have often focused on whether female children are 
discriminated against relative to their male counterparts. Although, some studies have 
found significant differences between boys and girls in Asia using either or both of the two 
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methods (i.e. Miller, 1981; Deaton, 1989b; Behrman, 1990; Gibson and Rozelle, 2004; and 
Kingdon, 2005), researcher have often been puzzled by the failure of the methods to detect 
differences even where their presence are strongly insinuated by other indicators (Case and 
Deaton, 2002). In African countries, studies tend not to find statistically significant 
evidence of discrimination against girls (Deaton, 1989b; Haddad and Reardon, 1993). 
Based on analysis of an individual level data set, Kingdon (2005) argues that two effects 
could account for the failure of the Engel curve methodology. First, aggregation might 
dilute discrimination sufficiently to render it undetectable, and second, the functional form 
usually estimated may not be up to the job. She suggests a modification which works well 
in her application and we pursue it here. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses both data and both 
the outlay equivalence and Engel curve methods. Section 3 presents and compares the 
results. The final section presents conclusions. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
2.1. Methodology 
 
2.1.1. Outlay equivalence analysis 
The first part of the analysis of orphan discrimination follows the methodology outlined by 
Deaton (Deaton, 1989b. See also Gibson and Rozelle, 2004, for a recent application). The 
methodology is briefly described below.  
 
The first step is to identify a bundle of adult goods and test if the proposed adult goods are 
demographically separable from children demographic groups, meaning that children 
should have only an income effect but not substitutability effect. This is equivalent to 
testing the joint significance of the coefficients on the children demographic variables in 
the following linear model: 
  ∑ ++++= iijijGiiii zdncXqp εαα .10     
 (1) 
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where  is expenditure on the candidate adult good i, is total expenditures on adult 
goods,  is the number of members in demographic category j, z is a vector of other 
explanatory variables included in the model, and 
iiqp GX
jn
iε  is the error term. Given total 
expenditures on adult goods, children should not influence the distribution of spending 
across adult goods.4 If the goods included are really adult goods, children will not have any 
effect in equation (1). Therefore, the coefficients, , should be jointly different from zero 
for demographic groups related to children in order for demographic separability to hold.  
ijc
 
Following the test of existence of adult goods using equation (1), we calculate the outlay 
equivalent ratios. The equivalent ratio, irπ , for a normal adult good i and demographic 
category r, can be calculated as: 
x
n
xqp
nqp
ii
rii *
)(
)(
ir ∂∂
∂∂=π
       
 (2) 
where x is total household expenditure, n total household size and nr number of household 
members of demographic category r. irπ  measures the effect of the addition of a member of 
demographic type r on total expenditure on good i in terms of the change in total 
expenditure that would be necessary to produce the same effect on adult good demand with 
this change presented as a share of per capita expenditure. For adult goods, one would 
expect an additional child to have the same effect as a reduction in income (measured by 
total expenditure) and hence a negative value for irπ . 
 
Following Deaton, (1989a), the expenditure outlay equivalent ratios in (2) can be calculated 
using the coefficients estimated from a standard Engle curve, specified in the following 
way: 
1
1
ln( ) ln ( ) .
j
ji i
i i i i i j i
j
np q x
w n
x n n i
zα β η γ δ μ
−
=
= = + + + + +∑      
(3) 
                                                 
4 In the empirical analysis a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test was done to test the endogeneity of total adult goods 
expenditures. If the test of exogeneity was rejected, 2SLS with total expenditure as an instrument was 
employed. 
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where wi is the budget share of the ith adult good, and z is a vector of control variables. The 
estimated parameters in equation (3) can be used to calculate: 
1
( ) (
j
j
i i i r i j
j
i r
i i
n
n
w
η β γ γ
π β
=
− + −
= +
∑ )
      
(4) 
Estimates of these ratios are obtained by substituting the parameters with their respective 
estimates (from equation 3) and substituting wi and the fraction nj/n by their mean values in 
the sample. The test of equal treatment between biological and non-biological children in 
each age group and for all adult goods is equivalent to testing the hypothesis 
ikijHo ππ =:           
(5) 
where j refers to biological children and k to non-biological children in the same age group. 
The test is simple to implement by testing the equality of the demographic coefficients in 
(3) via a t-test.  
 
Standard errors for the π ratios were derived using the non-parametric bootstrap 
methodology (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The bootstrap method involves drawing 
synthetic samples of the same size as the original sample by sampling with replacement 
from the original sample.5 Hence, an arbitrary observation from the original sample may 
appear not at all, once, or multiple times within a given synthetic sample. Regressions using 
equation (3) were run on 1000 synthetic samples and the π ratios were calculated in each 
instance. Standard errors are then calculated from this sample of 1000 π ratios. An 
alternative approach to deriving standard errors for the π ratios is described in Deaton et al. 
(1989a). The bootstrap approach has the advantage of accommodating the non-linear nature 
of the π ratios as a function of the estimated parameters as well as allowing for clustered 
data sampling. 
 
                                                 
5 The method for drawing synthetic samples paralleled the approach for drawing the original sample. In 
particular, since data is clustered, clusters are sampled rather than observations. 
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An additional test for demographic separability is available as a further check on the 
validity of the chosen adult goods (Deaton et al., 1989a). If separability holds then the 
addition of a child will act as an equally sized income effect on all adult goods, thus, the 
outlay equivalent ratios should be equal across goods for a given (children) demographic 
group k. If πk denotes the vector of π-ratios for all M adult goods in demographic group k, 
and kπ the average of the π-ratios over the M adult goods, then testing equality of the π-
ratios is equivalent to testing the M-1 linear restrictions: ik kπ π= for all .1,..,i = M 6 To 
form the appropriate Wald statistics, construct the matrix ( / )A I ii M′= − where I is an 
MxM identity matrix and i is a Mx1 unit vector. The set of linear restrictions can now be 
expressed as kAπ . The Wald statistics are distributed as 2χ  with M-1 degrees of freedom 
under the null hypothesis and given by 
[ ] 1( )r k kW A A V A A kπ π −′ ′ ′= π .       (6) 
( )kV π  is the variance-covariance matrix for the M π-ratios for demographic group k. The 
empirical variance matrix is obtainable from the bootstrapped sample of π-ratios. 
  
2.1.2. Engel curve approach 
The Engel curve methodology relies on the estimation of Engel curves for children’s goods 
controlling for household demographic composition. In absence of differential treatment, 
the share of biological children (in total household size) should have the same effect on the 
expenditure share as the share of non-biological children in the same age group. 
Consequently, the test of equal coefficients provides a test for equal treatment. As is aptly 
summarized in Kingdon (2005) previous studies have estimated Engel curves of the form 
defined in equation (3) by OLS, despite a large number of households having zero 
purchases on the good. An issue which also pertains to the present data set as evident from 
Table 1. Using an individual level data set from India showing discrimination against girls, 
Kingdons analysis suggests that accounting for zero consumption might improve the Engel 
curves ability to detect discrimination. We follow her recommendation and specify a hurdle 
model of the form (Wooldridge, 2002): 
                                                 
6 Note the last restriction is redundant, hence the M-1 degrees of freedom. 
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( 0 | ) 1 ( )P s Z Zγ= = − Φ       (7)   
log( ) | ( , 0)s Z s > ~ 2( , )N Zβ σ        (8) 
The share of children goods in total expenditure is denoted s, Z is a vector including the full 
t of explanatory variables from equation (3), γ and β are conformable coefficient vectors. 
Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Embedded in the formulation (7) 
and (8) is that whether a household has expenditure on the analyzed good or not is 
determined by a probit model. For households, where the expenditure share is positive, the 
logarithm of the expenditure share follows a normal distribution. Maximum likelihood 
estimation is laid out in Wooldridge (2002) and is equivalent to first estimate (7) by a 
probit, and then OLS estimation of the logarithmic expenditure share on explanatory 
variables. Using probabilities of the lognormal distribution it be shown that
se
can  the 
unconditional expectation of s and the marginal effect of a variable z Z∈  are given by: 
    (9) 2( | ) ( ) exp( / 2)E s Z Z Zγ β σ= Φ +   
[ ]2exp( / 2) ( ) ( )Z Z Z
z
( | )E s Z β σ γφ γ β γ= + + Φ∂      (10) 
Similar to the method of obtaining standard errors for the outlay equiva
∂
lence ratios we 
dopt a bootstrap approach to allow for the clustered nature of the data set.7
ormation. The survey collected expenses on 863 different goods (food and 
non-food).   
                                                
a
 
2.2. Data 
The data used in this study comes from the Mozambique national household survey about 
living conditions (IAF) undertaken by the National Institute of Statistics (INE). This survey 
is representative at the national, provincial, and rural/urban levels. The survey was 
conducted between July 2002 and June 2003. The year long interview period was 
programmed in order to capture potential seasonality in household consumption. The 
survey covered 8,700 households corresponding to about 44,000 individuals. Enumerators 
visited each household at least three times over the period of a week to collect consumption 
and other inf
 
 
7 A 1,000 random draws with replacement are performed. For each draw marginal effects are calculated for 
the relevant demographic groups. 
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For the purpose of the outlay equivalence method we are specifically interested in 
identifying adult goods, i.e. goods that children do not consume. If a good is a true adult 
good, the addition of a child (with the concomitant expenses necessary to support that 
child) acts in a manner analogous to a reduction in income with respect to spending on 
adult goods. For the case of normal goods, consumption should decline. Six candidate adult 
goods were identified including: adult clothes; alcoholic beverages (inside and away from 
ome); personal care (hair treatment, nail products, lipstick, “mulala”, lotion, etc,); public 
 making 
recise recall difficult. Nevertheless, since we are interested in all indicators which can 
versus boys and girls. Whereas differences found in boy-girl comparisons using adult goods 
or children’s goods can be due to differential norms regarding the dressing or teaching of 
                                                
h
and private transportation services; tobacco; and food and soft drinks away from home.  
 
For the Engel curve approach we identify two children goods. Engel curves are estimated 
separately for these two goods. If no discrimination is present then the composition of the 
children in a household should not affect the expenditure share. The survey included 
questions on yearly expenditure on primary education (EP1 and EP2) – including school 
uniforms – and monthly expenditures on children’s clothing and footwear.8 While a 
monthly recall question should give a good estimate of households’ expenditure on 
children’s clothing and footwear (at least for items deemed by the respondent to belong to 
these groups), the yearly recall question on education expenditure may not be particularly 
accurate. At the time of the survey the structure of school fees in Mozambique was rather 
erratic with enrollment, examination, graduation and add-hoc fees (World Bank, 2004).9 
Anecdotal evidence also points to some extent of informal fees being asked for children to 
be promoted to the next class. The questionnaire covers ‘fees’ and it is not clear if all types 
of fees are included. In particular, it is doubtful if informal/illegal fees are covered. Even in 
the best of circumstances, fees are paid irregular throughout the year, perhaps
p
illuminate if discrimination is present, educational expenditure is used cautiously. 
 
Note the advantage of comparing biological and non-biological children of the same gender 
 
8 In the Portuguese questionnaire there are two entries: ‘Calçado para criança’ (footwear) and ‘Vestuario para 
criança’ (clothing). 
9 School fees have since been abolished for primary schools. 
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boys and girls, this does not apply to differences between biological and non-biological 
children of the same gender.10
 
Fejl! Henvisningskilde ikke fundet. presents relevant data for this study. The analysis will 
be conducted for rural and urban zones in order to capture differential characteristics of 
rural and urban families. Furthermore, the analysis will also be performed separately for 
poor and non-poor household. Poor households are defined as those living below a poverty 
line that reflects basic needs (Ministry of Planning and Development et al, 2004). Resource 
constraints in these households living below the poverty line are severe and may influence 
intra-household resource allocation decisions. In other words the budget constraint is more 
likely to be binding. Finally, following general practice, 1046 households without any 
children and 538 households with only a single household member were excluded from the 
sample leaving a total of 7116 households with at least one child present in the final 
sample.   
 
The average budget share of the candidate adult goods as a group is 13 percent. Tobacco 
and adult clothes are the goods that have the highest share among all adult goods. Each of 
these two goods represents about 4 percent in total of expenditure. The groups “food and 
soft drinks consumed away from home” and “personal care” represent small shares of total 
expenditures (0.2 and 0.6 percent, respectively). Generally, budget shares for adult goods 
are higher in urban than in rural areas. In urban areas, these goods represent 15 percent of 
total expenditures compared with 11 percent in rural areas. Differences between rural and 
urban samples are most marked with respect to transportation and personal care products. 
Overall, the shares for adult goods observed in Mozambique are similar to values found in 
other developing countries. In Burkina Faso, for example, Haddad et al. (1993) found that 
these goods represented 15 percent of total expenditures. In Papua New Guinea, Gibson 
and Rozelle (2004) found that candidate adult goods represented 12 percent of total of 
expenditure. 
                                                 
10 There could still be differences between biological and non-biological children. For example, if biological 
children are more astute due to better circumstances as a small child, and therefore work and play more, 
clothing expenditures might be higher for biological than non-biological children without the difference being 
attributable to discrimination. However, we believe the size of such effects to be negligible. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (mean values). 
Variables 
Full 
sample 
Urban 
sample 
Rural 
sample 
Full  
Sample 
Rural 
Sample 
Expenditure share:      
    Total adult goods 0.125 0.153 0.114 7,116  3,805 
    Of which:  Alcohol 0.010 0.011 0.010 7,116   3,805 
                      Tobacco 0.043 0.049 0.041 7,116   3,805 
                      Adult clothing 0.043 0.043 0.043 7,116   3,805 
                      Transportation 0.022 0.035 0.016 7,116   3,805 
                      Food and soft drinks consumed away from home 0.002 0.004 0.001 7,116   3,805 
                      Personal care 0.006 0.011 0.004 7,116   3,805 
Education (EP1, EP2, S1, S2) 0.007 0.012 0.003 5694  2,957 
Education (EP1, EP2, S1, S2)  (households with expenditure>0) 0.009 0.013 0.005 4538  2080 
Children’s clothing 0.005 0.005 0.005 5694   2,957 
Children’s clothing (households with expenditure>0) 0.0487 0.050 0.047 594 294 
Log of  total household expenditures 9.151 9.496 8.851 7,116   3,805 
Log of household size 1.556 1.632 1.491 7,116   3,805 
Demographic composition: Proportion of .. (group)      
     (1)  Biological children aged 0-5 years 0.150 0.128 0.170 7,116   3,805 
     (2)  Non-biological children aged 0-5 years 0.040 0.042 0.038 7,116   3,805 
     (3)  Biological children aged 6-10 years 0.104 0.098 0.109 7,116   3,805 
     (4)  Non-biological children aged 6-10 years 0.032 0.032 0.032 7,116   3,805 
     (5)  Biological children aged 11-15 years 0.079 0.082 0.076 7,116   3,805 
     (6)  Non-biological children aged 11-15 years 0.031 0.035 0.028 7,116   3,805 
     (7)  People aged 16-20 years 0.110 0.130 0.092 7,116   3,805 
     (8)  People age d 21-25 years 0.075 0.087 0.065 7,116   3,805 
     (9)  People aged 26-59 years 0.320 0.320 0.319 7,116   3,805 
    (10) People with more than 60 years of age 0.059 0.045 0.072 7,116   3,805 
Proportion of households headed by women 0.252 0.266 0.239 7,116   3,805 
Educational level of household head 1.106 1.884 0.432 7,116   3,805 
The mean age of the household head 42.937 42.696 43.146 7,116   3,805 
Proportion of household with a person working in agriculture or fishing 0.756 0.503 0.976 7,116   3,805 
Proportion of household with a person working in commerce 0.180 0.313 0.0065 7,116   3,805 
Proportion of household with a person working in the services sector 0.142 0.270 0.030 7,116   3,805 
Source: IAF2002/03 as described in the main text. 
 
Educational expenditures include fees for lower primary one (EP1, grade 1-5), upper 
primary (EP2, grade 6-7), lower secondary (SE1, grade 8-10) and upper secondary (SE2, 
grade 11-12) for both public and private schools together with spending on school 
uniforms. The expenditure share is generally low, and a large number of households do not 
have any educational expenditure. This reflects in part children not being enrolled in 
school, and partly that non-paying children are sometimes allowed to stay in school (World 
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Bank, 2004).11 Expenditure on children’s clothing is overall quite low due to the large 
number of households not purchasing in the recall period. However, for households 
incurring expenses it rises to around 5 percent. 
 
To study the influence of demographic effects the household members were divided into 10 
groups. The first six groups, comprised of people less than 15 years of age, are the ones of 
primary interest for this study. The remaining four groups include adults that are used for 
the confirmation of the presence of adult goods. The groups were divided in the following 
way: biological children aged 0-5 years (group 1), non-biological children aged 0-5 years 
(group 2), biological children aged 6-10 years (group 3), non-biological children aged 6-10 
years (group 4), biological children aged 11-15 years (group 5), non-biological children 
aged 11-15 years (group 6). For the rest of the age groups, the categorizations were as 
follows: people aged 16-20 years (group 7), people aged 21-25 years (group 8), people aged 
26-59 years (group 9), people 60 years and older (group 10). The largest demographic 
category is biological children aged 0-5 years in rural areas. Of the total rural population, 
nearly 17 percent are biological children aged 0-5 years old. In urban areas, the same group 
represents about 13 percent of the total population. Non-biological children in the same age 
group represent only about 4 percent of the total population.  
 
In the study sample, about 25 percent of the households are headed by women with a 
slightly higher percentage in urban areas compared to rural areas (27 and 24 percent 
respectively). In terms of productive activities, 76 percent of the households have one or 
more members active in agriculture and fishing. Agriculture and fishing utterly dominates 
activities in rural areas with 98% of households having one member at least part-time active 
in this sector. Agriculture remains important in urban areas with 50 percent of households 
having an individual identifying it as a primary activity. In urban areas, 31 percent of 
households reported having a member working in trading/commerce. For service activities 
the number is 27 percent. 
  
                                                 
11 General problems with the reporting of education expenditures (as discussed above) may also explain the 
low share. 
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 3. Results 
 
For both the outlay equivalence method and the Engel curve approach, the analysis is 
performed at the rural and urban levels with households further divided by socio-economic 
status (poor and non-poor households). The results are first described for poor and then for 
non-poor households. 
 
3.1 Analysis for poor households  
 
3.1.1 Outlay equivalence method 
Table 2 presents p-values from the tests for identification of adult goods based on equation 
(1) for the sub-set of poor households. The last column shows the p-values for the joint 
tests (in italics). The results for this sub-set of population indicate that all six candidate 
adult goods qualify, although tobacco is a borderline case. 
 
Table 3 presents π-ratios and standard errors for the analysis conducted at rural and urban 
levels respectively, for poor households. As stated above, negative π ratios indicate 
compression of expenditure on the associated adult good due to the addition of a child in a 
given age group. There are seven goods (the six adult goods plus the results for all six 
goods combined) and three age classes resulting in 21 comparisons at each of the two levels 
of analysis (rural and urban) or 42 comparisons overall. However, the crucial comparison is 
with respect to the aggregate of all six adult goods. For this case, the relationship is as 
hypothesized (greater compression of expenditure on adult goods with respect to biological 
children) in five of six instances. For urban 0-5 year olds the result indicate possible reverse 
discrimination. The results from the Wald tests of equal π-ratios across adult goods 
(equation 6) are shown in Table 4. For all children demographic groups in rural and urban 
areas the hypothesis of equal π-ratios cannot be rejected, thus confirming the results from 
the F-tests presented in Table 2. 
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Table 3. Poor households: Outlay equivalence ratios. 
Adult goods 
Biological 
0-5  
Non-
biological  
0-5 
Biological 
6-10  
Non-
biological  
6-10 
Biological 
11-15 
Non-
biological 
11-15 
 Urban 
Alcohol 
 0.093 
 (0.647) 
0.027 
(0.604) 
0.206 
(0.778) 
-0.216 
(0.592) 
1.199 
(0.900) 
0.094 
(0.732) 
Tobacco 
 0.715 
 (0.767) 
0.325 
(0.766) 
-0.216 
(0.503) 
-0.638 
(0.779) 
-0.723* 
(0.372) 
0.287 
(0.798) 
Adult clothing 
 0.028 
 (0.309) 
-0.496* 
(0.299) 
-0.680** 
(0.303) 
0.144 
(0.404) 
-0.886*** 
(0.269) 
0.279 
(0.637) 
Transportation 
 0.027 
 (0.256) 
-0.195 
(0.340) 
-0.512* 
(0.301) 
0.074 
(0.350) 
-0.401 
(0.284) 
-0.136 
(0.461) 
Meal and drink away home 
 -0.153 
 (0.449) 
-0.620 
(0.668) 
0.028 
(0.654) 
-0.472 
(0.672) 
-0.382 
(0.645) 
-1.408** 
(0.669) 
Personal Care 
 -0.234 
 (0.258) 
-0.488 
(0.353) 
-0.213 
(0.238) 
-0.103 
(0.349) 
-0.461* 
(0.307) 
0.079 
(0.549) 
All 6 goods 
 0.180 
 (0.200) 
-0.179 
(0.245) 
-0.418** 
(0.187) 
-0.168 
(0.259) 
-0.580*** 
(0.149) 
0.096 
(0.310) 
 Rural 
Alcohol 
  -0.745* 
 (0.395) 
-1.014** 
(0.453) 
-0.591 
(0.389) 
0.560 
(0.827) 
-0.715* 
(0.423) 
-1.129** 
(0.504) 
Tobacco 
 -0.157 
 (0.346) 
0.919* 
(0.550) 
0.070 
(0.386) 
0.369 
(0.580) 
-0.092 
(0.434) 
0.485 
(0.632) 
Adult clothing 
 0.059 
 (0.190) 
0.211 
(0.328) 
-0.032 
(0.199) 
0.053 
(0.307) 
0.032 
(0.217) 
0.260 
(0.362) 
Transportation 
-0.388 
 (0.316) 
-0.011 
(0.486) 
-0.425 
(0.292) 
0.662 
(0.527) 
-0.111 
(0.388) 
-0.786** 
(0.390) 
Meal and drink away home 
 1.991 
 (1.373) 
-0.264 
(0.633) 
0.057 
(0.611) 
0.416 
(1.177) 
-1.887** 
(0.834) 
-0.028 
(0.785) 
Personal Care 
   -0.555** 
 (0.247) 
0.043 
(0.718) 
-0.387 
(0.259) 
0.793 
(1.416) 
-0.674** 
(0.332) 
-0.339 
(0.559) 
All 6 goods 
-0.168 
(0.133) 
0.223 
(0.204) 
-0.144 
(0.128) 
0.300 
(0.242) 
-0.152 
(0.165) 
-0.025 
(0.248) 
Notes: Outlay equivalence ratios calculated from equation 4. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are obtained by bootstrap with 
1,000 replications, cf. the main text. Entries in italics indicate a larger non-biological than biological outlay equivalence (reverse 
discrimination).  
*, **, *** denotes significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
Table 5 presents the results of t-tests for equality of π ratios between biological and non-
biological children at the rural and urban levels for each adult good. Again, the crucial tests 
are the ones for all six goods combined. For this aggregate, the greater compression of 
expenditure on adult goods with respect to biological children was found to be statistically 
significant for three of the six possible cases. Muddying the waters somewhat, the one case 
with an unexpected sign (more compression of household expenditures for non-biological 
children than biological in the case of children from 0-5 years old in urban areas) is also 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  
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Table 4. Poor households: Wald tests for equality of π-ratios across adult goods. 
 Rural  Urban 
Demographic group Test statistic  p-value Test statistic p-value 
(1) Biological (0-5 ) 8.262 0.14 1.861 0.87 
(2) Non-biological (0-5) 8.377 0.14 2.066 0.84 
(3) Biological (6-10 ) 3.359 0.64 3.002 0.70 
(4) Non-biological (6-10) 1.410 0.92 1.403 0.92 
(5) Biological (11-15 ) 8.957 0.11 6.225 0.28 
(6) Non-biological (11-15) 8.313 0.14 4.491 0.48 
General category (16-20) 9.663 0.09 6.717 0.24 
General category (21-24) 7.048 0.22 11.374 0.04 
General category (25-59) 8.491 0.13 4.958 0.42 
Notes: Wald statistic calculated from equation 6, distributed 2χ with 5 degrees of freedom. Reported p-values 
equal the probability of observing a Wald statistic larger than the reported test statistic under the null of equality of 
π-ratios. 
 
Table 5. Poor households: T-tests for equality of π-ratios for each age group. 
 Urban  Rural 
Adult goods 
Children 
0-5 
Children 
6-10 
Children 
11-15  
Children 
0-5 
Children 
6-10 
Children 
11-15 
 P- Values 
Alcohol 0.92 0.59 0.32  0.56 0.26 0.50 
Tobacco 0.41 0.68 0.26  0.04** 0.60 0.38 
Adult clothing 0.22 0.08* 0.10*  0.67 0.83 0.63 
Transportation 0.63 0.12 0.56  0.45 0.08* 0.23 
Meal and soft drink 
away home 0.44 0.52 0.18  0.22 0.62 0.08* 
Personal Care 0.54 0.73 0.28  0.29 0.37 0.57 
All 6 goods 0.06* 0.40 0.05**  0.09* 0.06* 0.71 
Notes: P-values from t-test of equality of demographic coefficients from equation (3) for each good. 
*, **, *** denotes significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
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 3.12 Engel curve approach 
Table 6 shows the results from estimating Engel curves for children’s clothing expenditure 
for poor household in the rural and urban sub-samples. Starting with the rural sample, the 
first column gives estimated coefficients and their standard errors for a standard Engel 
curve specification estimated by OLS. In the two next columns the estimated coefficients 
from the hurdle model (equation 7 and 8) are presented. The last column in the rural section 
shows marginal effects on the expenditure share coming from the hurdle model. The last 
four columns display analogous results from the urban sample. Our interest centers on 
differences in coefficients across demographic groups belonging to the same age category. 
The last three rows summarize the differences for each column together with significance 
levels. A plus sign indicates a difference which is consistent with discrimination, i.e. more 
is spent on children’s clothing for biological children than for non-biological children 
controlling for other factors. For both the rural and urban samples the pure OLS estimates 
give some indication of discrimination, albeit in different age groups. In rural areas 
discrimination is significant at 10 percent for the 6 to 10 years old and at 5 percent in the 
age category 11 to 15 years old. For the urban areas there is – based on expenditures on 
children’s clothing – weak evidence (significant at 10 percent) of discrimination for the age 
group 0-5 years. For the hurdle model significant differences (5 percent) only show up in 
the rural sample for the oldest age group (11 to 15 years). Note, that even though some of 
the differences in coefficients between demographic groups are consistent with reverse 
discrimination (indicated by a minus sign) – none of these are significant. To the extent that 
discrimination is present in the data, the hurdle model does not seem to be better than a 
pure OLS estimation to detect them. The fact that both models find significant 
discrimination for the 11 to 15 year old children in rural areas is taken as a sign of 
robustness of the result. 
 
Table 7 is equivalent to Table 6 but for educational expenditure. Despite a majority of 
individual level regressions showing significant coefficients on the demographic groups, 
we find no significant differences between the impact of biological and non-biological 
demographic groups for school age children. 
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 Although the outlay equivalence analysis on poor households contains the one 
counterintuitive result that biological children are discriminated relative to non-biological 
children for the age group of 0 to 5 year olds in urban areas, overall, the results indicates 
discrimination in intra-household resource allocation against children that are not the 
biological descendant of the household head for poor households. The findings in the 
outlay equivalence analysis are somewhat corroborated by Engel curve analysis of 
expenditures on children’s clothing and education. In particular, discrimination is 
significant for children aged 6 to 10 years in rural areas for both the outlay equivalence and 
Engel curve analysis on clothing expenditure.  
 
3.2 Analysis for non-poor households  
 
3.2.1 Outlay equivalence method 
Table 8 presents results of the tests for identification of adult goods based on equation (1) 
for the subset of non-poor households. Three out of the six candidate adult goods fail to 
pass this test, namely adult clothing, tobacco and transportation. Since the method is invalid 
with non-adults goods, the analysis preceded using only the three goods (alcohol, 
Meal/drink away from home and personal care) that qualified as adult goods (Table 8). π-
ratios and their associated standard errors are presented in Table 9 and the Wald tests for 
equality of π-ratios across the three adult goods are given in Table 10. Results show that the 
hypothesis of the three good being adult goods cannot be rejected. Looking at all three adult 
goods combined (Table 9), four of the six comparisons of coefficients between biological 
and non-biological demographic groups show the outlay equivalence ratio to be smaller for 
biological than non-biological children, thus, indicating discrimination. However, Table 11 
– which shows p-values from the test of differences between π-ratios – fails to find any 
significant difference between biological and non-biological children.  
 
3.2.2 Engel curve approach 
The results from the Engel curve analysis of respectively children’s clothing and 
educational expenditure for non-poor households are given in Table 12 and 13. Starting 
with children’s clothing, the majority of coefficient comparisons are consistent with 
discrimination (last three rows).  
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Table 9. Non-poor households: Outlay equivalence ratios. 
       
Adult goods 
Biological 
0-5 
Non-
biological  
0-5 
Biological 
6-10  
Non-
biological  
6-10 
Biological 
11-15 
Non-
biological 
11-15 
 Urban  
Alcohol 
-0.472 
(0.561) 
-0.096 
(0.726) 
-0.715 
(0.556) 
-0.566 
(0.822) 
0.730 
(0.684) 
0.643 
(0.740) 
Meal and soft drink away home 
-2.050** 
(0.814) 
-1.345 
(1.663) 
-1.159 
(0.825) 
-2.481*** 
(1.368) 
-0.323 
(0.853) 
0.821 
(2.037) 
Personal care 
-0.576 
(0.431) 
-1.263 
(1.276) 
0.298 
(0.366) 
0.799 
(1.325) 
-0.564 
(0.472) 
0.702 
(0.818) 
All 3 goods 
-0.865* 
(0.467) 
-0.747 
(0.726) 
-0.543 
(0.364) 
-0.653 
(0.629) 
0.116 
(0.429) 
0.719 
(0.613) 
 Rural 
Alcohol 
-0.413 
(0.529) 
-0.360 
(0.702) 
-0.386 
(0.483) 
-1.107 
(0.686) 
-0.142 
(0.514) 
-0.107 
(0.795) 
Meal and soft drink away home 
-1.609* 
(0.891) 
5.113 
(3.815) 
-0.929 
(0.741) 
-1.909** 
(0.901) 
-1.748** 
(0.773) 
-1.654* 
(0.890) 
Personal care 
-0.493 
(0.344) 
0.337 
(0.865) 
0.154 
(0.475) 
0.354 
(0.754) 
-0.207 
(0.368) 
1.166 
(1.545) 
All 3 goods 
-0.497 
(0.402) 
0.125 
(0.510) 
-0.312 
(0.335) 
-0.860* 
(0.519) 
-0.254 
(0.383) 
0.065 
(0.668) 
Notes: Outlay equivalence ratios calculated from equation 4. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are obtained by bootstrap with 1,000 
replications, cf. the main text. Entries in italics indicate a larger non-biological than biological outlay equivalence (reverse 
discrimination).  
*, **, *** denotes significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
 
Table 10. Non-poor households: Wald tests for equality of π-ratios across adult goods.  
 Rural  Urban 
Demographic group Test statistic  p-value Test statistic p-value 
(1) Biological (0-5 ) 1.499 0.47 2.949 0.23 
(2) Non-biological (0-5) 2.214 0.33 0.894 0.64 
(3) Biological (6-10 ) 1.628 0.44 4.169 0.12 
(4) Non-biological (6-10) 4.207 0.12 3.150 0.21 
(5) Biological (11-15 ) 3.503 0.17 2.490 0.29 
(6) Non-biological (11-15) 3.170 0.20 0.008 0.99 
General category (16-20) 0.301 0.86 5.160 0.08 
General category (21-24) 2.476 0.29 3.155 0.21 
General category (25-59) 1.813 0.40 3.209 0.20 
Notes: Wald statistic calculated from equation 6, distributed 2χ with 2 degrees of freedom. Reported p-values equal the 
probability of observing a Wald statistic larger than the reported test statistic under the null of equality of π-ratios. 
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 However, only three of the differences in coefficients are significant and two of them point 
towards discrimination of biological children. Only the pure OLS model finds 
discrimination of non-biological children. This result is found for the youngest age group 
(0-5 years). Looking at Table 13 no significant results indicating discrimination in 
education expenditure are found and in general no consistent picture emerges from the 
(insignificant) differences in coefficients. 
 
Based on the methods employed we were not able to find any evidence of discrimination in 
the non-poor sample of households. 
 
Table 11. Non-poor households: T-tests for equality of π-ratios for each age group. 
 Urban  Rural 
Adult goods 
Children 
0-5  
Children 
6-10  
Children 
11-15  
Children 
0-5  
Children 
6-10  
Children 
11-15 
 P- Value 
Alcohol 0.64 0.81 0.73  0.96 0.39 0.93 
Meal drink away from home 0.65 0.34 0.67  0.16 0.19 0.84 
Personal Care 0.45 0.61 0.27  0.35 0.77 0.28 
All 3 goods 0.99 0.83 0.52  0.22 0.39 0.64 
Notes: P-values from the test of equality of π-ratios in each age group. P-values obtained from t-test of equality of means in 
the bootstrapped sample. 
*, **, *** denotes significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
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4 Conclusions 
 
The weight of evidence points to discrimination in the intra-household allocation of 
resources against children that are not direct biological descendants of the household head 
in poor households. The outlay equivalence analysis found significant discrimination for 
younger children (aged 0-10) in rural households and older children (aged 11-15) in urban 
households. For the rural households this was confirmed for the 6-10 year olds by the Engel 
curve approach (children’s clothing expenditure), which also found significant 
discrimination for the oldest age group in rural areas.  
 
There is no evidence that non-poor households discriminate against children that are not the 
biological descendant of the household head. There are two likely reasons underpinning the 
dichotomy of results between poor and non-poor households. First, resources are more 
severely constrained in poor versus non-poor households forcing more difficult choices in 
resource allocation. Non-biological children may experience discrimination under these 
harsher economic conditions. Second, our inability to identify the reason for the presence of 
a non-biological child within a family may also play a role. The available evidence 
indicates that wealthier households are more likely to host children in order for them to 
attend school (Nhate, 2004). Hence, the bias from mixing together children that are likely 
to be discriminated against (AIDS orphans for example) with children that are not (those 
living with friends or relatives in order to attend school) under a single rubric “non-
biological children” may be substantially more profound in the non-poor sub-set of the 
population. As indicated earlier, the results obtained are likely a lower bound on the 
discrimination against the target group of children. 
 
Unfortunately, AIDS is likely to aggravate the problem over the next five to ten years by 
substantially increasing the number of children requiring care from neighbors, friends, 
and/or relatives due to the death of one or more of their parents. As the overall burden on 
communities grows, few would hypothesize that the tendency for non-biological children to 
reside in better off households would become more pronounced or the degree of 
discrimination against non-biological children would decline. Rather, the inverse seems 
more likely.  
 114
 If one wishes to target some assistance at particularly disadvantaged groups, then children 
living in poor households that are not the biological descendant of the household head, 
especially those that do not attend school or attend school only sporadically, would appear 
to be a logical choice. The results also indicate that the policy of placing orphans in 
families of neighbors, friends or relatives functions less well, in terms of the interests of the 
orphans, than would occur in a world free of discrimination. Further, the policy may 
perform even more poorly as the burden grows. Nevertheless, the result does not 
necessarily imply that the policy should be abandoned. This decision can only be reached 
through comparison with potential substitute policies. While the analysis of potential 
substitute policies merits further attention, the available evidence indicates that attractive 
substitute policies are few to non-existent. Despite discrimination, the current policy may 
be the best available alternative. 
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Abstract 
 
A nationwide household survey for Mozambique (IAF 2002/03) is used to estimate a 
large censored food demand system with 12 food groups for the sample of urban 
households. Using the translog indirect utility approach, the censored nature of the data 
is addressed by estimating a system of Tobit equations with a recently suggested quasi 
maximum likelihood estimator. Augmenting the system with demographic and 
geographical variables in a theoretically consistent way, I find that differences in 
elasticities between regions are significant. The results show that regional variation has 
to be taken into account when evaluating policies or employing CGE models. Further, 
the approach employed here can be applied to a number of developing countries with 
varying geographic conditions. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last ten years Mozambique has enjoyed a good spell of macroeconomic growth 
and – measured by a consumption metric – the level of poverty has fallen steadily from 69 
percent in 1996 to 54 percent in 2002 (MPD, 2004). Other poverty indicators show similar 
improvements. Despite these achievements which had broad geographic coverage 
Mozambique is still a poor country with limited integrated markets and a strong need for 
further poverty reduction policies (Fox et al., 2005). The task of policy formulation is 
complicated by the geography of Mozambique. The two main centres of economic activity 
(Maputo, the capital in the south, and Beira in the central part of the country) are separated 
by more than a 1,000 kilometres. Further to the north of Beira the Zambezi River cuts off 
the northern part of the country and only poor infrastructure link the two parts, limiting 
economic integration. 
 
Detailed knowledge of households’ preference structure is a valuable tool for improving 
policy advice and evaluating the effects of existing policies. Important policy areas where 
such knowledge can improve policy advice span a range from tax reform and transfers to 
public goods provision. In poor countries, such as Mozambique with a per capita income of 
1,300 USD (PPP) in 2005, where the bulk of expenditures are directed towards food 
consumption, studying food demand is important. This is so both as a goal in itself to allow 
policy makers to study the effect of policies directly affecting food demand (i.e. price 
subsidies) and as an essential building block in economy wide models, such as general 
equilibrium models (e.g. Jensen & Tarp, 2004). 
 
Not surprisingly, given the importance of price and income response parameters, 
identifying and estimating these have a long tradition in applied economics. Because price 
variation is inherently necessary for any successful attempt at identifying consumers’ 
responses to price changes, estimation of price and income elasticities in developed 
countries has usually relied on aggregate time series data. Since prices normally vary little 
within developed countries at any given point in time, time series data is essential to 
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identify price variation. However, in developing countries where markets are less integrated 
and transportation is often burdensome in terms of both monetary and time costs, prices can 
be expected to vary considerably between locations. If nationally representative (or 
regionally representative but dispersed) cross sectional household survey data is available 
the price differences between different locations can be exploited to obtain estimates of 
price response parameters. This was first exploited by Deaton (1987) to estimate own and 
cross price elasticities from a cross section of households from Cote d'Ivoire.1 An 
additional benefit from using household survey data is the availability of demographic 
variables at the household level. This makes it possible to (partly) control for household 
heterogeneity in the parameters. In addition, household surveys usually have a sample size 
which permits estimation of a large number of parameters. 
 
This paper attempts to shed light on households’ response to relative price changes in food 
products in urban areas in Mozambique, a geographically weakly integrated country.2 The 
contribution of the present paper is twofold. First, I use the most recent national 
representative household survey conducted in Mozambique in 2002/03 (IAF02) to estimate 
a large complete demand system for 12 food groups augmented with demographic and 
locational variables using the urban household sample. This is done using a translog 
demand system approach. Using survey data at the household level both poses challenges 
and yields benefits. A recurring problem when estimating demand systems using micro data 
is the likely wide presence of households reporting zero consumption of one or more of the 
commodities analyzed. As will be evident, the problem of censoring is severe in the sample 
of urban Mozambican households considered here. Ignoring it would bias our estimates. 
The approach taken in the present paper accounts for censoring by estimating a system of 
Tobit equations as proposed by Yen, Lin and Smallwood (2003). 
 
Second, location dummy variables for households living in the southern, central and 
northern part of the country are utilized in the demand system (together with demographic 
                                                 
1 See Kedir (2005) for a recent application to Ethiopia. 
2 While the majority of Mozambican household reside in rural areas the urban definition applied in this study 
is quite broad covering some 30 percent of the population of households. 
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variables) to focus on differences in elasticities between these regions. In particular, the 
paper investigates to what extent differences are due to preferences (i.e. differences in 
parameters) or whether they are attributable to regional price differences. Given the 
geography of Mozambique, location is likely to be an important determinant of demand 
patterns and elasticities. The results are interesting in themselves and should be a valuable 
input into ongoing efforts at the Mozambican Ministry of Planning and Rural Development 
to construct both national and regional applied general equilibrium models. Further, the 
methodology used here can be applied to other countries where regions differ in geography. 
 
For the purposes of this paper I am fortunate to use a data set which is both nationally 
representative and have a spatial time dimension in the way the data was collected. Because 
it was collected throughout a full year there is ample price variation over and above what 
exists between villages as a result of lack of market integration. Thus, elasticities are 
expected to be estimated with a better precision than is usually obtainable from cross-
sectional data. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2 the data together with some 
descriptive statistics are presented. This is followed by an outline of the methodology 
employed in section 3, while section 4 presents the results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
The data source for this study is the 2002/03 nationally representative household survey of 
Mozambican households (IAF). It contains detailed information on food consumption for a 
random sample of 8,700 households in Mozambique, as well as information on general 
characteristics of the household, daily expenses and consumption from home production, 
possession of durable goods, gifts and transfers received. All aspects of survey 
implementation and a set of summary statistics are available from the National Institute of 
Statistics (INE 2004). The interviewers were in the enumeration area for a week, during 
which three household visits were programmed in order to administer questionnaires and 
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assist households in keeping track of daily consumption. Thus, to the extent it is possible 
food consumption should be very well covered within the survey period. 
 
The survey was designed with an explicit view to be representative in time as well as space. 
Data collection was done over the space of one year divided into quarters. For each sub-
group of the population, the survey was designed to represent, one quarter of the 
households were interviewed in each period. 
 
The geography of Mozambique and the fact that ‘around the year’ price information is 
available should allow sufficient price variation to identify price elasticities with good 
precision. This is an exercise which is often difficult when only cross section data is 
available. It is natural to divide the 11 provinces of Mozambique into three distinct regions; 
south, central and north. The south is made up of the provinces Maputo City, Maputo 
province, Gaza and Inhambane. The provinces of Sofala, Manica, Tete and Zambezia 
constitute the central part of Mozambique. Lastly, the north includes Nampula, Niassa and 
Cabo Delgado.3
 
The food demand system estimated includes all expenditures on food products – divided 
into 11 separate food groups and a residual category; vegetables, maize flour, fish, bread, 
rice, meat, oil & fats, fruits, sugar, beans, other staples and the residual group other foods. 
Other staples consist of cassava and potatoes and the residual group includes beverages, 
spices and meals eaten outside the house. Maize, bread and rice are the main staples of 
Mozambican households in urban areas, with some also consuming cassava and potatoes 
(other staples). As an artefact of the geography of Mozambique fish is also widely 
consumed. Meat is composed of beef, pork and chicken meat. In nutritional terms beans are 
an important protein substitute for meat and fish. Fruits are consumed throughout 
Mozambique. A large component of oil and fats is cooking oil, but a limited number of 
households also consume butter. 
 
                                                 
3 In the following the regions are simply referred to as: south, central and north. 
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To avoid the problems inherent in evaluating the value of home produced goods the scope 
is limited to the urban part of the sample.4 This sample consists of 4,005 urban households 
interviewed in 335 clusters. However, households were removed where the unit price and 
expenditure information looked dubious or were missing, very large households, and 
households which had zero purchases for more than eight goods. Specifically, deleted 
households were those with more than 10 members, households with logarithmic income 
and prices more than four standard deviations from the mean sample value. Unit prices 
were obtained by averaging over all consuming households in each enumeration area. If no 
households in the enumeration area consumed the good the average over households 
interviewed in the same quarter in the same region (north, central or south) was used. Unit 
prices for bundles of goods are obtained by weighting individual good prices with the 
expenditure share. The final sample includes 3,543 households. 
 
The first part of Table 1 presents expenditure shares on the 12 food groups for the south, 
central and the north separately. Expenditure shares clearly differ between regions. 
Vegetables are much more widely consumed in the south, with the highest expenditure 
share there, compared with central and north. On the other hand, maize flour which makes 
up around 24 percent of the budget in the central region is less important in the north and 
only accounts for 3 percent of expenditure in the south. Fish and other staples – mostly 
cassava and potatoes – are the most important food product for households located in the 
north, whereas these food groups are less important elsewhere, although fish is widely 
consumed. In the north sorghum is a significant part of the other staple category. Overall, it 
is clear that there are large regional differences in food consumption patterns which need to 
be accounted for in the estimation. In addition, Table 1 indicates the need for estimating a 
large demand system with many goods when the focus is on regional differences. 
Aggregating some of the categories further risks blurring regional differences in food 
consumption. Thus, the approach of limiting the number of demographic variables in 
favour of more food groups seems warranted. 
                                                 
4 Excluding rural household to some extent limits the usefulness of the elasticity estimates obtained here for 
nationwide policy analysis. However, including rural households would add further complications without 
adding much value to the analysis of regional differences. 
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Table 1. Food consumption for urban Mozambican households. 
South Central North Full Sample 
 
Food group 
Share in total food expenditure 
(%) 
Households  
consuming 
(%) 
Mean expenditure 
share 
(%) 
Vegetables 19.4 10.7 5.3 91.7 11.9 
Maize flour 3.1 23.6 15.5 52.9 13.4 
Fish 11.5 13.2 20.5 90.1 15.2 
Bread 13.0 5.0 3.9 65.9 7.5 
Rice 8.6 9.8 7.0 50.2 8.4 
Meat 9.1 6.6 4.9 33.7 6.9 
Oil & fats 3.6 5.4 2.6 58.8 3.8 
Fruits 12.0 3.9 5.3 83.3 7.3 
Sugar 3.5 3.3 3.4 52.1 3.4 
Beans 3.6 5.7 4.6 54.8 4.6 
Other staples 4.7 6.1 21.1 66.0 10.9 
Other food 8.0 6.5 6.0 72.4 6.8 
No. Obs. (N) 1720 1102 721 3543 3543 
Number of 
goods 
consumed 
Number of household 
consuming 
(full sample) 
Share of household 
consuming (%) 
(full sample) 
 
4 227 6.4  
5 334 9.4  
6 520 14.7  
7 606 17.1  
8 594 16.8  
9 526 14.9  
10 370 10.4  
11 268 7.6  
12 98 2.8  
Source: IAF2002/03. Sample as explained in the main text.  
Note: Shares in columns with the heading ‘Share in total food expenditure’ and ‘Mean expenditure share’ 
may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
 
The two last columns of the both the upper and lower part of Table 1 illustrate the need for 
a censored approach to estimate food demand for urban Mozambican households. While 
two food groups (vegetables and fish) are consumed by more than 90 percent of the 
households, most food groups have a substantial number of households with zero-
purchases. Looking at the second half of Table 1 reveals that only around 3 percent of the 
households consume all 12 goods; again highlighting the relevance of taking zero 
consumption explicitly into account. 
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Apart from the dummy variables for location, south and north (central is the base 
specification), household size is also included as an additional explanatory variable to 
account for economies of scale in food preparation. There are other potential demographic 
variables which could be included, but their inclusion would add limited value to the focus 
of this analysis, and at the same time expand the already large number of parameters to be 
estimated. 
 
Table 2 lists some summary statistics for the demographic and location dummy variables. 
The mode of the distribution of household size is five members, which constitutes 16 
percent of all households. The sample is roughly equally divided between the three 
geographical areas. 
 
Table 2. Sample means of demographic variables.    
Variable Description Mean Min Max 
Household size Household size normalized at the mode of the sample distribution 5.06 1 10 
South Household located in south (omitted category) 0.36 0 1 
Center Household located in center (=1) 0.29 0 1 
North Household located in north (=1) 0.35 0 1 
Source: IAF2002/03. Sample as explained in the main text. 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 The translog demand system 
The theoretical point of departure is the n-good indirect translog demand system proposed 
by Christensen, Jorgensen & Lau (1975)5. The flexible indirect utility function is 
logarithmic quadratic in normalized prices and has the form 
0
1
log ( , ) log 1/ 2 log log
n n n
ji
i ij
i i j
i ppV p x p
x x x
α α γ
=
= + +∑ ∑∑    (1) 
where x, pj is total expenditure and the price of good j, respectively. The unknown 
parameters are 0, iα α  and , , 1,.....,ij i j nγ = . Since all prices are normalized by income, 
homogeneity of degree zero in prices and income is guaranteed. Share equations can be 
obtained by applying a logarithmic version of Roy’s identity 
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The normalisation , ensuring that the budget shares sum to one, has been imposed. 
The theoretical restriction of Slutsky symmetry can be implemented by the restriction 
1
1
n
j
j
α
=
=∑
ij jiγ γ=  for all i,j. Demographic and locational variables are incorporated through the α-
parameters. Specifically, let hz  denote a 1xL vector of household demographic and location 
dummy variables for household h with the elements denoted by hlz . The α-parameters can 
then be specified as 0
1
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5 For recent applications of the indirect translog demand system see Yen, Fang & Su (2004) and Yen, Lin & 
Smallwood (2003). 
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Adding an error term, εi, and denote byΛ the set of all parameters, latent share equations 
can be written in the form  
( , ; ) , 1,.....,i i iw w p x i nε= Λ + = ,  
where  is the deterministic component given by (2). ( , ; )iw p x Λ
3.2 Accounting for censoring 
Without restrictions on the error term the system of latent share equations cannot be a valid 
representation of observed behaviour since nothing constrains the shares to be non-
negative. In particular, if a substantial number of households have zero consumption of 
some goods, the distribution of the error terms should allow for a positive probability of 
observing zero consumption. A number of methods have been proposed to deal with the 
issue of censoring. Wales and Woodland (1983) suggest a Kuhn-Tucker approach, whereby 
a utility function is maximized subject to non-negativity constraints on quantities. Lee and 
Pitt (1986) start from a random indirect utility function and use a dual approach related to 
the literature on rationing based on reservation prices, where demand for all goods depends 
on market prices for positively consumed goods and reservation prices for non-consumed 
goods. Because the rationed quantity is zero it is sometimes possible to solve for 
reservation prices explicitly. While theoretically appealing, these approaches suffer from 
the drawbacks that in the case of many non-consumed goods for some households, 
evaluation of multiple integrals is necessary. Further, as illustrated by Van Soest and 
Kooreman (1990), the issue of coherency of the solution has also to be addressed. Since the 
set of reservation (and market) prices that supports the observed behaviour may not be 
unique. In addition, for some flexible forms neither the Wales and Woodland nor the Lee 
and Pitt approaches are feasible. 
 
An alternative solution, the Amemiya-Tobin approach, is inspired by Amemiya’s (1974) 
multivariate regression with truncated normal distributions. Here the consumer is implicitly 
seen as maximizing a deterministic utility function and deviations from the corresponding 
deterministic shares are interpreted as random errors in the optimization process, 
measurement errors in the shares or random disturbances which influence the consumption 
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decision (Wales and Woodland, 1983). However, like the Kuhn-Tucker approach, the 
implementation of Amemiya-Tobin type estimators is complicated by the need for 
evaluating multiple integrals in cases where censoring is severe. To circumvent the 
computational difficulties involved in the procedures described above, Shonkwiler and Yen 
(1999) suggested a two-step estimation procedure, where a probit regression is run in the 
first step for each equation to determine the pattern of censoring.6 Using the estimated 
parameters in the second step, each latent share equation is augmented so as to take into 
account the censored nature of the data. The augmented system can then be estimated 
consistently with the (transformed) errors being normally distributed. The two-step nature 
of the estimator makes inference complicated by the need to adjust the covariance matrix as 
devised by Murphy and Topel (1985). Even so, the technique has been widely used in 
empirical applications (e.g. Yen, Kan and Su 2002).7
 
In this paper I follow the Amemiya-Tobin approach and specify the system of expenditure 
shares as a system of Tobit equations (see Yen, Lin and Smallwood 2003, Dong, Gould and 
Kaiser 2004, Yen and Lin 2002).8 The method has the advantage of having potential fewer 
parameters for a given number of share equations than for example the two-step approach. 
For the study of regional difference in Mozambique a large (in terms of different food 
groups) demand system is essential in order to avoid that the aggregation of food groups is 
not obscuring possible differences among regions. To overcome the computational burden 
of simulating multiple integrals, a quasi maximum likelihood estimation technique 
recommended by Yen, Lin and Smallwood (2003) is employed. 
 
                                                 
6 Alternatively, a multivariate probit can be run to facilitate cross equation correlation between the errors in 
the censoring mechanism, however, multivariate probit estimation requires evaluation of multiple integrals (or 
simulations hereof). 
7 The three approaches considered here have received much attention. However, other methods have recently 
been suggested in the literature, see Golan, Perloff and Shen (2001) and Perali and Chavas (2000). 
8 This treatment is not entirely innocuous. In particular, the Tobit formulation suffers the well-known 
limitation that the same process determines both the probability of censoring and the size of the expenditure 
share. Thus, a variable is constrained to influence the probability of censoring and the expenditure share in the 
same direction. Even with its drawbacks, this set-up has the advantage of saving on parameters.   
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3.3 Quasi maximum likelihood estimation 
Write the observed shares, , as a system of Tobit equations where joint normality of the 
error term, ε
*
iw
i, is assumed 
* max( ( , ; ) ,0), 1,..,i i iw w p x iε= Λ + = n      (3) 
Even if the adding up condition is imposed on the deterministic shares, it may not hold for 
the observed shares in the model. To overcome this Pudney (1989) suggests treating the 
n’th good as a residual good and then obtain the elasticities from the following identity,9
  . 
1
* *
1
1
n
n i
i
w w
−
=
= −∑
To construct the likelihood function for the n-1 estimated share equations, let the first k 
goods be the ones which are consumed in positive quantities by household h, and partition 
the (n-1)x1 error vector into 
  [ ] [ ]1 2 1 2 1 2 1: , ,.., : , ,...k k k ne e ε ε ε ε ε ε+ + −≡  
and assume they are normally distributed with covariance matrix  
  11
21 22
Σ⎡ ⎤Σ = ⎢ ⎥Σ Σ⎣ ⎦
 
where is a kxk matrix, is a (n-1-k)xk matrix and 11Σ 21Σ 22Σ is a (n-1-k)x(n-1-k) matrix. The 
joint probability density function (pdf) of the errors can be written in terms of the joint 
marginal pdf for the first k errors and the pdf of the last n-1-k errors conditional on the first 
k errors, i.e. 
1 2 1 2 1( , ) ( ) ( | )f e e g e h e e= × . 
where  is the joint marginal pdf for the first k errors, distributed k-dimensional normal 
with zero mean and covariance matrix 
1( )g e
11Σ . The joint pdf of conditional on , , 
can be shown to be (n-1-k)-dimensional normal with mean and covariance matrix given by 
(Greene, 2000) 
2e 1e 2 1( | )h e e
           
1
2.1 21 11 1
1 '
22.1 22 21 11 21
eμ −
−
= Σ Σ
Σ = Σ − Σ Σ Σ
                                                 
9 This has the consequence that the estimated parameters are not invariant to which good is excluded. 
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The likelihood contribution of household h, being in consumption regime c, i.e. where the 
first k goods are consumed, can be stated as  
  
1 2 1( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2 1 1( ) ... ( , ,.., | ) ..
n l lw w w
h
c k k n 1 2 1k k nL g e h u u u e du du du
− + +− Λ − Λ − Λ
+ + − + +
−∞ −∞ −∞
= ∫ ∫ ∫ −  
Using the expressions for the mean and covariance matrix given above, it is possible to 
evaluate the multiple integral as a standard (n-k-1)-dimensional normal pdf. Define the 
indicator function hcI as being one if household h is in consumption regime c and zero 
otherwise. The likelihood function for the sample of N households can now be written as  
        (4) 
1
( ( ))
h
c
N
Ih
c h
h c
L L w
=
=∏∏ Λ
Where  denotes the (n-1)x1 vector of deterministic shares for household h. ( )hw Λ
 
While methods exist to simulate the likelihood function derived above (see Yen, Lin & 
Smallwood (2003) for a simulated maximum likelihood approach), they are 
computationally intensive when the number of non-consumed goods are large for a sizable 
part of the sample, as is the case for the present sample. Instead I adopt the quasi maximum 
likelihood (QML) procedure where the true likelihood function is approximated by linking 
bivariate Tobit models across the equations. More explicitly, the likelihood function given 
by (4) is approximated by multiplying all possible pair-wise combinations of bivariate 
Tobit likelihood functions. Define for household h and equation i and j the normalized 
errors; ( )* ( ) /ih ih i iu w w σ= − Λ  and ( )* ( ) /jh jh ju w w jσ= − Λ  where  is the observed share 
for good i and 
*
ihw
iσ  is the standard deviation of the i’th error term. The likelihood 
contribution from the joint share equations i,j of household h takes the form of a bivariate 
Tobit likelihood function 
  131
    
  
( )
( )
* ** *
* *
* *
( 0, 0)( 0, 0) 1 1
( 0, 0)1 2 1/ 2
( 0, 0)1 2 1/ 2
( , , ) ( , , )
( ) ( ) /(1 )
( ) ( ) /(1 )
ih jhih jh
ih jh
ih jh
I w wI w wh
ij ih jh ij j i ih jh ij
I w w
j jh ih ij jh ij
I w w
i ih jh ij ih ij
L u u u u
u u u
u u u
ρ σ σ ψ ρ
σ φ ρ ρ
σ φ ρ ρ
> >= = − −
= >−
> =−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= Ψ × ×⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤Φ − − ×⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤Φ − −⎣ ⎦
I(.) is an indicator function taking the value one if it evaluates to true, ,φ Φ , are the 
standard normal pdf and standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf), 
respectively. Similar, the bivariate standard normal pdf and cdf are denoted ψ and . The 
quasi likelihood function for the N households over all pair wise bivariate Tobits is given 
by 
Ψ
2 1
1 1 1
N n n
h
ij
h i j i
L
− −
= = = +
=∏∏∏ L         (5) 
Cross-equation parameter restrictions on the demand system are easily accommodated via 
the linking of the pair wise Tobit likelihoods. Estimation proceeds by maximizing (5). The 
parameters obtained are consistent but will be less efficient than full information maximum 
likelihood estimation. In Monte Carlo simulations, Barslund (2006a) shows that the quasi 
maximum likelihood estimator yields parameter estimates very close to those of a 
simulation based full information maximum likelihood method. 
3.4 Elasticities and decomposition of demographic effects 
As pointed out by Lazaridis (2004), in a system of censored demand equations, price and 
expenditure elasticities should take into account not only the direct effect on the latent share 
but also the indirect effect from a possible change in the nature of censoring. The 
unconditional mean of observed shares is given by (Wooldridge 2002) 
 
 [ ] [ ]*( ) ( ) / ( ) ( ) /i i i i i iE w w w w iσ σ φ σ= Φ Λ Λ + Λ       
 
Income and uncompensated price elasticities for the system of equations can be written as 
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( )
1 1 1
*
1 1
ˆˆ ˆ( )
1 ˆ 1
ˆ1 log /
n n n
ij i ij
j i jX
i i n n
i
ij j
i j
w
Ew p x
γ γ
η
γ
= = =
= =
− + Λ ⋅
= Φ ⋅ +
+
∑ ∑∑
∑∑
 and 
( )
1
*
1 1
ˆˆ ˆ( )
1 ˆ
ˆ1 log /
n
ij i kj
M k
ij i ijn n
i
ij j
i j
w
e
Ew p x
γ γ
δ
γ
=
= =
− Λ ⋅
= Φ −
+
∑
∑∑
 
where a hat denotes estimated parameters and ˆˆ ˆ( ) /i i i⎡w σ ⎤Φ ΛΦ = ⎦ ij. ⎣ δ is the kronecker delta 
taking the value one if i=j and zero otherwise. A bar indicates that the logarithm is 
evaluated at the mean price and income for the location and demographic group in question 
and the superscript M denotes uncompensated (Marshallian) elasticities. Compensated price 
elasticities, Cijε , can be calculated using the Slutsky equation , for all 
 
*C X
, 1,..., .i j n=
ij ij i iEwε ε η= +
 
Differences in elasticities between demographic and geographical groups can be obtained 
by utilizing the augmentation of the iα parameter (as described above). Let superscript r 
and a signify a reference and alternative demographic group, respectively, and make the 
convenient normalization of prices and incomes such that ( )log / 0r jp x =  for the reference 
group. The difference in expenditure elasticities for good i is then 
( )
, , , ,
1 1
*, *,
1 1 1
1 1
ˆˆ ˆ( )
1 1ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ( )
ˆ1 log
X r a X r X a
i i i
n n
a
ij i ijn n n
j ir r a
i ij i ij i n nr a aj i ji i
ij j
i j
w
w
Ew Ew p x
η η η
1
/
n
j
γ γ
γ γ
γ
= =
= = =
= =
∂ = −
− + Λ ⋅⎡ ⎤= Φ ⋅ − + Λ ⋅ − Φ ⋅⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ +
=
∑ ∑∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑
     (6) 
Analogous for own- and cross price elasticities. Confidence intervals facilitating statistical 
inference are obtained by the delta method.10
 
It is possible to decompose the elasticity differences into two components; a part stemming 
from demographic price differences and a part due to differences in α  parameters. The 
relative importance of the first part can be judged by taking the difference between the 
                                                 
10 An alternative method to get standard errors for the elasticities and their differences is to use a bootstrap 
approach. However, given the computational burden in estimating the system, this is not feasible here. 
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elasticity for the reference demographic group and the elasticity for the alternative 
demographic group evaluated at the parameters pertaining to the reference group and prices 
for the alternative group. Similarly, the difference associated with differences in α  
parameters is calculated by taking the difference in (6), but with the elasticity for the 
alternative demographic group evaluated at reference group prices. Because the elasticities 
are non-linear the two components will not in general sum to the total difference defined by 
equation 6 above. However, the ratio of the two components will illustrate their relative 
importance in contributing to the total difference. The results will focus on differences in 
elasticities with respect to geographical location, but differences between any two 
demographic groups can be analysed using the framework presented here. 
 
An obvious alternative to analysing regional differences in elasticities would be to estimate 
three models separately and compare the estimated elasticities. An advantage is that it 
would not be necessary to restrict the price response parameters, γij’s, in (2) to be equal 
over regions.11 Although attractive, this would reduce the sample considerably for each 
region and, contrary to the method pursued here, it would not allow for a statistical test of 
difference between the regions.  
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Elasticities for central Mozambique 
All estimations are carried out using household weights provided by the National Statistical 
Office in Mozambique. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the enumeration area, and 
stratification of the sample.12 In total, 188 parameters were estimated. A full list of 
coefficients is relegated to appendix B. 
 
                                                 
11 In principle it is possible to augment each γij in (2) with regional dummy variables but the number of 
parameters to estimate would be unmanageable in practical terms. 
12 All estimations were done in the software package Stata 9.2 using the command qmldemand_tl.ado (see 
appendix A). 
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The reference household considered in the following has five members and comes from the 
central part of the country. I compare the elasticities from this group of households with 
two households with an equal number of members in respectively the south and north of the 
country. Income and all prices are normalised such that the average over the households in 
the reference group is one (i.e. the logarithm of income, prices and prices over income are 
zero). 
 
As expected, a substantial number of parameters are estimated with good precision. In total 
111 of the 188 (56 %) estimated parameters are significant at the five percent level. Of the 
78 price response parameters (γ’s) 35 (45 %) are significant at the five percent level, and 45 
out of 66 estimated covariance parameters (ρ’s and σ’s) are significant. Inclusion of the 
demographic variables is also warranted from the results; 20 out of 33 are significant. All 
but one of the 11 αi0’s are significant at 5 percent. Table 3 shows the size and significance 
of the demographic variables.  
 
Table 3. Size and significance of demographic and geographic variables. 
Equation Household size  South North 
Vegetables 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.078*** 
(0.008) 
-0.063*** 
(0.010) 
Maize flour -0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.296*** 
(0.029) 
-0.041 
(0.026) 
Fish 0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.062*** 
(0.011) 
0.072*** 
(0.015) 
Bread 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.049*** 
(0.011) 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
Rice -0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.049* 
(0.026) 
-0.023 
(0.024) 
Meat 0.011 
(0.008) 
0.043 
(0.026) 
-0.074 
(0.050) 
Oil & fats 0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.056*** 
(0.008) 
-0.040*** 
(0.007) 
Fruits 0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.086*** 
(0.011) 
0.033*** 
(0.008) 
Sugar -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.024*** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
Beans 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.036*** 
(0.010) 
-0.037*** 
(0.012) 
Other staples -0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.010 
(0.021) 
0.132*** 
(0.029) 
Note: 
*, **,*** denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Household size 
normalised at 5 members (the mode of the distribution). That is, effects of household size are calculated 
relative to a household with 5 members. Effects are on the deterministic shares (equation 2).  
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Each column shows the effect from the demographic variable on the deterministic share 
(see equation 2) relative to a reference household.13 Looking horizontally across the table it 
is clear that inclusion of household size and the dummy variables for location is warranted. 
Only the meat food group is unaffected by any of the three variables (none of them enters 
significantly). Focusing on the differences between the central part and the north and south 
of Mozambique the table illustrates some striking differences. For vegetables and fish both 
the north and south dummy variable are significant and with opposite signs, reflecting the 
observations in Table 1 and signifying that there are significant differences in consumption 
shares between the three regions for these food items even when possible price differences 
have been accounted for. The expenditure share for oil and fats, fruits, and beans in the 
north and south is significantly different from the central part of Mozambique, but since 
they have the same sign it is not possible to assess if they also differ between the north and 
south. In the south all other food groups except meat and other staples have significantly 
different expenditure shares relative to the central part. The results listed in Table 3 point in 
the direction of different elasticities between the regions in Mozambique. This is explored 
further below. 
 
The precision with which the coefficients are estimated is expected to carry over to small 
standard errors around the estimated elasticities. Table 4, which shows estimated elasticities 
and their standard errors for a reference household in central Mozambique, confirms this. 
 
Of the 121 estimated price elasticities 52 are significant at the 5 percent level and a further 
11 are significant at the 10 percent level.14 All 11 expenditure elasticities are significantly 
different from zero. However, more interestingly; seven are different from one at the 5 
percent significance level. 
 
 
13 Recall from (3) that an increase in the deterministic share (and as a result the latent share) has two effects; it 
increases the probability of the household consuming the good (non-censoring) and it increases the 
expenditure share given consumption of the good. 
14 Since focus is exclusively on food consumption all elasticities are conditional elasticities and, thus, 
expenditure elasticities are measured with respect to total food expenditures. 
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Looking at the estimated uncompensated own price elasticities, bread, oil and fats, sugar, 
beans, fish, meat and fruits are price elastic – with the first four food groups significantly 
greater than minus one in absolute terms – while fruits, fish and meat have uncompensated 
own prices around minus one. Vegetables and maize flour are both significantly price 
inelastic. While the point estimate for rice and other staples suggest they are price inelastic, 
although the confidence interval is too large to say so significantly. The cross price 
elasticities are generally smaller than own price elasticities in absolute value. However, for 
some goods there are sizeable cross price effects. This is especially valid for maize flour, 
rice, beans and other staples, which all have relatively large and significant cross price 
effects. A majority of food groups are gross complements as is often found in food demand 
studies (see Yen, Lin & Smallwood 2003, Dong, Gould & Kaiser 2004) and the absolute 
size also conforms well to these studies.  
 
Most food groups have one or more gross substitutes except for maize flour and sugar. That 
might be expected given the importance of this ingredient in the food basket for households 
located in the central part of the country, cf. Table 1. Sugar has in general few natural 
substitutes. Notable significant gross substitutes are found between vegetables and bread 
and fish. Fish and beans together with rice and other stables are also gross substitutable. 
There is no evidence of meat and fish being (significant) gross substitutes as might be 
expected by these two important sources of protein. The other main protein source, beans is 
a gross substitute for both fish and meat. 
 
The food expenditure elasticities reveal four food groups, namely vegetables, fish, fruits 
and beans to be necessities and the remaining seven, maize flour, bread, rice, meat, oil and 
fats, sugar and other staples to be luxury food items. As noted earlier seven of these pass 
significance tests (in terms of luxuries and necessities) at five percent. These findings 
conform reasonably well to prior expectations. The fact that maize flour and rice come out 
as luxuries reflect the small incomes which, despite the good economic performance of the 
Mozambique economy recently, many urban families still have to get by on (MPD 2004). It 
is surprising that the category other staples, containing mainly cassava and potatoes, is not a 
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necessity. It might be that the category is so broad that items are used for food variety by 
wealthier households. It also reflects to some extent the choice of the central part of the 
country as the reference location. Table 1 revealed that other staples is a much bigger 
category in the northern part of Mozambique and Table 3 showed a large significant 
coefficient on the northern location dummy for the food category of other staples. 
 
Turning to the compensated price elasticities, these are displayed in Table 5 for 
completeness. The compensated own price effects are all negative and smaller (in absolute 
value) than their uncompensated counterpart as would be expected from demand theory. 
While most food products are gross complements Table 5 shows that if households are 
compensated for price changes most products become net substitutes. 
 
4.2 Regional differences in elasticities  
I now proceed to evaluate the impact of geography on food demand elasticities. As noted 
above for a majority of food groups the dummy variables for location (North and South) are 
significant, and therefore expenditure shares differ between regions once possible relative 
price differences have been accounted for. Thus, given the utility function, the estimated 
parameters can be used for partial welfare analysis of relative price changes and the effects 
are allowed to differ between the demographic groups included in the estimation. However, 
for policy analysis in general and for equilibrium analysis in CGE models in particular, the 
parameters of interest are often the elasticities. It therefore becomes of interest to 
investigate to what extent the share differences carry over to differences in regional 
elasticities and whether these differences are significant. This is pursued here using the 
methodology discussed in section 3.3. 
 
Table 6 shows expenditure and own price elasticities for central and southern Mozambique 
measured for a reference household (i.e. with five household members), their differences 
and the standard error of the differences. The difference is calculated by (6) and associated 
standard errors are obtained by the delta method. 
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 Looking first at expenditure elasticities (the five first columns), note that roughly the same 
goods are necessities and luxuries in both areas – with the exception of beans and possibly 
bread. Neither bread nor beans are estimated with enough precision in the south to reject 
that bread is a luxury and beans a necessity as is the case in central Mozambique. There are 
sizeable differences in elasticities (absolutely greater than 0.1) for maize flour, bread, fruits, 
beans and oil and fats. However, only for bread is the difference significant at 5 percent. In 
the south the point estimate of the expenditure elasticity of maize flour is very high at 2.03 
– but the confidence interval around this estimate is correspondingly large (not shown) 
implying no significant difference between the central and southern estimates. For 
vegetables, meat and fish the differences are small and insignificant. Note though, that the 
point estimates for vegetables still differ with around 6 percent between central and south. 
For maize flour, bread, oil and fats, fruits and beans the point estimates differ with 10 
percent or more, making it clear that policies aimed at or implying price changes for these 
food groups will have different impact in the two regions. 
 
The last two columns of the first part of Table 6 attempt to separate the total differences in 
expenditure elasticities into respectively a price effect and a parameter effect as described 
in section 3.3. Informally, the price effect can be interpreted as the difference that would 
have been observed had the equations been estimated without the location dummy 
variables.15 It is the effect of households being at different points on the same demand 
curve due to price differences alone. Although the two effects do not add to the total 
differences – as expected because of the non-linearities in the system – they nonetheless 
seem sensible in size and direction. As an example take sugar, where the price effect 
suggests that the expenditure elasticity should have been higher in the central than in the 
southern part of the country. The observed difference is negative and to reconcile that with 
the positive price effect the parameter effect must be large and negative relative to the price 
                                                 
15 Estimating the model without location dummy variables would have resulted in another set of parameter 
estimates, possibly, with differences of another magnitude, thus clearly, one has to be cautious in interpreting 
the reported differences. On the other hand as argued in section 3.3, the relative sizes of the price effects and 
the parameter effects still convey useful information as to the source of the observed differences. 
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effect – as is indeed the case. In general the parameter effects are much larger than the price 
effects suggesting that differences in expenditure elasticities are due to differences in 
parameters rather than to differences in prices. For bread and other staples this is not the 
case, though. Here relative price differences play a role. 
 
The second part of Table 6 concentrates on own price elasticities. While the same exercise 
has been done for cross price elasticities only differences in own price elasticities are 
reported to keep the focus and to have a manageable amount of output. Price elastic and 
inelastic food groups do not differ between the two regions. In general the size of the 
differences is smaller than for expenditure elasticities and for fish, rice, meat, fruits, sugar 
and other staples there are virtually no differences between elasticities. However, for two 
food groups, bread and oil and fats, differences are sizeable and significant. For beans the 
difference is small, but estimated with good precision so that the difference in own price 
elasticities is significant at 5 percent. Parameter effects explain most of the differences. 
Only for bread and oil and fats is the magnitude of the price effect non-negligible. Since 
own price elasticities constitute a combined substitution and income (expenditure in the 
terminology here) effect it would be preferable to observe large price effects in the 
differences between own price elasticities where large price effects were observed for 
expenditure elasticities; at least for some goods. This to some extent is the case as 
illustrated by the food groups of bread and oil and fats. However, for maize flour and other 
staples the price effect fail to show up in the differences in own price elasticities. This 
could be because the substitution and income effects cancel out the price effect difference. 
 
To sum up, differences in expenditure and own price elasticities between south and central 
Mozambique are generally small in absolute size. For a few goods, notably vegetables and 
bread, the size and significance of the absolute differences warrant the use of different 
elasticities for the two regions.  
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Table 7 is equivalent to Table 6 and shows differences between central and northern 
Mozambique. Luxuries and necessities do not differ between the two regions – except for 
other staples, where the point estimate shows it to be a necessity in the north. With a point 
estimate of 0.98 and a standard error of 0.13 this is a borderline case. There are sizeable 
differences in expenditure elasticities for oil and fats and other staples (respectively, -0.18 
and 0.20), although the confidence intervals surrounding them are too large to make them 
significant at any level. This to some extent reflects the rather strong data requirement to 
estimate differences with precision. Even when they are not significant the size of the 
differences in point estimates are worth taking into account when analysing regional 
changes in food consumption – whether it is by using different regional expenditure 
elasticities or as part of a sensitivity analysis. The price effect is of relative importance for 
maize flour, meat and beans, whereas to the extent there are differences in expenditure 
elasticities for the other food groups these are driven by parameter effects. As for own price 
elasticities, the size of the differences resemble those found between the central and 
southern part of Mozambique. For maize flour, bread and oil and fats the differences are 
significant. The price effects are small for all food groups and nowhere larger than 0.03 in 
absolute sizes. Except for vegetables (where the total difference is not significant) and oil 
and fats the parameter effects are equally quite small. 
 
  145
5. Conclusion 
Even though Mozambique has managed to reduce poverty considerably during the past 
decade, it is still a poor country where around 50 percent of expenditures are directed 
towards food consumption. Therefore food prices, food demand and nutrition are among 
the key elements when discussing household welfare, and in particular changes herein. 
However, little is known about demand elasticities for core food groups in Mozambique. In 
this paper a large food demand system has been estimated for a nationally representative 
sample of urban Mozambican households. The issue of censoring of the expenditure shares 
has been addressed by a recently suggested maximum likelihood estimator. Because of 
Mozambique’s varied geography and limited economic integration across regions the focus 
is on regional differences. The novel estimates illuminate some interesting differences in 
expenditure shares between demographic and geographic groups. Further, expenditure and 
own price elasticities are presented for respectively northern, central and southern 
Mozambique, and a test for statistical significance between regions is developed. In 
particular for own price elasticities there are significant – both in a statistical and a 
quantitative sense – differences between the central and the south and north of 
Mozambique. Apart from being the first estimates using micro data for Mozambique the 
findings are useful for developers of CGE models with a regional aspect and for the 
evaluation of policies that alter relative food prices.   
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APPENDIX A
QMLdemand_tl: A Stata command to estimate indirect translog demand system using
Quasi Maximum Likelihood (QML)
This appendix documents the Stata command qmldemand_tl, which implement a quasi maxi-
mum likelihood routine for estimating the indirect translog. The censoring is assumed to be of
the multivariate Tobit type. Adding-up is guaranteed by treating the last share as a residual.
The command supports augmenting the parameters with demographic variables. For a more
indept treatment see Barslund, 2006b. The command estimates a system of equations of the
form given in the main text (equation 3) using the QML estimator explained therein (equation
5). Below follows the syntax with examples.
Syntax
The syntax differs slightly from the general syntax for Stata commands. All parameters are
identified from the knowledge of observed expenditure shares (exp_share#), logarithmic prices
(log_p#) and total logarithmic expenditure (log_exp).
qmldemand_x exp_sharel exp_share2 ..... exp_shareM log_p1 logp2 ... logpM log_exp
[weight] [if exp] [in range]
[,alpha(varlist) beta(varlist) first from(matname) robust cluster(varname)
constraints(numlist) maximize_options]
Weights: pweights, fweights, aweights, and iweights are allowed.
Options
alpha(varlist) specifies a list of variables to augment the -parameter. Each variable
specified will increase the number of estimated parameters by the number of
equations minus one.
beta(varlist) (only for qmldemand_ai) specifies a list of variables to augment the -parameter.
Each variable. specified will increase the number of estimated parameters by
the number of equations minus one.
first tells Stata to run an auxiliary system estimation without price response coefficients
(0s) to obtain starting values before running the full system. Useful if no good
initial values are available.
from(matname) specify a matrix of starting values. Options for ml init can be specified
inside the parenthesis. If first is specified, from(matname) relates to starting
values for the auxiliary system estimation without price response coefficients
(see first).
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Other options are normal Stata maximum likelihood options (See Stata Base Reference Man-
ual).
robust specifies that the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used.
cluster(varname) allows non-independent observations within groups (defined by varname).
Observations are independent between groups. Cluster implies robust.
constraint(numlist) specifies a list of linear parameter constraints.
maximize options general ML options available in Stata (see Stata Base Reference Manual).
Examples
qmldemand_tl s_1 s_2 s_3 s_4 s_5 log_p1 log_p2 log_p3 log_p4 log_p5 lnx [aw=hhweight],
alpha(hhsize gender) first cluster(ea)
qmldemand_ai s_1 s_2 s_3 s_4 s_5 log_p1 log_p2 log_p3 log_p4 log_p5 lnx [aw=hhweight],
alpha(hhsize gender) beta(hhsize) from(start, copy) cluster(ea)
Note that all M shares have to be specified, although only M   1 are actually used in the
estimation procedure.
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Abstract
Recently a number of authors have suggested to estimate censored demand systems
as a system of Tobit multivariate equations employing a Quasi Maximum Likelihood
(QML) estimator based on bivariate Tobit models. In this paper I study the e¢ ciency
of this QML estimator relative to the asymptotically more e¢ cient Simulated ML
(SML) estimator in the context of a censored Almost Ideal demand system. Further,
a simpler QML estimator based on the sum of univariate Tobit models is introduced. A
Monte Carlo simulation comparing the three estimators is performed on three di¤erent
sample sizes. The QML estimators perform well in the presence of moderate sized
error correlation coe¢ cients often found in empirical studies. With absolute larger
correlation coe¢ cients, the SML estimator is found to be superior. The paper lends
support to the general use of the QML estimators and points towards the use of simple
etimators for more general censored systems of equations.
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1 Introduction
Analysis of individuals and households consumption patterns and their response to relative
price changes has a long tradition in economics and goes back at least to Engels seminal
work on expenditure shares. Systems of exible functional forms such as the translog and
almost ideal demand systems (Jorgensen et al. 1979, Deaton and Muellbauer 1980) and
the advance of fast computers have made estimation of price response coe¢ cients in large
demand systems with many goods based on household survey data feasible. Hence, a large
literature has grown. However, until recently the problem of censoring of the expenditure
shares (i.e. the minimum consumption share is zero) was largely ignored or only addressed
in systems with a small number of goods (see Wales & Woodland 1983, Lee & Pitt 1986).
To account for censoring a model which allows for a positive probability of observing
zero consumption must be estimated. Thus, whether implicit or explicit, the model should
accommodate a market participation decision and a consumption decision. Further, the
estimation procedure must be capable of accommodating cross-equation restrictions, mak-
ing joint estimation of all equations necessary. If errors are normal and assumed to covary
between the decisions to consume each good, then - with multiple goods not consumed
for some households - the contribution to the likelihood function will require evaluation
of multiple integrals over a multivariate normal density function. As an example, con-
sider the case of a ve good demand system where a non-neglible number of households
only consume two of the ve goods, thus equations for the three non-consumed goods are
censored. For these households part of the likelihood contribution will be the probability
that the three error terms fall within a range consistent with observed censoring of these
three goods. Di¢ culties associated with evaluating multiple integrals over the multivari-
ate normal density function explain why accounting for censoring in applications of large
demand system is rare.
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One way to account for censoring which has been used in the literature is to model the
consumption shares as a multivariate Tobit model (see Yen, Lin and Smallwood 2003), such
that implicitly the participation decision and the consumption decision are determined by
the same process. In the context of demand system estimation two maximum likelihood
based estimators have recently been used to estimate multivariate Tobit systems. Harris
and Shonkwiler (1997) proposed a Quasi Maximum Likelihood (QML) estimator based
on linking bivariate Tobit models to avoid evaluating high dimensional integrals. More
recently Yen, Lin and Smallwood (2003) have used a Simulated Maximum Likelihood
(SML) estimator of a similar system.1 While both estimators are consistent, the SML
estimator is asymptotically more e¢ cient, since it uses more sample information than the
QML estimator. However, the relative performance of the estimators in applications with
empirically relevant sample sizes is unknown.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First - inspired by the idea of linking bi-
variate Tobit models - I introduce a simpler QML estimator based on the maximization of
the sum of univariate Tobit models over all equations. Although the proposed estimator
does not identify the error correlation across equations this is of secondary importance in
a demand system context since error correlations are not used to calculate elasticities or
other quantities of interest. Second, I compare the three estimators using Monte Carlo
simulations in a setup with four simultaneous equations subject to a large degree of cen-
soring. Their performance is assessed in three di¤erent sample sizes with respectively 200,
1,000 and 3,000 observations. The sample sizes are chosen to resemble a small sam-
ple of households (200 observations), a larger sample (1,000 observations) and a typical
1Shonkwiler & Yen (1999) propose a two step estimator where the participation decision is modelled as a
univarite probit on each equation (or alternatively, a multivariate probit over all equations). In the second
step, the equations determining the expenditure shares are augmented to take account of the censoring
and errors are assumed multivariate normal. The estimator is consistent but less e¢ cient relative to the
SML estimator due to the two-step nature. It is not considered in the present work, since it is not suitable
for estimation of Tobit type models.
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(sub)-sample from the World Banks LSMS surveys (3,000 observations).
There are a number of reasons contributing to the relevance of this exercise. First, it is
not evident which estimator is preferable for relatively small sample sizes. Second, even if
the SML estimator is superior, the cost of implementation and the computational burden
associated with simulating the likelihood function might warrant the use of a su¢ ciently
good second best estimator. Third, the SML estimator has di¢ culties converging from
arbitrary starting values and computation time is reduced substantially by using good
starting values possibly obtained from less e¢ cient estimators. Further, the type of QML
estimators used in this paper can be applied to more general systems of censored systems,
i.e. the system suggested by Yen and Lin (2006).
There exist few application specic comparisons of the SML estimator and the bivariate
Tobit QML estimator considered here. Yen, Lin and Smallwood (2003) estimate a large
demand system with both the SML and the bivariate Tobit QML and conclude that the
QML and SML estimator deliver very similar results. In a similar application Yen and
Lin (2002) nd QML and SML estimates to be close and similar. Clearly, since the true
data generating mechanism and parameters are unknown these studies cannot shed light
on the relative performance of the estimators in question.
In the following section the model is outlined together with the three estimators. Sec-
tion 3 describes the Monte Carlo setup, while section 4 presents results.2 Some brief
concluding remarks are o¤ered at the end.
2 Estimation of a multivariate system of Tobit equations
The point of departure is a multivariate generalization of the Tobit model. Denote the
dependent variable by yi; the matrix of explanatory variables by X and the full set of
2While the simulations have been done in the context of estimating an almost ideal demand system
with ve goods (the last good being determined residually as suggested by Pudney (1989), i.e. four
goods/equations estimated), this is not emphasized in the discussion of the results.
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parameters to be estimated by ; then the system of equations (i = 1; ::;M) can be
written (suppressing observation indices)
yi = max (fi (X; ) + "i; 0) ; i = 1; ::;M (1)
where "i is an equation specic error term. Dene the vector of errors " = ["1; ::; "M ] and
allow parametric estimation by assuming multivariate normal errors with zero mean and
covariance : In the context of demand system estimation, yi is the expenditure share on
good i and the functions fi are of some exible form. Note that in applications where
there is no need for cross equation restrictions (1) can be estimated consistently using
a univariate Tobit model equation by equation. However, even in this case e¢ ciency is
gained by estimating all equations jointly as a system.
Simulated Maximum Likelihood estimation
To construct the likelihood function for the system given by (1), let a censoring regime zc
be a 1M vector with entries equal to zero for the censored equations and one for the
non-censored equations. Each observation belongs to a particular censoring regime. Thus,
an observation with the rst k equations non-censored and the remaining censored would
have ones in the rst k entries and zeros for the rest. Call this regime zc and note that
all censoring regimes can be written like this with k equal to the number of non-censored
equations and a suitable reorganization of the equations. That is, no generality is lost. To
develop the likelihood function for the observations belonging to the censoring regime, zc;
partition the error vector and the covariance matrix such that
"  ["1; "2]  ["1; "2; ::; "k : "k+1; "k+2; ::; "M ]
 

11
21 22

where 11 is a k k matrix, 21 is a (M   k) k matrix and 22 is a (M   k) (M   k)
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matrix. Let g("1) be the joint marginal probability density function (pdf) for the rst
k errors. The pdf function for the M errors can be written in terms of g("1) and the
joint marginal pdf of the remaining (M   k) error terms conditional on observing "1;
h("2 j "1):Thus, the joint marginal pdf, f("1; "2); can be written as
f("1; "2)  g("1)  h("2 j "1)
It can be shown that h("2 j "1) is distributed multivariate normal with mean and covariance
matrix given by (Greene 2000)
2:1 = 21
 1
11 "1
22:1 = 22   21 111 
0
21
The contribution to the likelihood function for an observation belonging to censoring
regime zc is then given by
LZc = g(e1)
 fk+1(X;)Z
 1
 fk+2(X;)Z
 1
::
 fM (X;)Z
 1
(M k) (uk+1; uk+2; ::; uM ) @uM ::@uk+2@uk+1
(2)
where g(e1) is the k-variate normal density with zero mean and covariance matrix 11
evaluated at e1 = [y1   f1 (X; ) ; y2   f2 (X; ) ; ::; yk   fk (X; )] : The integration is with
respect to the M   k-variate normal density with mean and covariance given above. To
write the likelihood function for the sample dene the indicator function IZch being one if
observation h is in censoring regime zc and zero otherwise. Since each observation belongs
to only one censoring regime the sample likelihood can be written as
L =
Q
h
Q
zc

Lzch
Izch
The set of censoring regimes includes the two special cases where respectively none and
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all equations are censored. The contributions to the likelihood function are LZc = g(e1)
and
LZc =
 f1(X;)R
 1
 f2(X;)R
 1
::
 fM (X;)R
 1
(M) (u1; u2; ::; uM ) @uM ::@u2@u1; both M-variate nor-
mal density functions having zero mean and covariance :
If for just one observation the number of censored equations exceeds two, a simulation
method has to be relied upon to evaluate the integral in (2). I rely on the GHK (Geweke,
Hajivassiliou and Keane) simulator to evaluate the integrals3.
Quasi Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Although implementation of the SML estimator is feasible in most statistical packages
(such as Stata and Gauss) it is likely to be computationally intensive. In addition without
good starting values obtaining convergence can be di¢ cult. Thus, it is of interest to
explore simpler estimators which allow for cross-equation restrictions and do not require
simulation techniques. Analogous to the literature on multivariate probit models (Avery et
al. 1983) a simple alternative is a QML estimator which maximizes the sum of individual
equation Tobit models (QMLT1). Formally, the QMLT1 estimator maximizes
lnQMLT1 =
X
h
X
i
lnLT1;i (3)
where the subscript T1 indicates that the QML is with respect to the univariate Tobit
model. LT1;i is the Tobit likelihood function for the ith equation and as before h indexes
observations. The estimator is based on maximizing the sum of marginal densities of the
system in (1) and is therefore consistent (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). However, because
the likelihood function in (3) is mis-specied relative to the true likelihood function for the
model in (1), Whites robust standard errors should be used for statistical inference (White,
3The methodology behind the GHK simulator is explained elsewhere and is beyond the scope of the
present paper (see Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou, 1993, and Cappellari and Jenkins, 2006). In practice
the GHK simulator has been shown to work well (Greene 2000).
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1982). The estimator incorporates all equations simultaneously in the procedure so cross
equation restrictions can be imposed. The entries in the covariance matrix outside the
diagonal in the system in (1) are not identied. Hence, the vector of estimated coe¢ cients
has fewer elements than the vector of coe¢ cients from the SML estimator. For demand
system applications where cross equation correlations are not of particular value this is
of minor importance. On the other hand, if the purpose of the QML estimation is to get
starting values for the SML estimator cross equation correlations are valuable in their own
right.
An extension to the approach in (3) which yields estimates of cross equation correlation
coe¢ cients is to estimate a sequence of pair-wise bivariate Tobit models (QMLT2). The
QMLT2 estimator maximizes
lnQMLT2 =
X
h
M 1X
i
MX
j=i+1
lnLT2;(i;j)
T2 indicates that the sequence of likelihood functions are bivariate Tobits. The coe¢ cient
of correlation between the error terms in the ith and jth equations is identied from
the contribution of LT2;(i;j) to the sample quasi likelihood. Thus, this approach yields as
many estimated coe¢ cients as the SML estimator. This last method has recently been
used in a number of studies (see Yen, Lin and Smallwood 2003, Barslund 2006, Lin and
Yen 2002, Harris and Shonkwiler 1997).
3 Monte Carlo simulations
The relative performance of each estimator is explored along two dimensions. First, a
system of four equations is estimated on three di¤erent sample sizes to investigate how
closely their performance is related to sample size. The sample sizes of 1,000 and 3,000 ob-
servations are chosen to resemble empirically relevant samples from typical cross sectional
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data sets. The third sample with 200 observations is employed to look at performance
in a small sample. Second, the e¤ect of the absolute size of the error correlation co-
e¢ cients is examined. In particular, since the QMLT1 estimator ignores cross equation
error correlations its performance should deteriorate as the absolute size of the correlation
coe¢ cients increases. The QMLT2 estimator identies the correlation coe¢ cient via the
bivariate Tobit formulation, but unlike the SML estimator it does not take into account
the complete correlation structure when estimating the pair-wise correlation coe¢ cients.
Overall, the SML estimator should improve relative to the other two estimators when the
correlation between equations increases. I compare the estimators for each sample size
and for two error correlation structures; namely an empirically relevant correlation matrix
(basecorrelations) and a matrix where the base correlations are doubled (largecorre-
lations). For comparison, and using the base correlation matrix, the system of latent
shares is estimated ignoring the issue of censoring and the errors are assumed multivariate
normally distributed. Each scenario consists of 500 simulations.
Monte Carlo setup
The system of equations is based on a censored almost ideal demand system. In the con-
text of an empirical application this corresponds to a ve good system where the last good
is residually determined as suggested by Pudney (1989). Although adding up (expenditure
shares sum to one) is accommodated in this way, parameter restrictions designed to facil-
itate adding up in the latent system of expenditure shares are still imposed. In addition,
in order to see how the estimators perform in the presence of cross equation restrictions,
slutsky symmetry is imposed on latent shares even if the theoretical justication for this
is blurred in censored systems.4 The latent almost ideal demand system has the form
4 In any case, imposing slutsky symmetry in censored demand systems is standard practice in empirical
applications.
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(observation indices suppressed)
wi = i +
M+1P
j=1
ij log pj + i log (x=a(p)) (4)
with log a(p) = 0 +
M+1P
j=1
j log pj + 1=2
M+1P
i=1
M+1P
j=1
ij log pi log pj
Where wi is the latent expenditure share on commodity i: i; i and ij are parameters
to be estimated. Exogenous variables are prices, pi and income/expenditure x. As is
often done in empirical applications, the unidentied parameter 0 is set equal to zero
(Moschini, 1998). The indices i; j denote commodities, thus i; j 2 f1; ::;M + 1g. Adding-
up, slutsky symmetry and homogeneity of the latent shares are ensured by the parameter
restrictions:
M+1P
i=1
i = 1; ij = ji;8i; j and
M+1P
i=1
i = 0:Denoting the full parameter vector
by  the observed shares are given by (equivalent to the system in (1))
wi = max (w

i () + "i; 0) ; i = 1; ::;M
For each scenario the simulations are done in the following steps:
1) Exogenous variables (logarithmic prices and incomes) are drawn from a stan-
dard normal
distribution.
2) Errors are drawn from the specied multivariate normal distribution (cf. be-
low).
3) Latent shares are calculated, errors added, and the observed share is determined
from
the censoring rule.
4) Each estimator is estimated using the observed shares and exogenous variables.
5) Estimates are saved.
Step 2 to 5 are carried out 500 times for each scenario with xed exogenous variables.
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Parameters are chosen such that they are within a range often found in empirical appli-
cations.
Alpha Beta Gamma: Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 4 Eq. 5
Equation 1 0.3 -0.025 -0.06 -0.03 0.05 0.20 0.02
Equation 2 0.25 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Equation 3 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
Equation 4 0.1 0.02 0.20 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02
Equation 5 0.3 -0.015 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01
The values ensure both adding up and slutsky symmetry of the latent shares. The errors
are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with the base error correlation structure
given by:
Standard Probability Correlation matrix (base corr. coef.):
deviation (). censored (%) Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 4
Equation 1 0.6 30.9 1.00 -0.20 -0.15 -0.08
Equation 2 0.5 30.9 -0.20 1.00 -0.15 -0.07
Equation 3 0.4 45.0 -0.15 -0.15 1.00 -0.10
Equation 4 0.3 36.9 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 1.00
The probability of an observation being censored is calculated using that for any given
observation the expected latent expenditure share wi is equal to i since expected loga-
rithmic prices and income are zero (drawn from a standard normal distribution). The base
correlation matrix is chosen to resemble the range of values found in empirical studies.
The average absolute value over the error correlation coe¢ cients is 0.125 with a maximum
absolute value of 0.20. This compares well with the average of 0.083 over absolute corre-
lation coe¢ cients found in Yen, Lin and Smallwood (2003) with only one coe¢ cient out
of 66 being signicantly larger than 0.20. Yen, Fang and Su (2004) report slightly larger
coe¢ cients. The absolute average is 0.118 and 6 out of 45 coe¢ cients are signicantly
larger than 0.20 with a maximum of 0.288. Similarly, Barslund (2006) nds an absolute
average of 0.116 with 5 out of 55 correlation coe¢ cients being signicantly larger than
0.20. The maximum value reported is 0.327. Lastly, Yen and Lin (2002) estimate a three
equation system with the largest correlation coe¢ cient not signicantly larger than 0.20
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and with an average value of 0.136 in absolute terms. Although the absolute size of the
correlation coe¢ cients is application specic, the scenarios with largecorrelations should
provide an upper bound for di¤erences in the estimators likely to be found in empirical
applications.
A nal issue relates to the evaluation of the SML log-likelihood using the GHK simu-
lator. The GHK simulator relies on a specic number, R, of random draws from the unit
interval. Because the accuracy of the GHK simulator relies on the size of R, formally,
the e¢ ciency of the SML estimator hinges on
p
N=R  ! 0, where N is the number of
observations (see Train 2003). The pitfall to avoid in relation to the Monte Carlo sim-
ulation is that the relative performance of the SML versus the QMLT1 and QMLT2 is
not confounded with poor accuracy of the SML estimator due to an inadequate number
of draws when using the GHK simulator. The random draws were generated by Statas
mdraws command (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2006). In practice, the number of draws were
determined following a suggestion by Haan and Uhlendor¤ (2006). They propose to start
by maximizing a simulated log-likelihood function using R equal to N0:55 random draws
and then increase the number of draws until the maximized log-likelihood function stabi-
lizes on a value. For all three sample sizes Halton sequences with R = 84 and antithetic
draws were used (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2006). For the sample of 3,000 observations the
change in the log-likelihood value at R = 84 was below 1=100 of a percentage point. The
change in parameter values was on average less than 1/25 of the di¤erence between the
SML and the QMLT2 estimator.5
5All estimations were done in Stata with seedingof the random generator used for drawing errors so
as to facilitate replicability. Files are available from the author.
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4 Results
To manage the amount of output the discussion of the results will concentrate on di¤er-
ences in the mean squared error (MSE) between the estimators. The performance of the
QML estimators, QMLT1 and QMLT2, is measured relative to the asymptotically more
e¢ cient SML estimator. Table 1 shows the results for the base correlation specication
with a sample of 200 observations.
Columns numbered 2 through 10 show the percentage deviation of the mean over the
500 simulations from the true value and the MSE for each of the estimated parameters for
respectively, the SML, QMLT1, QMLT2, and the non-censored estimator. The deviation
from the mean is reported in order to gorge the biasness in nite samples. As expected
- given the degree of censoring - the non-censored estimator shows a large bias for all
coe¢ cients (column 8). Turning to the three estimators of primary interest, the most
interesting thing coming out of Table 1 is how similar the results are. Looking across
the rows it is clear that the di¤erences between the estimators for both measures are
small. When one estimator performs particularly well with respect to a point estimate of
a coe¢ cient the other two also do well. And similar when coe¢ cients are less precisely
estimated. For an illustration look at the estimated standard deviations for the error term
of equation 1 (1) and 4 (4), respectively. In terms of their MSE, 4 performs well over
all three estimators whereas the opposite is true for 1. Column 10, 11 and 12 summarize
the di¤erences between the coe¢ cient MSEs over the three estimators. Column 10 shows
a comparison of the SML and QMLT2 estimator, where a plus indicates that the SML
has the lowest MSE. Similar for column 11 where the SML is compared to the QMLT1
estimator. Lastly, the QMLT2 and QMLT1 estimators are compared in column 12. Thus,
for all three columns a plus signies that the estimator using the most sample information
performed better. Reecting the resemblance of column 2 to 7 none of the estimators
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perform better than the two others for all coe¢ cients. However, the QMLT2 seems to
have on average slightly lower MSEs than both the SML (minus in column 10) and the
QMLT1 (plus in column 12).
It is of interest to test if the small di¤erences in performance between the estimators
are statistically signicant. For this purpose I perform two-tailed t-tests of equality of
MSEs based on the sample of 500 replications. Signicance levels are indicated in the
three last columns by one, two or three asterisks equivalent to signicance at 10, 5 and
1 percent, respectively. For only one coe¢ cient (1) does the SML estimator perform
signicantly better than the two others, while the QMLT2 does signicantly better than
the SML for ve coe¢ cients and better than the QMLT1 for seven coe¢ cients. In sum,
for small samples with error correlations of empirical relevant size both the QMLT1 and
QMLT2 perform very well.
Table 2 is similar to Table 1, but the sample size is increased to 1,000 observations.
First, note that for the three estimators of primary interest the deviations of the mean for
most estimated coe¢ cients are smaller than in Table 1. This is to be expected from consis-
tent estimators. Contrast that with the biased non-censored estimator, where deviations
from the mean are more or less unchanged between Table 1 and 2. Also the MSEs are
reduced substantially. Regarding the comparison in the last three columns, the SML esti-
mator has lower MSEs for a majority of coe¢ cients than both the QMLT1 and QMLT2
estimators. However, this better performance is not statistically signicant (except for
one coe¢ cient in the comparison between the SML and QMLT1 estimators), again re-
ecting that the coe¢ cient estimates coming from the three estimators are very close for
each simulation. The QMLT2 estimator has lower MSEs for all but two parameters (ve
are signicantly lower) compared with the QMLT1 estimator. In Table 3 the number of
observations is further increased to 3,000 while keeping the same base error correlation
structure. Except for the non-censored estimator the e¤ect on the deviation of the mean
167
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and the MSEs for all estimators are as expected. The great majority of parameters have
means within one percent of the true value and the MSEs have decreased compared to
Table 2. However, the SML estimator is now superior to both QML estimators. Not only
does it perform better for the great majority of parameters (lower MSEs) as indicated
in column 10 and 11 in Table 3, but it is also signicantly better for a small number of
parameters. The QMLT2 does a better job than the QMLT1 estimator (column 12).
The main message from Table 1 to 3 where simulations are done with the base error
correlation structure is that it takes a relatively large sample size before the theoretical
better performance of the SML estimator shows up. Even then the gains from employing
the SML estimator are small. In particular, it is clear that both QML estimators pro-
vide very accurate approximations of the SML estimator for the sample sizes examined
here, although only the QMLT2 estimator yields error correlation estimates. To illustrate
the last point consider the di¤erence in individual point estimates between the SML and
QMLT1 estimators for the 500 simulations with 3,000 observations. The two estimators
have 22 parameters in common since the QMLT1 estimator does not identify error corre-
lations. For 13 of the 22 parameters the QMLT1 estimator is never more than 5 percent
worse than the SML estimator. For the remaining parameters, more than 85 of the 500
point estimates are not more than 5 percent further from the true value than the SML
estimator. The only exception being 22 where only 71 percent lies within this criterion.
Table 4 to 6 are analogous to table 1, 2 and 3, but with the correlation matrix mul-
tiplied by two (large correlations). The non-censored estimator is not included since
the results above showed it to be clearly biased. Although all three tables are presented
for completeness, table 4 with 200 observations provides a clear case of how the results
di¤er between the two sets of tables. With the absolute larger correlation coe¢ cients the
SML estimator is superior to both the QMLT2 and the QMLT1 estimators with very few
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(ve) MSEs larger than those for the two QML estimators. Further, signicant di¤erences
show up for a substantial number of coe¢ cients. Similarly, the QMLT2 estimator, which
takes error correlations into account, performs much better than the QMLT1 estimator
that does not. In table 5 with 1,000 observations this is even more evident. The major-
ity of parameters show the SML estimator to be signicantly better performing than the
two other estimators, whereas the same is the case for the QMLT2 versus the QMLT1
estimator. The picture is the same in table 6 where the simulations are done on 3,000
observations.
Table 4, 5 and 6 show, that with larger correlation coe¢ cients there are signicant
gains from using more sophisticated estimators and that the gains are apparent at all
sample sizes analyzed here. Since it is often di¢ cult to have a prior opinion on the size
of the correlation coe¢ cients for a given application, one recommendation would be to
rst apply the QMLT2 estimator to assess the size of the correlation coe¢ cients before
considering to go on with the SML estimator. In that case, the QMLT2 provides some
very accurate starting values.
5 Concluding remarks
The results in this paper indicate that there is very little to gain from using a SML
estimator compared to the two simpler QML estimators investigated here, if the absolute
size of the error correlation coe¢ cients is of the same magnitude as usually found in
empirical studies. However, the error correlation structure can not be known prior to an
application, and if these are large in absolute value there will be gains from using the
asymptotically better SML estimator. In this case both QML estimators provide good
starting values for the SML estimator; something which is useful in the cause of achieving
convergence of the maximum likelihood routine.
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Even if Monte Carlo simulations are subject to the problem of specicity which makes
broad generalizations of the results di¢ cult, this study has shown that for moderate sample
sizes most commonly found in empirical applications simple QML estimators perform
surprisingly well. The results herein also suggest that QML estimators of a similar type
to those presented here might be useful in more general systems of censored equations.
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